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John Cook
February 27th 04, 10:36 AM
Hi all


Just saw this and it peaked my interest..

"The New Air Superiority Benchmark

Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.

It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
fighter in history.

But that is history now!

Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
future."

http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;threadid=445


Cheers

Glenn P.
February 27th 04, 05:09 PM
John Cook wrote:
> The Typhoon crew did
> not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one

That's quite a trick. Were they using their standard sidearms for this?

Harry Andreas
February 27th 04, 05:26 PM
In article >, John Cook
> wrote:

> Hi all
>
>
> Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>
> "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>
> Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.

Bit of hyperbole there.
The author lumps the E and C models together.
Wake me when the Eurofighter trumps the C.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Tarver Engineering
February 27th 04, 06:30 PM
"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, John Cook
> > wrote:
>
> > Hi all
> >
> >
> > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> >
> > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> >
> > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>
> Bit of hyperbole there.
> The author lumps the E and C models together.
> Wake me when the Eurofighter trumps the C.

If the F-35C is that good, it is one more nail in the F-22's coffin.

Scott Ferrin
February 27th 04, 07:45 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:30:18 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
>> In article >, John Cook
>> > wrote:
>>
>> > Hi all
>> >
>> >
>> > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>> >
>> > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>> >
>> > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
>> > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
>> > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
>> > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
>> > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
>> > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
>> > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
>> > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
>> > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
>> > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
>> > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>>
>> Bit of hyperbole there.
>> The author lumps the E and C models together.
>> Wake me when the Eurofighter trumps the C.
>
>If the F-35C is that good, it is one more nail in the F-22's coffin.
>


Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of the
F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over the
line into raving obsession.

Tarver Engineering
February 27th 04, 07:47 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:30:18 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In article >, John Cook
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> > Hi all
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> >> >
> >> > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> >> >
> >> > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> >> > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> >> > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> >> > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> >> > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> >> > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> >> > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> >> > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> >> > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on
the
> >> > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> >> > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
> >>
> >> Bit of hyperbole there.
> >> The author lumps the E and C models together.
> >> Wake me when the Eurofighter trumps the C.
> >
> >If the F-35C is that good, it is one more nail in the F-22's coffin.

> Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of the
> F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over the
> line into raving obsession.

Celebration, Scotty.

You were wrong all along.

Ed Rasimus
February 27th 04, 07:57 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:36:33 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

>Hi all
>
>
>Just saw this and it peaked my interest..

You mean "piqued", but I digress.
>
>"The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>
>Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
>undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
>crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
>scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
>were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
>when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
>belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
>experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
>not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
>F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
>afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.

---rest of drivel snipped---

First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
"first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
"ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."

You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.
You've described a WVR engagement and don't acknowledge that the
standard Eagle tactics would have been to long range radar shoot in
the face, then intermediate range IR shoot in the face, then blast
through with guns if the kill was not complete.

The Eurofighters wouldn't have engaged in a turn/burn WVR engagement
and the Eagles would not have been in a "fighting wing" or closer
formation so that the Eurofighters could "comfortably gun" the
trailing one.

In other words, the entire report is pathetically bogus and written by
someone without the first clue of air/air engagement or training.

I'm not demeaning either the Eurofighter or the RAF, but there is no
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this report regarding
superiority of the one or demise of the other.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Krztalizer
February 27th 04, 08:16 PM
Reminds me of the "shocking" 'loss' between the USN and the IAF that was
reported here a year or so back.

Ian
February 27th 04, 09:04 PM
"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:36:33 +1100, John Cook >
> wrote:
>
> >Hi all
> >
> >
> >Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>
> You mean "piqued", but I digress.
> >
> >"The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> >
> >Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> >undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> >crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> >scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> >were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> >when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> >belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> >experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> >not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> >F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> >afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>
> ---rest of drivel snipped---
>
> First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
> "first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
> learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
> Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
> quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
> engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
> "ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."
>
> You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.

Violation on whose part?

Ed Rasimus
February 27th 04, 09:28 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:04:47 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
>> "first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
>> learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
>> Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
>> quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
>> engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
>> "ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."
>>
>> You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.
>
>Violation on whose part?
>

I can't speak for the RAF, but their regs are remarkably similar to
USAF's. It would be a violation to conduct an unbriefed DACT
engagement. Spontanous "bouncing" goes on, but it isn't condoned.

There's no point in doing it. It doesn't meet any training objectives,
it isn't controlled, it is downright dangerous and without pre-briefed
ROE proves nothing.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Scott Ferrin
February 27th 04, 09:51 PM
>> Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of the
>> F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over the
>> line into raving obsession.
>
>Celebration, Scotty.
>
>You were wrong all along.

Maybe you'll prove it by posting some pictures of those strakes.

Tarver Engineering
February 27th 04, 09:53 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of the
> >> F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over the
> >> line into raving obsession.
> >
> >Celebration, Scotty.
> >
> >You were wrong all along.
>
> Maybe you'll prove it by posting some pictures of those strakes.

Why?

With you batting zero here at ram, you lack the credibility to even question
me.

Scott Ferrin
February 27th 04, 09:53 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 14:28:40 -0700, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:04:47 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:
>
>>
>>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>>>
>>> First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
>>> "first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
>>> learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
>>> Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
>>> quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
>>> engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
>>> "ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."
>>>
>>> You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.
>>
>>Violation on whose part?
>>
>
>I can't speak for the RAF, but their regs are remarkably similar to
>USAF's. It would be a violation to conduct an unbriefed DACT
>engagement. Spontanous "bouncing" goes on, but it isn't condoned.
>
>There's no point in doing it. It doesn't meet any training objectives,
>it isn't controlled, it is downright dangerous and without pre-briefed
>ROE proves nothing.
>
>
>
>Ed Rasimus
>Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>"When Thunder Rolled"
>Smithsonian Institution Press
>ISBN #1-58834-103-8


Not to mention if you bust something while doing it you might be in
hot water? :-)

Ian
February 27th 04, 10:18 PM
"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:04:47 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>
> >> First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
> >> "first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
> >> learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
> >> Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
> >> quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
> >> engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
> >> "ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."
> >>
> >> You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.
> >
> >Violation on whose part?
> >
>
> I can't speak for the RAF, but their regs are remarkably similar to
> USAF's. It would be a violation to conduct an unbriefed DACT
> engagement. Spontanous "bouncing" goes on, but it isn't condoned.
>
> There's no point in doing it. It doesn't meet any training objectives,
> it isn't controlled, it is downright dangerous and without pre-briefed
> ROE proves nothing.
>
Not that I'm trying to condone it, but it did occur in one of the low flying
areas, where such bouncing happens all the time. The rumour round work was
that the F15s (and we were told by the Typhoon pilot they were e's) had been
following on previous sorties, and and made a bit of radio contact, leading
to the 'incident' in question.

Ed Rasimus
February 27th 04, 10:18 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:53:39 GMT, Scott Ferrin >
wrote:

>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 14:28:40 -0700, Ed Rasimus
>>
>>There's no point in doing it. It doesn't meet any training objectives,
>>it isn't controlled, it is downright dangerous and without pre-briefed
>>ROE proves nothing.
>>
>
>Not to mention if you bust something while doing it you might be in
>hot water? :-)

Actually, for most operating area around Great Britain, it would be
COLD water--very cold water.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

BUFDRVR
February 27th 04, 10:42 PM
>Not to mention if you bust something while doing it you might be in
>hot water? :-)
>

I think "hot water" is an understatement.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Scott Ferrin
February 27th 04, 11:13 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 13:53:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of the
>> >> F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over the
>> >> line into raving obsession.
>> >
>> >Celebration, Scotty.
>> >
>> >You were wrong all along.
>>
>> Maybe you'll prove it by posting some pictures of those strakes.
>
>Why?
>
>With you batting zero here at ram, you lack the credibility to even question
>me.
>


LOL The doc needs to change your meds. Either that or you need to
put down the crack pipe.

John Cook
February 27th 04, 11:18 PM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 12:57:58 -0700, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:36:33 +1100, John Cook >
>wrote:
>
>>Hi all
>>
>>
>>Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>
>You mean "piqued", but I digress.

I guess your right, but my interest was 'peaked' as well:-).

>>
>>"The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>>
>>Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
>>undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
>>crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
>>scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
>>were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
>>when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
>>belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
>>experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
>>not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
>>F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
>>afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>
>---rest of drivel snipped---
>
>First, lets examine the reported incident. Two Eurofighters on a
>"first RAF formation training flight"--so they are cruising around
>learning how to fly their airplane. Are "bounced" by a pair of Mud
>Hens (not the air superiority variant of the F-15, although arguably
>quite capable.) The two RAF aircraft break off their training and
>engage in an unbriefed, unauthorized hassle with the Eagles, and
>"ended up on the F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one...."
>
>You've described a violation of training and safety regulations.
>You've described a WVR engagement and don't acknowledge that the
>standard Eagle tactics would have been to long range radar shoot in
>the face, then intermediate range IR shoot in the face, then blast
>through with guns if the kill was not complete.
>
>The Eurofighters wouldn't have engaged in a turn/burn WVR engagement
>and the Eagles would not have been in a "fighting wing" or closer
>formation so that the Eurofighters could "comfortably gun" the
>trailing one.
>
>In other words, the entire report is pathetically bogus and written by
>someone without the first clue of air/air engagement or training.

The comments are reportedly from Archie Neill (One of the BAE pilots
who instructs the Case White RAF pilots)

"PS Shot the sh*t out of a couple of F15s yesterday. Our first
formation teach sortie (2 ship). Battle formation, 1nm Northwest of
Windermere, bounced from the 8 o'clock. Two rapid counters and we were
saddled up in their 6, comfortably gunning the trailer, who was in
full burner in wing-rock wondering what happened.

I love this aircraft. Look out world Typhoon is coming!"

Anyone who hears what the F-15 pilots thought, do tell!

See the thread on PPrune here.


http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=f3e487d8fe4ffb0deaaf6cc838c7b874&threadid=120595

or here
http://www.eurofighter.starstreak.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=827




>I'm not demeaning either the Eurofighter or the RAF, but there is no
>reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this report regarding
>superiority of the one or demise of the other.

Probabley not, but its fun non the less

>
>
>Ed Rasimus
>Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>"When Thunder Rolled"
>Smithsonian Institution Press
>ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Tarver Engineering
February 27th 04, 11:45 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 13:53:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>
> >> >> Well, keep hoping. You really ought to get your burning hatred of
the
> >> >> F-22 checked out by a mental health professional. You're FAR over
the
> >> >> line into raving obsession.
> >> >
> >> >Celebration, Scotty.
> >> >
> >> >You were wrong all along.
> >>
> >> Maybe you'll prove it by posting some pictures of those strakes.
> >
> >Why?
> >
> >With you batting zero here at ram, you lack the credibility to even
question
> >me.

> LOL The doc needs to change your meds. Either that or you need to
> put down the crack pipe.

Cease your projection, little kook troll.

Peter Stickney
February 28th 04, 02:43 AM
In article >,
Ed Rasimus > writes:
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:53:39 GMT, Scott Ferrin >
> wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 14:28:40 -0700, Ed Rasimus
>>>
>>>There's no point in doing it. It doesn't meet any training objectives,
>>>it isn't controlled, it is downright dangerous and without pre-briefed
>>>ROE proves nothing.
>>>
>>
>>Not to mention if you bust something while doing it you might be in
>>hot water? :-)
>
> Actually, for most operating area around Great Britain, it would be
> COLD water--very cold water.

And, IIRC, they can take it out of your pay, as well.
Let;s see... A Captain makes - <munble-froz> and a Beagle costs
<unguzza-wuuzza> carry the 3... That gives you an ETS date of
something like 3006.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

John Cook
February 28th 04, 02:50 AM
<snipped petty sniping and name calling>

Hey boys!!!! how about a cease fire, I'm sure your both right!!.

so if you just want to call each other names, or question each others
sexualality/virility/intellegence/expertise/(insert any measure of
ones worth)... Can you please email each other with the lovey dovey
stuff..

Go on.... try behaving like adults just for a while.... you might get
to like it, and the rest of us will not have to wade through several
dozen post with **** poor one line insults..

Thanks in anticipation




>> >> >> line into raving obsession.
>> >> >
>> >> >Celebration, Scotty.
>> >> >
>> >> >You were wrong all along.
>> >>
>> >> Maybe you'll prove it by posting some pictures of those strakes.
>> >
>> >Why?
>> >
>> >With you batting zero here at ram, you lack the credibility to even
>question
>> >me.
>
>> LOL The doc needs to change your meds. Either that or you need to
>> put down the crack pipe.
>
>Cease your projection, little kook troll.
>

t_mark
February 28th 04, 03:30 AM
> I love this aircraft. Look out world Typhoon is coming!"

This strikes me as very much like the people who love the sports teams who
beat the teams they dislike, even when having no affiliation with either. I
imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when 22s are
'trouncing' the rest.

Rick Folkers
February 28th 04, 04:01 AM
Correct me if I am wrong but I thought that the Brits made the decision to
save
money and not fit the 27MM mauser in the Typhoon. Wonder what they shot
the 15's with? did they have cameras?


"John Cook" > wrote in message
...
> Hi all
>
>
> Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>
> "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>
> Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>
> It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
> result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
> mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
> losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
> knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
> understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
> the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
> first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
> combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
> fighter in history.
>
> But that is history now!
>
> Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
> District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
> the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
> been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
> of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
> they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
> evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
> level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
> against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
> that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
> right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
> future."
>
>
http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;threadid=445
>
>
> Cheers
>
>

John Cook
February 28th 04, 04:05 AM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:30:34 -0600, "t_mark" > wrote:

>> I love this aircraft. Look out world Typhoon is coming!"
>
>This strikes me as very much like the people who love the sports teams who
>beat the teams they dislike, even when having no affiliation with either. I
>imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when 22s are
>'trouncing' the rest.
>

Hmmm.. is that the 22 x F-22's ;-), you know its changing from a
silver bullet force to a Golden BB force..

I would imaging you'll hear it quite often as the very very few F-22
won't have time to play games.

Whats the latest? is it sub 200 yet?.

I imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when
UCAV's are 'trouncing' the rest.

Cheers

John Cook
February 28th 04, 04:10 AM
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 22:01:09 -0600, "Rick Folkers" >
wrote:

>Correct me if I am wrong but I thought that the Brits made the decision to
>save
>money and not fit the 27MM mauser in the Typhoon. Wonder what they shot
>the 15's with? did they have cameras?

The first 55 RAF Typhoons will have the Cannon, The next tranches for
the RAF may have it, officially its been dropped!!, but some people
in the know seem to think differently.....

Wait for the tranche 2 negotiations to conclude within (if the
present rumours are true) the next 3-6 months.

Cheers

Mike Zaharis
February 28th 04, 05:17 AM
John Cook wrote:

> Hi all
>
> Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
>
> "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
>
> Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
>
> It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
> result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
> mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
> losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
> knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
> understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
> the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
> first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
> combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
> fighter in history.
>
> But that is history now!
>
> Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
> District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
> the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
> been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
> of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
> they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
> evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
> level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
> against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
> that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
> right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
> future."
>
> http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;threadid=445
>
> Cheers

Usually, F-15E's carry Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs). These are not often removed, as it's
a hassle, and for Strike Eagle missions, the range/weapons carriage is worth more than
the loss in maneuverability. These would have seriously compromised the ACM capabilities
of the F-15Es in the incident discussed.

This is not to say that the Eurofighter does or does not have an advantage over the F-15E
in ACM, just that this incident tells one very little, without knowing how the aircraft
were outfitted.

Does anyone know if the F-15Es in this scenario were carrying CFTs?

Ian
February 28th 04, 08:32 AM
"Mike Zaharis" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> John Cook wrote:
>
> > Hi all
> >
> > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> >
> > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> >
> > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
> >
> > It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
> > result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
> > mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
> > losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
> > knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
> > understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
> > the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
> > first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
> > combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
> > fighter in history.
> >
> > But that is history now!
> >
> > Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
> > District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
> > the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
> > been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
> > of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
> > they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
> > evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
> > level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
> > against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
> > that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
> > right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
> > future."
> >
> >
http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;thr
eadid=445
> >
> > Cheers
>
> Usually, F-15E's carry Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs). These are not often
removed, as it's
> a hassle, and for Strike Eagle missions, the range/weapons carriage is
worth more than
> the loss in maneuverability. These would have seriously compromised the
ACM capabilities
> of the F-15Es in the incident discussed.
>
> This is not to say that the Eurofighter does or does not have an advantage
over the F-15E
> in ACM, just that this incident tells one very little, without knowing how
the aircraft
> were outfitted.
>
> Does anyone know if the F-15Es in this scenario were carrying CFTs?

The pictures I've seen of the F15 don't (obviously at least) show any CFTs.

Paul J. Adam
February 28th 04, 08:56 AM
In message >, Krztalizer
> writes
>Reminds me of the "shocking" 'loss' between the USN and the IAF that was
>reported here a year or so back.

Or Jeff Ethell reporting how the Chilean Air Force beat a US Navy
carrier group 56-20. You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
exercise before drawing too many conclusions.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

John Cook
February 28th 04, 10:46 AM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 08:56:09 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>In message >, Krztalizer
> writes
>>Reminds me of the "shocking" 'loss' between the USN and the IAF that was
>>reported here a year or so back.
>
>Or Jeff Ethell reporting how the Chilean Air Force beat a US Navy
>carrier group 56-20. You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
>exercise before drawing too many conclusions.


I've emailed the 48th TFW for an answer..

as below:-

"Could you please help me with some information in regard to an
incident on Thursday the 19th of February 2004 over the skies of
Windermere, it is reported that Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es appaerently
belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW.


Could you please give me some background information on this incident.


Firstly Did this happen?, and If so
1. Was it an preplanned exercise?.
2. Which aircraft from the 48th were involved.
3. What was their loadout, eg Conformal fuel tanks, weapons.
4. what happend?.

Many thanks"


now its wait n see

cheers

R.J. Goldstein
February 28th 04, 10:52 AM
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

>In message >, Krztalizer
> writes
>>Reminds me of the "shocking" 'loss' between the USN and the IAF that was
>>reported here a year or so back.
>
>Or Jeff Ethell reporting how the Chilean Air Force beat a US Navy
>carrier group 56-20. You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
>exercise before drawing too many conclusions.

Always the whining excuses.

Rod

Grantland
February 28th 04, 10:59 AM
"Rick Folkers" > wrote:

>Correct me if I am wrong but I thought that the Brits made the decision to
>save
>money and not fit the 27MM mauser in the Typhoon. Wonder what they shot
>the 15's with? did they have cameras?

They squirted them with BSE-foam, and then went into a paroxysm of
maniacal laughter and frenzied mutual high-fiving.

Grantland

Brett
February 28th 04, 11:00 AM
"John Cook" > wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 22:01:09 -0600, "Rick Folkers" >
> wrote:
>
> >Correct me if I am wrong but I thought that the Brits made the decision
to
> >save
> >money and not fit the 27MM mauser in the Typhoon. Wonder what they shot
> >the 15's with? did they have cameras?
>
> The first 55 RAF Typhoons will have the Cannon,

Only as ballast based on the current Government requirements.

> The next tranches for
> the RAF may have it, officially its been dropped!!, but some people
> in the know seem to think differently.....

As ballast based on the current Government requirements.

> Wait for the tranche 2 negotiations to conclude within (if the
> present rumours are true) the next 3-6 months.

It will probably still be ballast because it will still be too expensive to
actually remove it from the design.

Stephen Harding
February 28th 04, 12:35 PM
Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:36:33 +1100, John Cook >
> wrote:

>>"The New Air Superiority Benchmark
[snip]

[snip]
> In other words, the entire report is pathetically bogus and written by
> someone without the first clue of air/air engagement or training.
>
> I'm not demeaning either the Eurofighter or the RAF, but there is no
> reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this report regarding
> superiority of the one or demise of the other.

Actually, the conclusion is quite simple. This is a report
that has been mislaid since December 1942.

The "fight" occurred when rowdy, young USAAF pilots, flying
their P-47 Thunderbolts were feeling their oats and bounced
some RAF Spitfires.

It was pretty clear that the P-47, and the 8th AF in general,
wasn't going to amount to much.


SMH

BUFDRVR
February 28th 04, 01:38 PM
>The comments are reportedly from Archie Neill (One of the BAE pilots
>who instructs the Case White RAF pilots)

I don't want to disparage Mr. Neill, however, it would be in his own interest
for this incident to have occured no?

I still doubt there's any truth to it and my opinion isn't based on anything
more than my belief that the 4 F-15E crewmembers would not have been acting so
dangerously in willful disregard of regulations.




BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 05:54 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 13:50:10 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

><snipped petty sniping and name calling>
>
>Hey boys!!!! how about a cease fire, I'm sure your both right!!.
>
>so if you just want to call each other names, or question each others
>sexualality/virility/intellegence/expertise/(insert any measure of
>ones worth)... Can you please email each other with the lovey dovey
>stuff..
>
>Go on.... try behaving like adults just for a while.... you might get
>to like it, and the rest of us will not have to wade through several
>dozen post with **** poor one line insults..
>
>Thanks in anticipation

Are you saying you've never had to deal with Tarver?

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 05:58 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

> Are you saying you've never had to deal with Tarver?

No, he is doing the same thing I am in asking trolls like yourself to cease
your childishness. The cut and paste trolls have already reformed. I know
you won't do it for me, but think of the talent ram could draw without your
participation, Ferrin.

Ron
February 28th 04, 06:06 PM
>Or Jeff Ethell reporting how the Chilean Air Force beat a US Navy
>carrier group 56-20. You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
>exercise before drawing too many conclusions.
>

The Chileans F-16s are very formidable fighters, especially in a knifefight.

Well depending on how recent that was, the Chileans might have had their F-16C,
helmet mounted sight, Python4 AAM, and it makes it prettty frustrating at the
merge, when all the Chilean pilot has to do it look at you, and you can
consider yourself "morted"


Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 06:07 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 09:58:02 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Are you saying you've never had to deal with Tarver?
>
>No, he is doing the same thing I am in asking trolls like yourself to cease
>your childishness. The cut and paste trolls have already reformed. I know
>you won't do it for me, but think of the talent ram could draw without your
>participation, Ferrin.


That's the pot calling the kettle black.

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 06:10 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 09:58:02 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> Are you saying you've never had to deal with Tarver?
> >
> >No, he is doing the same thing I am in asking trolls like yourself to
cease
> >your childishness. The cut and paste trolls have already reformed. I
know
> >you won't do it for me, but think of the talent ram could draw without
your
> >participation, Ferrin.
>
>
> That's the pot calling the kettle black.

I am an aircraft systems engineer with a body of work that is widely tabbed
to in aviation.

What do you bring to ram, Ferrin? Reform, or get out.

John Doe
February 28th 04, 06:14 PM
"Mike Zaharis" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> John Cook wrote:
>
> > Hi all
> >
> > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> >
> > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> >
> > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
> >
> > It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
> > result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
> > mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
> > losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
> > knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
> > understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
> > the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
> > first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
> > combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
> > fighter in history.
> >
> > But that is history now!
> >
> > Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
> > District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
> > the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
> > been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
> > of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
> > they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
> > evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
> > level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
> > against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
> > that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
> > right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
> > future."
> >
> >
http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;threadid=445
> >
> > Cheers
>
> Usually, F-15E's carry Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs). These are not often
removed, as it's
> a hassle, and for Strike Eagle missions, the range/weapons carriage is
worth more than
> the loss in maneuverability. These would have seriously compromised the
ACM capabilities
> of the F-15Es in the incident discussed.
>
> This is not to say that the Eurofighter does or does not have an advantage
over the F-15E
> in ACM, just that this incident tells one very little, without knowing how
the aircraft
> were outfitted.
>
> Does anyone know if the F-15Es in this scenario were carrying CFTs?
>

Yes. ALL F-15Es from the 48th FW at Lakenheath carry CFTs. If they were in
the Lake District, then they also had external fuel tanks. Hardly a BFM/ACM
configuration.

Wake me when they do a planned training sortie with the C models from
Lakenheath.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 06:16 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 10:10:21 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 09:58:02 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >
>> >> Are you saying you've never had to deal with Tarver?
>> >
>> >No, he is doing the same thing I am in asking trolls like yourself to
>cease
>> >your childishness. The cut and paste trolls have already reformed. I
>know
>> >you won't do it for me, but think of the talent ram could draw without
>your
>> >participation, Ferrin.
>>
>>
>> That's the pot calling the kettle black.
>
>I am an aircraft systems engineer with a body of work that is widely tabbed
>to in aviation.

Well you can pretend to be whatever you like but the only person
you're fooling is yourself. Maybe you do actually push a broom at an
aircraft plant somewhere but nobody cares. 95% of what you say is
worthless if not outright laughable and the rest is insults directed
at those who know you're full of ****.


>
>What do you bring to ram, Ferrin? Reform, or get out.

Those who live in glass houses. . .

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 06:20 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

> Well you can pretend to be whatever you like but the only person
> you're fooling is yourself. Maybe you do actually push a broom at an
> aircraft plant somewhere but nobody cares. 95% of what you say is
> worthless if not outright laughable and the rest is insults directed
> at those who know you're full of ****.

Don't allow your own delusions be your whole world, Ferrin.

What I wrote about myself is completely true.

What do you bring to ram, Ferrin?

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 06:42 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 10:20:42 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Well you can pretend to be whatever you like but the only person
>> you're fooling is yourself. Maybe you do actually push a broom at an
>> aircraft plant somewhere but nobody cares. 95% of what you say is
>> worthless if not outright laughable and the rest is insults directed
>> at those who know you're full of ****.
>
>Don't allow your own delusions be your whole world, Ferrin.
>
>What I wrote about myself is completely true.

Do you honestly believe anybody cares what you do? Do you think
they'll say to themselves "Wow, Tarver says he's a system engineer.
Maybe there really is such a thing as splaps and optical nukes and
maybe there really ARE strakes on the F-22 despite all evidence to the
contrary, including a statement from Lockheed themselves"? If you
haven't figured it out by now, posts stand or fall on their own merit
and most here don't really give a rat's ass what you claim to be. If
Neil Armstrong said the moon was made of cheese without offering any
evidence to support his claim would you believe him? If Brad Pitt
said the B-52 has eight engines would you say he's full of ****
because he doesn't fly them?

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 06:47 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 10:20:42 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> Well you can pretend to be whatever you like but the only person
> >> you're fooling is yourself. Maybe you do actually push a broom at an
> >> aircraft plant somewhere but nobody cares. 95% of what you say is
> >> worthless if not outright laughable and the rest is insults directed
> >> at those who know you're full of ****.
> >
> >Don't allow your own delusions be your whole world, Ferrin.
> >
> >What I wrote about myself is completely true.
>
> Do you honestly believe anybody cares what you do? Do you think
> they'll say to themselves "Wow, Tarver says he's a system engineer.

I know most of the talent that ram draws would rather discuss how airplanes
work with another expert than your uninformed self. We have cut and paste
trolls to make uninformed information drops. The have reformed, why can't
you, Ferrin?

> Maybe there really is such a thing as splaps and optical nukes and
> maybe there really ARE strakes on the F-22 despite all evidence to the
> contrary, including a statement from Lockheed themselves"?

Lockmart are the source of the information that they were going to try
strakes and then decided they were the "least desirable fix" for their tail
section problems. The fact that you are reading deficiaent is just one more
reason for you to reform, Ferrin.

> If you
> haven't figured it out by now, posts stand or fall on their own merit
> and most here don't really give a rat's ass what you claim to be.

Perhaps that is true in your red queen reality, Ferrin.

What do you bring to ram?

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 07:02 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 10:47:20 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 10:20:42 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >
>> >> Well you can pretend to be whatever you like but the only person
>> >> you're fooling is yourself. Maybe you do actually push a broom at an
>> >> aircraft plant somewhere but nobody cares. 95% of what you say is
>> >> worthless if not outright laughable and the rest is insults directed
>> >> at those who know you're full of ****.
>> >
>> >Don't allow your own delusions be your whole world, Ferrin.
>> >
>> >What I wrote about myself is completely true.
>>
>> Do you honestly believe anybody cares what you do? Do you think
>> they'll say to themselves "Wow, Tarver says he's a system engineer.
>
>I know most of the talent that ram draws would rather discuss how airplanes
>work with another expert than your uninformed self. We have cut and paste
>trolls to make uninformed information drops. The have reformed, why can't
>you, Ferrin?

"Cut and paste trolls"? What would you be considered? A clueless
troll?



>
>> Maybe there really is such a thing as splaps and optical nukes and
>> maybe there really ARE strakes on the F-22 despite all evidence to the
>> contrary, including a statement from Lockheed themselves"?
>
>Lockmart are the source of the information that they were going to try
>strakes and then decided they were the "least desirable fix" for their tail
>section problems. The fact that you are reading deficiaent is just one more
>reason for you to reform, Ferrin.

On the contrary, I read quite well. Including your dozens of claims
that the F-22 DOES have strakes. Now how could a supposed "expert"
like you claim to be make such a mistake? And mistake it was as
you've offered no evidence to the contrary. Might I add "no balls" to
your description as AFAIK in the entire time you've been adding your
odor to r.a.m. you've never admitted you were wrong about anything.
(Which makes you look like an idiot, not a genius since you obviously
haven't figured that out yet.)



>
>> If you
>> haven't figured it out by now, posts stand or fall on their own merit
>> and most here don't really give a rat's ass what you claim to be.
>
>Perhaps that is true in your red queen reality, Ferrin.

Obviously it's not in your's as you continue to tell yourself that
people accept what you say just because you say so, no matter how
absurd what you say may be.


>What do you bring to ram?

Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
passing.

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 07:04 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

> >What do you bring to ram?
>
> Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
> up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
> passing.

You bring completely unqualified opinion to ram, Ferrin.

Kevin Brooks
February 28th 04, 07:07 PM
"Ron" > wrote in message
...
> >Or Jeff Ethell reporting how the Chilean Air Force beat a US Navy
> >carrier group 56-20. You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
> >exercise before drawing too many conclusions.
> >
>
> The Chileans F-16s are very formidable fighters, especially in a
knifefight.
>
> Well depending on how recent that was, the Chileans might have had their
F-16C,
> helmet mounted sight, Python4 AAM, and it makes it prettty frustrating at
the
> merge, when all the Chilean pilot has to do it look at you, and you can
> consider yourself "morted"

The Chilean Air Force has no F-16's as of yet. They have ordered some, but
do not as yet have any in their inventory.

Brooks

>
>
> Ron
> Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
>

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 07:18 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:04:19 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> >What do you bring to ram?
>>
>> Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
>> up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
>> passing.
>
>You bring completely unqualified opinion to ram, Ferrin.

That's the best you can do? You rest all of your credibility on your
claim that you are a systems engineer in the aerospace field??? Do
you even recognize the absurdity of that?

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 07:40 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:04:19 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> >What do you bring to ram?
> >>
> >> Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
> >> up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
> >> passing.
> >
> >You bring completely unqualified opinion to ram, Ferrin.
>
> That's the best you can do? You rest all of your credibility on your
> claim that you are a systems engineer in the aerospace field??? Do
> you even recognize the absurdity of that?

I have already posted credentials in excess of your "nothing", Ferrin.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 07:45 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:40:24 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:04:19 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >
>> >> >What do you bring to ram?
>> >>
>> >> Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
>> >> up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
>> >> passing.
>> >
>> >You bring completely unqualified opinion to ram, Ferrin.
>>
>> That's the best you can do? You rest all of your credibility on your
>> claim that you are a systems engineer in the aerospace field??? Do
>> you even recognize the absurdity of that?
>
>I have already posted credentials in excess of your "nothing", Ferrin.


Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
you're talking about. Let's see your so-called credentials come up
with a photo of an F-22 with strakes. Until you can I'd quit using
your "credentials" to try to prop up your arguements.

Chad Irby
February 28th 04, 07:49 PM
In article >,
"Tarver Engineering" > wrote:

> I am an aircraft systems engineer with a body of work that is widely tabbed
> to in aviation.

Yeah, there are several Web pages that refer to your body of work
extensively.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 08:59 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:40:24 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 11:04:19 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >
> >> >> >What do you bring to ram?
> >> >>
> >> >> Facts backed up by evidence. You might have to look those two words
> >> >> up as you don't appear to ever have been aquainted with them even in
> >> >> passing.
> >> >
> >> >You bring completely unqualified opinion to ram, Ferrin.
> >>
> >> That's the best you can do? You rest all of your credibility on your
> >> claim that you are a systems engineer in the aerospace field??? Do
> >> you even recognize the absurdity of that?
> >
> >I have already posted credentials in excess of your "nothing", Ferrin.
>
>
> Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
> you're talking about.

I recognize your superior knowledge of not knowing what you are talking
about.

The F-22 should have died in '98. No matter how the program turns out now
my hypothesis was correct.

Fortunately for USAF and Lockmart, the F-35 looks to be a winner.

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 09:00 PM
"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
. com...
> In article >,
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> > I am an aircraft systems engineer with a body of work that is widely
tabbed
> > to in aviation.
>
> Yeah, there are several Web pages that refer to your body of work
> extensively.

Archive trolls are just a way to sandbag someone.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 09:45 PM
>> Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
>> you're talking about.
>
>I recognize your superior knowledge of not knowing what you are talking
>about.

Let's see those strakes Mr. Expert.

Tarver Engineering
February 28th 04, 09:48 PM
"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
> >> you're talking about.
> >
> >I recognize your superior knowledge of not knowing what you are talking
> >about.
>
> Let's see those strakes Mr. Expert.

The public record of strakes on F-22s exists only as press releases from
Lockmart.

If you mean to say that the broad spectrum of things you don't know about
must be wrong, that attitude does show up in your unqualified posting of
your opinion.

B2431
February 28th 04, 10:01 PM
>From: Scott Ferrin

>
>>> Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
>>> you're talking about.
>>
>>I recognize your superior knowledge of not knowing what you are talking
>>about.
>
>Let's see those strakes Mr. Expert.
>
Scott, you may as well give up. Tarver has never proven any of his claims and
isn't man enough to admit he's wrong about anything.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

John Cook
February 28th 04, 10:10 PM
<more play ground ranting snipped>


I had hoped the rest of us will not have to wade through several
dozen post with **** poor one line insults..

Some hope Huh.....

I have a good idea .... USE EMAIL TO INSULT EACH OTHER!

Coz I for one am not interested in all the bull****..

So go make another group up, called Rec.****poor.Insults.
and post to your hearts contents, you can even make it a binaries
group If ever those strakes turn up!!


Anyone else fed up with it??

Yes I've tried the Kill filters, but apparently mines broken as there
still breathing...

Cheers

Mike Zaharis
February 28th 04, 10:38 PM
Ian wrote:

>
> The pictures I've seen of the F15 don't (obviously at least) show any CFTs.

Which F-15? The air superiority (A, B, C, D) ones rarely use CFTs. I think the
only ones that do use them are the ones in Iceland, so they can divert to the UK
if necessary, according to Air International.

Almost all of the pictures of operational E models have them installed. I don't
believe that they're permanent, but they look like they're a pain in the behind
to remove, and there's nothing that E's generally do that would necessitate
their removal. They do lower the aircraft's G limits and add weight, which
would decidedly handicap them in the WVR arena.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 10:48 PM
On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 09:10:04 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

><more play ground ranting snipped>
>
>
>I had hoped the rest of us will not have to wade through several
>dozen post with **** poor one line insults..
>
>Some hope Huh.....
>
>I have a good idea .... USE EMAIL TO INSULT EACH OTHER!
>
>Coz I for one am not interested in all the bull****..
>
>So go make another group up, called Rec.****poor.Insults.
>and post to your hearts contents, you can even make it a binaries
>group If ever those strakes turn up!!
>
>
>Anyone else fed up with it??
>
>Yes I've tried the Kill filters, but apparently mines broken as there
>still breathing...
>
>Cheers


Ya know nobody's FORCING you to read these posts. I agree this
particular thread is going on and on so I'm going to end it. We'll
see if Tarver can let it lie.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 10:50 PM
On 28 Feb 2004 22:01:58 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

>>From: Scott Ferrin
>
>>
>>>> Like I said. "Credentials" don't mean squat if you don't know what
>>>> you're talking about.
>>>
>>>I recognize your superior knowledge of not knowing what you are talking
>>>about.
>>
>>Let's see those strakes Mr. Expert.
>>
>Scott, you may as well give up. Tarver has never proven any of his claims and
>isn't man enough to admit he's wrong about anything.
>
>Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired


Yeah I know. I've even tried being nice to him before and explaining
that people actually think higher of someone who's willing to admit
they are wrong but it bounced right off solid rock.

Scott Ferrin
February 28th 04, 10:53 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 15:05:44 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:30:34 -0600, "t_mark" > wrote:
>
>>> I love this aircraft. Look out world Typhoon is coming!"
>>
>>This strikes me as very much like the people who love the sports teams who
>>beat the teams they dislike, even when having no affiliation with either. I
>>imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when 22s are
>>'trouncing' the rest.
>>
>
>Hmmm.. is that the 22 x F-22's ;-), you know its changing from a
>silver bullet force to a Golden BB force..
>
>I would imaging you'll hear it quite often as the very very few F-22
>won't have time to play games.
>
>Whats the latest? is it sub 200 yet?.


Lowest "official" number I've heard is 276.


>
> I imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when
>UCAV's are 'trouncing' the rest.

It will be a while before UCAVs are doing air to air.



>
>Cheers
>

Krztalizer
February 28th 04, 11:47 PM
> You need to know the ROE and the purpose of the
>>exercise before drawing too many conclusions.
>
>Always the whining excuses.
>

Rod, that's crap. If you say, "I beat ten guys in a fight" and leave off the
part about them all being in their 80s and wheelchair bound, those are relevent
facts to determining what really happened. I don't doubt that a Eurojäger
could beat an Eagle, but wouldn't you at least like to hear about the
circumstances? That's not whining.

t_mark
February 29th 04, 12:07 AM
I don't doubt given a set of circumstances the Euro could win, but even if
that's the case it's mind-boggling to declare an end to US air superiority.

Chad Irby
February 29th 04, 02:17 AM
In article >,
"Tarver Engineering" > wrote:

> Archive trolls are just a way to sandbag someone.

The thing is, "archive trolls" have to have actual material to "archive."

If it were *false* material, you'd be able to dig into Google and show
how they were wrong. But for some reason, you can't manage to do this...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

John Cook
February 29th 04, 02:25 AM
>
>
>Ya know nobody's FORCING you to read these posts. I agree this
>particular thread is going on and on so I'm going to end it. We'll
>see if Tarver can let it lie.

Thanks, its much appreciated.

Charles Gray
February 29th 04, 08:34 PM
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:53:28 GMT, Scott Ferrin >
wrote:

>On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 15:05:44 +1100, John Cook >
>wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 21:30:34 -0600, "t_mark" > wrote:
>>
>
>Lowest "official" number I've heard is 276.
>
>
>>
>> I imagine we won't hear much of this a few years down the line when
>>UCAV's are 'trouncing' the rest.
>
>It will be a while before UCAVs are doing air to air.
>
>
>
>>
>>Cheers
>>
You know, that's always puzzled me-- I recall reading in the 1980's
that they thought Air to Air UCAV's might actually beat CAS versions,
due to the problems of picking targets out of the ground, IFF, etc.
On the other hand, Air to Air could be done by selecting a section of
air and declaring anything in it hostile, giving the UCAV's free
range.

What changed? I'm assuming that at least part of it is the fact
that unlike the 1980's we're not talking all out war, so it's very
likely that even "war" zones may have to worry about civilian air
traffic and nobody wants a repeat of the Iranian shoot down (although
that wasn't a UCAV).

Chad Irby
February 29th 04, 09:59 PM
In article >,
Charles Gray > wrote:

> You know, that's always puzzled me-- I recall reading in the 1980's
> that they thought Air to Air UCAV's might actually beat CAS versions,
> due to the problems of picking targets out of the ground, IFF, etc.
> On the other hand, Air to Air could be done by selecting a section of
> air and declaring anything in it hostile, giving the UCAV's free
> range.
>
> What changed?

A lot of people found out just how hard that particular job was. Target
acquisition and ID is hard enough for humans, and the challenge of doing
that *plus* flying an air combat mission is still a ways off.

Add in ECM (if the robots are supposed to kill anything in their "box"
they can't ID, the enemy just jams the IFF and they kill *everything*),
and it gets even harder.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Scott Ferrin
February 29th 04, 10:52 PM
> You know, that's always puzzled me-- I recall reading in the 1980's
>that they thought Air to Air UCAV's might actually beat CAS versions,
>due to the problems of picking targets out of the ground, IFF, etc.
>On the other hand, Air to Air could be done by selecting a section of
>air and declaring anything in it hostile, giving the UCAV's free
>range.
>
> What changed? I'm assuming that at least part of it is the fact
>that unlike the 1980's we're not talking all out war, so it's very
>likely that even "war" zones may have to worry about civilian air
>traffic and nobody wants a repeat of the Iranian shoot down (although
>that wasn't a UCAV).

I think it would depend on what kind of UCAV. I've still not heard
definitively whether they'd be controlled by a pilot on the ground or
if they'd be 100% autonomous or some combination. It would also
depend on the kind of air to air. Is it just medium to long range
shots or might it include dogfighting? I think the questions are can
it dogfight autonomously and can it be trusted not to down a friendly
aircraft. Also if remotely piloted would the guy on the ground be
able to see as well as a guy in the cockpit in a dogfight and will the
communicatons link stay up. Things like that.

Charles Samardza
March 1st 04, 02:45 PM
"John Doe" > wrote in message .net>...
> "Mike Zaharis" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >
> > John Cook wrote:
> >
> > > Hi all
> > >
> > > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> > >
> > > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
> > >
> > > Thursday the 19th of February 2004 will mark the day when the
> > > undisputed king of air superiority had to surrender its thirty-year
> > > crown to a newcomer. It happened over the skies of Windermere, in the
> > > scenic English Lake District. Two Eurofighter Typhoon twin-seaters
> > > were on the first RAF formation training flight from Warton Aerodrome
> > > when they were bounced from the eight o'clock by a couple of F-15Es
> > > belonging to the USAFE's 48th TFW, probably the most formidable and
> > > experienced combat unit in the European theatre. The Typhoon crew did
> > > not seem to be intimidated and with two rapid counters ended up on the
> > > F-15 tail, comfortably gunning the trailing one, who was in full
> > > afterburner, wings rocking and wondering what had happened.
> > >
> > > It is fair to expect that the most surprised by this first encounter
> > > result would be the F15 crew, used to dominate the skies since the
> > > mid-seventies and with an exchange ratio record of 101 wins to zero
> > > losses, and a bunch of die-hard Eurofighter critics without much
> > > knowledge of the new fighter air combat capabilities. It is
> > > understandable if the RAF rookies would also show their surprise at
> > > the outcome, as one does not expect to win an air engagement on the
> > > first training sortie with a brand new machine against one of the best
> > > combat units in the world, riding what up to now has been the best
> > > fighter in history.
> > >
> > > But that is history now!
> > >
> > > Those definitely not surprised by what the events over the Lake
> > > District skies signify are the top echelon in the Air Combat Command,
> > > the Chief of Staff and the RAND Corp. analysts and boffins. They have
> > > been saying for years that the F-15 is no match to the new generation
> > > of European fighters and even to the Su-35 Flanker. They know what
> > > they say: their operational analyses studies and other simulated
> > > evaluations-as indeed have ours, both at the industry and government
> > > level-have shown that the F-15 is unable to gain air superiority
> > > against Eurofighter Typhoon. Now they have the first real indication
> > > that their worries were not unjustified and that the F/A-22 was the
> > > right choice, if they want to maintain the air superiority also in the
> > > future."
> > >
> > >
> http://users.boardnation.com/~warplane/index.php?board=14;action=display;threadid=445
> > >
> > > Cheers
> >
> > Usually, F-15E's carry Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs). These are not often
> removed, as it's
> > a hassle, and for Strike Eagle missions, the range/weapons carriage is
> worth more than
> > the loss in maneuverability. These would have seriously compromised the
> ACM capabilities
> > of the F-15Es in the incident discussed.
> >
> > This is not to say that the Eurofighter does or does not have an advantage
> over the F-15E
> > in ACM, just that this incident tells one very little, without knowing how
> the aircraft
> > were outfitted.
> >
> > Does anyone know if the F-15Es in this scenario were carrying CFTs?
> >
>
> Yes. ALL F-15Es from the 48th FW at Lakenheath carry CFTs. If they were in
> the Lake District, then they also had external fuel tanks. Hardly a BFM/ACM
> configuration.
>
> Wake me when they do a planned training sortie with the C models from
> Lakenheath.


The other problem is that they are comparing aircraft whose mechanical
technology is 20 years apart. Electronics may be equal(even if you
ignore the fact that the 'E' is configured/equipped for a strike role
rather than A2A) but the mechanical design has several generations of
difference.

Paul F Austin
March 2nd 04, 02:55 AM
"Charles Samardza" > wrote
> "John Doe" > wrote
> > >
> > > John Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi all
> > > >
> > > > Just saw this and it peaked my interest..
> > > >
> > > > "The New Air Superiority Benchmark
....
> >
> > Wake me when they do a planned training sortie with the C models from
> > Lakenheath.
>
>
> The other problem is that they are comparing aircraft whose mechanical
> technology is 20 years apart. Electronics may be equal(even if you
> ignore the fact that the 'E' is configured/equipped for a strike role
> rather than A2A) but the mechanical design has several generations of
> difference.

Actually,_one_generation apart although that generation is about 30 years
long. Typhoon benefits from better propulsion technology, controls
technology and somewhat better structural technology so it would be strange
if a Typhoon wasn't substantially better than a F-15C. In fact if it turns
out not to be, a passel of British aero- and -propulsion engineers should be
looking for jobs.

John Cook
March 2nd 04, 05:03 AM
On Mon, 1 Mar 2004 21:55:56 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

Apparentley the time taken from the bounce until the Typhoons had
achieved a clear shot on the F15E's rear l was 9 seconds.

Not Too Shabby!!!

>
>> > Wake me when they do a planned training sortie with the C models from
>> > Lakenheath.
>>
>>
>> The other problem is that they are comparing aircraft whose mechanical
>> technology is 20 years apart. Electronics may be equal(even if you
>> ignore the fact that the 'E' is configured/equipped for a strike role
>> rather than A2A) but the mechanical design has several generations of
>> difference.
>
>Actually,_one_generation apart although that generation is about 30 years
>long. Typhoon benefits from better propulsion technology, controls
>technology and somewhat better structural technology so it would be strange
>if a Typhoon wasn't substantially better than a F-15C. In fact if it turns
>out not to be, a passel of British aero- and -propulsion engineers should be
>looking for jobs.
>

t_mark
March 2nd 04, 07:11 AM
> Actually,_one_generation apart although that generation is about 30 years
> long. Typhoon benefits from better propulsion technology, controls
> technology and somewhat better structural technology so it would be
strange
> if a Typhoon wasn't substantially better than a F-15C. In fact if it turns
> out not to be, a passel of British aero- and -propulsion engineers should
be
> looking for jobs.

Now the story is they were C models?

Ed Rasimus
March 2nd 04, 02:32 PM
On Tue, 02 Mar 2004 16:03:07 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

>On Mon, 1 Mar 2004 21:55:56 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:
>
>Apparentley the time taken from the bounce until the Typhoons had
>achieved a clear shot on the F15E's rear l was 9 seconds.
>
>Not Too Shabby!!!
>

Let's take an objective look at another absurd claim. The setup was
that the Mud Hens attacked from 8 o'clock. That would be 135 degrees
off the nose of the Typhoons. And, the "clear shot on the F-15Es rear
would necessitate either a turn into the attack, forcing an
over-shoot, followed by a reversal and turn back to the egress by the
Eagles. Minimum heading change required---90 degrees of turn to
negate, then back 135 degrees to the Eagle's course, assuming the
Eagle doesn't turn at all!

So, with 225 degrees of turn to accomplish and your statement of 9
seconds, 25 degrees/second sustained. If the Eagles turned to respond
to the defensive first move of the Typhoons, then the angles to be
handled increase and the turn rate must as well. Since a 9G turn at
corner velocity of modern fighters generates around 14-16 degrees per
second, one must assume that these incredible Typhoons either have
increased G available to something around 16G or reduced corner
velocity to around 150 kts.--one is impossible, the other absurd.

And, throughout, it continues the idea of the Mud Hens attacking in
welded wing, which simply isn't the practice.

Dare I say, once again--bovine excrement!



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Jeb Hoge
March 2nd 04, 04:09 PM
John Cook > wrote in message >...
> On Mon, 1 Mar 2004 21:55:56 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> > wrote:
>
> Apparentley the time taken from the bounce until the Typhoons had
> achieved a clear shot on the F15E's rear l was 9 seconds.
>
> Not Too Shabby!!!

Hmm...strike-configured Beagles coming from 8 o'clock, probably one
pass and one turn, and the oh-so-advanced Typhoons (and I *like* these
airframes) on a training flight (so probably not loaded with much of
anything but internal gas) took 9 seconds to convert? Is it just me,
or does that not sound all that impressive?

Tony Volk
March 2nd 04, 04:11 PM
I think he was simply making a comment, not revising the facts. If
ANYONE is surprised that cft-laden Mudhens got beaten by clean Eurofighters,
well, I guess they don't know a lot about airplanes. Same goes for
the -15C. Of course there the biggest difference wouldn't so much be the
plane (the Viper would be the best test in the USAF), but the a-a focused
(and skilled) pilots. Frankly, I don't see the fuss in saying a new fighter
was able to beat a design that's about 30 years old! It ought to! Eagles
have dominated the a-a arena because of their BVR capabilities and their
superior tactics, not because of their supreme WVR performance (where they
are at least partially inferior to several planes already).
To add even more fuel to this garbage fire is the testimony from our own
military pilots that such reckless behavior could get the -15E pilots in
seriously big trouble. Why would some of the best pilots (likely senior in
rank) risk such penalties (not to mention safety!) to start a fight when
they would be at a disadvantage? Machismo trumps good judgment? Not
likely. This is about as big a yawner as they get. Cheers,

Tony

> Now the story is they were C models?
>
>

Paul F Austin
March 3rd 04, 01:40 AM
"t_mark" wrote ...
> > Actually,_one_generation apart although that generation is about 30
years
> > long. Typhoon benefits from better propulsion technology, controls
> > technology and somewhat better structural technology so it would be
> strange
> > if a Typhoon wasn't substantially better than a F-15C. In fact if it
turns
> > out not to be, a passel of British aero- and -propulsion engineers
should
> be
> > looking for jobs.
>
> Now the story is they were C models?

No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story" there
and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed, the
main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.

It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year old
McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.

Ed Rasimus
March 3rd 04, 03:42 PM
On Tue, 2 Mar 2004 20:40:27 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
>configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story" there
>and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed, the
>main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
>
>It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year old
>McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
>

I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
time, so there's something to be said for them.

What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
"free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
(I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)

Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
ludicrous.

When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Paul F Austin
March 4th 04, 01:42 AM
"Ed Rasimus" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
> >No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
> >configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story"
there
> >and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed, the
> >main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
> >
> >It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year old
> >McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
> >
>
> I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
> customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
> time, so there's something to be said for them.
>
> What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
> democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
> spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
> "free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
> a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
> (I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)
>
> Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
> technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
> dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
> un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
> situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
> ludicrous.
>
> When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
> used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
> superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
> precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
> came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
> brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.

Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with AESA,
in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency in
air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).

Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have second
and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone with
a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key mission
again. Probably 20 years and probably China.

monkey
March 6th 04, 06:19 AM
"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message >...
> "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> >
> > >No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
> > >configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story"
> there
> > >and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed, the
> > >main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
> > >
> > >It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year old
> > >McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
> > >
> >
> > I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
> > customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
> > time, so there's something to be said for them.
> >
> > What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
> > democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
> > spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
> > "free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
> > a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
> > (I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)
> >
> > Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
> > technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
> > dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
> > un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
> > situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
> > ludicrous.
> >
> > When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
> > used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
> > superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
> > precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
> > came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
> > brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.
>
> Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with AESA,
> in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
> interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency in
> air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).
>
> Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have second
> and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone with
> a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key mission
> again. Probably 20 years and probably China.

You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
engagement.

Ian
March 6th 04, 07:10 AM
"monkey" > wrote in message
om...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > >
> > > >No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
> > > >configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story"
> > there
> > > >and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed,
the
> > > >main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
> > > >
> > > >It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year
old
> > > >McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
> > > customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
> > > time, so there's something to be said for them.
> > >
> > > What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
> > > democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
> > > spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
> > > "free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
> > > a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
> > > (I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)
> > >
> > > Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
> > > technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
> > > dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
> > > un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
> > > situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
> > > ludicrous.
> > >
> > > When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
> > > used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
> > > superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
> > > precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
> > > came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
> > > brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.
> >
> > Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with
AESA,
> > in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
> > interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency
in
> > air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).
> >
> > Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have
second
> > and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone
with
> > a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key
mission
> > again. Probably 20 years and probably China.
>
> You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> engagement.

When was it ever called Eurofighter 90? The technology demonstrator only
flew for the first time on 8th Aug 86 (and incidently displayed at the
Farnborough Airshow a fortnight later). So to turn round a tech dem into a
full production aircraft in 4 years is pushing it - for any country/company
in the world!

John Cook
March 6th 04, 07:45 AM
On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 07:10:23 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:
<snip a quite sensible discussion>

>> You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
>> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
>> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
>> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
>> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
>> engagement.
>
>When was it ever called Eurofighter 90? The technology demonstrator only
>flew for the first time on 8th Aug 86 (and incidently displayed at the
>Farnborough Airshow a fortnight later). So to turn round a tech dem into a
>full production aircraft in 4 years is pushing it - for any country/company
>in the world!

I think he may be refering to an old German design called the TFK-90
in the 1980, some of the design features was used on the ECA about 4
years later, things like a twin tail were dropped among several
thousand other things... Note 1992 is the start of the Eurofighter
2000 project that is now the Eurofighter Typhoon...


I suppose in his world the F-22 was called the F-15 before its make
over ;-)

Cheers
>

John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

John Mullen
March 6th 04, 10:17 AM
"monkey" > wrote in message
om...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:

(snip)

> > Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with
AESA,
> > in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
> > interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency
in
> > air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).
> >
> > Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have
second
> > and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone
with
> > a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key
mission
> > again. Probably 20 years and probably China.
>
> You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol)

No you don't. It never was.

> oh
> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> engagement.

Get your spoon ready then.

John

Ian
March 6th 04, 12:50 PM
Just out of interest what British aircraft have you flown in?
"monkey" > wrote in message
om...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > >
> > > >No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
> > > >configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story"
> > there
> > > >and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed,
the
> > > >main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
> > > >
> > > >It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year
old
> > > >McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
> > > customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
> > > time, so there's something to be said for them.
> > >
> > > What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
> > > democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
> > > spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
> > > "free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
> > > a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
> > > (I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)
> > >
> > > Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
> > > technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
> > > dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
> > > un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
> > > situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
> > > ludicrous.
> > >
> > > When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
> > > used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
> > > superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
> > > precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
> > > came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
> > > brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.
> >
> > Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with
AESA,
> > in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
> > interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency
in
> > air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).
> >
> > Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have
second
> > and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone
with
> > a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key
mission
> > again. Probably 20 years and probably China.
>
> You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> engagement.

Ed Rasimus
March 6th 04, 03:49 PM
On 5 Mar 2004 22:19:16 -0800, (monkey) wrote:


>You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
>they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
>eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
>yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
>my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
>engagement.

It would be interesting for you to fill in some details about the what
and who. I've flown with RAF types on exchange duty and found them
incredibly well trained and knowledgeable. One of my earliest tactical
fighter IPs was an exchange Lightning driver who was instructing in
F-105 school. He could beat anybody in the squadron air-to-air in a
decidely non-air-to-air aircraft.

You would be hard pressed to find anyone in any service who is better
at low-level than a Buccaneer driver, and the talent and experience
carried right through to the Tornado force. For light, flex tactical
operations, the Jaguar guys are pretty impressive as well.

So, you might want to offer something to justify your strong opinion.

As for your future diet, you should be aware (based on your implied
experience) that "neutral set-up BFM" doesn't tell you squat about an
aircraft's air superiority real-world mission potential. On any given
day, a pair of similar generation tactical fighters flown by a pair of
reasonably trained and knowledgeable pilots can end a neutral setup
BFM engagement with either side winning.

I've lost a lot of neutral setup BFM engagements. I've won a few as
well. But, I've never lost a combat engagement.

You want ketchup with that lunch?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

monkey
March 6th 04, 06:06 PM
i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
you flew them. yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask any
contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole the
RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
like that. I also learned to fly fighters from brits among pilots from
many other nationalities, and i feel that they were the weakest of all
the europeans. I'm sure many of the folks here have seen nothing other
than unclassified performance numbers for a lot of these aircraft, nor
have they done a whole lot of military flying. What I'm trying to say
here is this - first, the US jets in general are very well designed,
the whole package - from the long range BVR sort/shot to engaged
maneuvering. So what, some F-15s (allegedly) got beat (lets not get
into the whole unbriefed engagement,/tr violation discussion here).
The fact of the matter is that the Eagle is very beatable in the phone
booth, because it wasn't designed to ever be there. Eagle drivers are
the kings of the BVR game. The F-22. When I talk about a neutral setup
I mean beak to beak, butterfly split type thing. I'm sorry I've seen
the numbers and the F-22 is one mean turning machine. As a matter of
fact I'm of the opinion that a good guy in a Hornet or big mouth 16
charlie will be able to do just fine against the typhoon. I'll send
you a hud tape to prove it if we ever get to exercise with these
guys...

> >You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> >they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> >eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
> >yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> >my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> >engagement.
>
> It would be interesting for you to fill in some details about the what
> and who. I've flown with RAF types on exchange duty and found them
> incredibly well trained and knowledgeable. One of my earliest tactical
> fighter IPs was an exchange Lightning driver who was instructing in
> F-105 school. He could beat anybody in the squadron air-to-air in a
> decidely non-air-to-air aircraft.
>
> You would be hard pressed to find anyone in any service who is better
> at low-level than a Buccaneer driver, and the talent and experience
> carried right through to the Tornado force. For light, flex tactical
> operations, the Jaguar guys are pretty impressive as well.
>
> So, you might want to offer something to justify your strong opinion.
>
> As for your future diet, you should be aware (based on your implied
> experience) that "neutral set-up BFM" doesn't tell you squat about an
> aircraft's air superiority real-world mission potential. On any given
> day, a pair of similar generation tactical fighters flown by a pair of
> reasonably trained and knowledgeable pilots can end a neutral setup
> BFM engagement with either side winning.
>
> I've lost a lot of neutral setup BFM engagements. I've won a few as
> well. But, I've never lost a combat engagement.
>
> You want ketchup with that lunch?
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Paul F Austin
March 6th 04, 06:48 PM
"monkey" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > >
> > > >No, my statement is that a Typhoon had better be superior to an ATA
> > > >configured Eagle (an F-15C), never mind a Mud Hen. There's no "story"
> > there
> > > >and there's no stupid chauvinism either. In case you haven't noticed,
the
> > > >main operator of Typhoons is Great Britain, who is on_our_side.
> > > >
> > > >It makes no difference in the size of_my_weenie whether a thirty year
old
> > > >McAir design is superior to a ten year old BAE design in a dog fight.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I've never been into the "size" thing either--I've simply gone with
> > > customer satisfaction. Eagles have satisfied the customer for a long
> > > time, so there's something to be said for them.
> > >
> > > What's at issue here is the (re-)education of the masses, which in a
> > > democratic political structure, influence the direction of defense
> > > spending. If they are told repeatedly that some low cost (dare I say
> > > "free lunch") solution is effective, they will opt for it rather than
> > > a more technologically and tactically superior one at higher cost.
> > > (I'm not arguing that high cost per se is definitive.)
> > >
> > > Over simplification, to the point that the GUM understand a very
> > > technical situation such as twenty-first century air-superiority, is
> > > dangerous. The idea that this spontaneous encounter between two
> > > un-briefed and un-prepared adversaries in a decidedly WVR, tail-aspect
> > > situation is somehow definitive of a paradigm shift in air/air is
> > > ludicrous.
> > >
> > > When the voters of Liverpool and Birmingham are writing their MP who
> > > used to be the candle-stick maker in Nottinghamshire regarding the
> > > superiority of Typhoons over Raptors and urging the investment of
> > > precious defense pounds sterling, they have to understand the total
> > > came, not simply they caused an overshoot and gunned the Eagle's
> > > brains out, ergo the Eagle is dead, long live the Typhoon.
> >
> > Eagle is a fine airplane and under some circumstances (the -15C with
AESA,
> > in BVR engagements) is still competitive with anything in the air. It's
> > interesting that the Typhoon operators have suddenly found more urgency
in
> > air to mud software and systems (as has the USAF for Raptor of course).
> >
> > Right now, most of the potential Disturbers of the World's Peace have
second
> > and third rate air forces. I wonder how long it will be before someone
with
> > a first rate air force pops up on the RADAR and ATA becomes a key
mission
> > again. Probably 20 years and probably China.
>
> You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> engagement.

I don't think anyone has made that claim. What is a problem is the 20 year
development cycle for military systems. ATF/F-22 development began about
twenty five years ago, LAH/Comanche about 25 years ago and JVX/V-22 about 20
years ago. This is great welfare for Merchants O' Death (of whom I'm one)
but it serves the nation badly. Those aren't the only systems. I've worked
on each of the four successor programs for DSP at one time or another. We're
due to launch the 25th and last DSP in the barn in 2006 and SBIRS High isn't
ready for prime time. GBI/NMD has been going off (mostly) and on for about
the same time. There's something seriously broken in the procurement of
Things That Go Fast and Explode.

By the way, good spelling and gramar lends credibility as a non Luser. HTH.

Ed Rasimus
March 6th 04, 08:32 PM
On 6 Mar 2004 10:06:24 -0800, (monkey) wrote:

>i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
>you flew them.

I'll be the last to flaunt my currency. The last systems I flew were
F-23, MiG-29, MiG-31, ASF (a notional Advanced Soviet
Fighter--paralleling ATF development) and F-15C, but those were all in
the multi-player interactive domes at Northrop--not real airplanes.
So, you've got the advantage on me.

>yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask any
>contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole the
>RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
>Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
>radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
>like that.

So, drawing from that endorsement of SS experience, you must wonder
how the USAF made the transition from year of F-4 dominance to be able
to handle Egos and Vipers? And, how did all those Hun drivers manage
to handle the F-4, coming from an under-powered, no-radar airplane?
And, how were the F-5 Aggressors able to teach so much Air/Air to
those over-powered Iggles and Snakes with their cosmic radars and
greater than 1-to-1 T/W ratios?

The point is you CAN fight in today's environment with a power
deficiency (as long as you can sustain a comfortable 7G and maintain
smash near corner at your chosen altitude). You can fight in today's
environment with a minimal sensor suite if you've got some data fusion
and a big brother on the horizon.

And, if you think fighting in today's environment is about
turning/burning and rolling your socks over the top of your boots,
you've missed a lot of the lectures.


> I also learned to fly fighters from brits among pilots from
>many other nationalities, and i feel that they were the weakest of all
>the europeans.

Whose better among Euros? While a lot of the countries have some good
drivers in specialties, the RAF seems to have the highest consistency
across the tactical spectrum. Germans are good, Italians are pretty
good, Danes and Norwegians are pretty good, French will tell you they
are great, Spanish have some good ones...


> I'm sure many of the folks here have seen nothing other
>than unclassified performance numbers for a lot of these aircraft, nor
>have they done a whole lot of military flying. What I'm trying to say
>here is this - first, the US jets in general are very well designed,
>the whole package - from the long range BVR sort/shot to engaged
>maneuvering. So what, some F-15s (allegedly) got beat (lets not get
>into the whole unbriefed engagement,/tr violation discussion here).
>The fact of the matter is that the Eagle is very beatable in the phone
>booth, because it wasn't designed to ever be there. Eagle drivers are
>the kings of the BVR game.

Sorry, but Eagles from day one were designed to be pretty darn good in
the phone booth, but that means mutual support and fluid attack. They
also are darn good BVR and got a helluva lot better when AIM-120 came
along. Their capability to search, sort and allocate revised the
tactics of the previous 25 years.

> When I talk about a neutral setup
>I mean beak to beak, butterfly split type thing. I'm sorry I've seen
>the numbers and the F-22 is one mean turning machine.

If you butterfly split, for beak-to-beak, you never go BVR, hence you
never employ all your systems, never get any mutual support, never
exercise any defense against all-aspect, never worry about F-poles,
etc. You don't integrate with AWACs, don't play ECM and simply pull
on the pole. If you call that "train like you fight" you must be
operating in a different military.

As for "mean turning machine", it's an aerodynamic fact of life that
stealth and agility are often mutually exclusive. Any airplane is a
compromise and the Raptor is no exception.

Given an effective 9G sustained limit on human physiology, then a
corner of 350 to 400 defines the limits of agility. To become a better
air/air fighter you broaden the envelope of your weapons. So, don't
look for any 1-v-1 marked superiority until there is some great
breakthrough in basic physics.

> As a matter of
>fact I'm of the opinion that a good guy in a Hornet or big mouth 16
>charlie will be able to do just fine against the typhoon. I'll send
>you a hud tape to prove it if we ever get to exercise with these
>guys...

You probably won't get any HUD video of Raptors in a Bug or Viper,
since full weapons system exercise will mort you before the merge.
>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

TJ
March 6th 04, 09:05 PM
(monkey) wrote in message > You know what, I've flown british jets and with british pilots, and
> they both suck. i would take a us made jet anytime over the
> eurofighter (i remember when it was called the eurofighter 90 lol) oh
> yeah, i'm not american either. give me a us made jet anytime. i'll eat
> my own crap when a typhoon wins over an f-22 in a neutral setup bfm
> engagement.

It was never called "eurofighter 90". You are mixng up MBB's TKF-90
proposal and ECA/ECF.

TJ

Paul F Austin
March 6th 04, 10:41 PM
"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On 6 Mar 2004 10:06:24 -0800, (monkey) wrote:
>
> > When I talk about a neutral setup
> >I mean beak to beak, butterfly split type thing. I'm sorry I've seen
> >the numbers and the F-22 is one mean turning machine.
>
> If you butterfly split, for beak-to-beak, you never go BVR, hence you
> never employ all your systems, never get any mutual support, never
> exercise any defense against all-aspect, never worry about F-poles,
> etc. You don't integrate with AWACs, don't play ECM and simply pull
> on the pole. If you call that "train like you fight" you must be
> operating in a different military.
>
> As for "mean turning machine", it's an aerodynamic fact of life that
> stealth and agility are often mutually exclusive. Any airplane is a
> compromise and the Raptor is no exception.
>
> Given an effective 9G sustained limit on human physiology, then a
> corner of 350 to 400 defines the limits of agility. To become a better
> air/air fighter you broaden the envelope of your weapons. So, don't
> look for any 1-v-1 marked superiority until there is some great
> breakthrough in basic physics.
>
> > As a matter of
> >fact I'm of the opinion that a good guy in a Hornet or big mouth 16
> >charlie will be able to do just fine against the typhoon. I'll send
> >you a hud tape to prove it if we ever get to exercise with these
> >guys...
>
> You probably won't get any HUD video of Raptors in a Bug or Viper,
> since full weapons system exercise will mort you before the merge.

Ed, IDR had an article on intraflight datalinks and their effects on fighter
operations. In the article they quoted some USAF fighter types as saying
that using networked tactics that almost no turning and burning occurred.
IRRC, the guy was quoted as saying that he rarely pulled even 2G and never
over 3. Can you comment?

Harry Andreas
March 6th 04, 10:44 PM
In article >, "Ian" >
wrote:

> When was it ever called Eurofighter 90? The technology demonstrator only
> flew for the first time on 8th Aug 86 (and incidently displayed at the
> Farnborough Airshow a fortnight later).

I was there and took a photo of it. ISTR static display only.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Ian
March 6th 04, 10:58 PM
"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Ian" >
> wrote:
>
> > When was it ever called Eurofighter 90? The technology demonstrator
only
> > flew for the first time on 8th Aug 86 (and incidently displayed at the
> > Farnborough Airshow a fortnight later).
>
> I was there and took a photo of it. ISTR static display only.
>
> --
Am pretty sure it was on flight display - could be wrong as was only 10 at
the time. Have some pics at work of it doing a display, but it may have went
back for another show?

Harry Andreas
March 6th 04, 11:01 PM
In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:


> Sorry, but Eagles from day one were designed to be pretty darn good in
> the phone booth, but that means mutual support and fluid attack. They
> also are darn good BVR and got a helluva lot better when AIM-120 came
> along. Their capability to search, sort and allocate revised the
> tactics of the previous 25 years.

Don't want to interrupt a good arguement (one of the reasons I like
reading RAM), just want to assert that the F-15/USAF's ability to
search, sort and allocate started with the F-14 and the AWG-9
WCS, which was the first aircraft in the world, IIRC, to have
capabilities along those lines.

I'd be interesed in your perspective on this Ed.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Ian
March 6th 04, 11:04 PM
"monkey" > wrote in message
om...
> i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
> you flew them. yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask any
> contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole the
> RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
> Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
> radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
> like that.

The jag was never designed as a fighter. It was originally intended as an
advanced trainer (to fit between the gnat (I think?) and the front line
aircraft.

Why is single seat operation an advantage in a tactical situation? Apart
form the obvious of only risking a single crewman at a time

Ed Rasimus
March 6th 04, 11:29 PM
On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 17:41:23 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>Ed, IDR had an article on intraflight datalinks and their effects on fighter
>operations. In the article they quoted some USAF fighter types as saying
>that using networked tactics that almost no turning and burning occurred.
>IRRC, the guy was quoted as saying that he rarely pulled even 2G and never
>over 3. Can you comment?
>

I'd say the guy you talked to was state-of-the-art (and probably
senior to the average first assignment fighter pilot type!)

The clear direction is "data fusion" in which info comes from a
variety of sources and is integrated onboard into a full sphere
display. The advantages are many:

1. You don't have to broadcast yourself.
2. You aren't limited to a narrow forward FOV.
3. You can operate totally passive.
4. Software can prioritize.
5. Command and control can direct.
and on and on.

Downside is trying to create meaningful displays that give the
operator what is needed and don't overload the poor wetware with way
too much info.

As I was in the waning days of a mediocre career, I found it was not
that difficult to win regularly at considerably lower G than the
young, buff, Lts.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus
March 6th 04, 11:33 PM
On Sat, 06 Mar 2004 15:01:24 -0800, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>
>> Sorry, but Eagles from day one were designed to be pretty darn good in
>> the phone booth, but that means mutual support and fluid attack. They
>> also are darn good BVR and got a helluva lot better when AIM-120 came
>> along. Their capability to search, sort and allocate revised the
>> tactics of the previous 25 years.
>
>Don't want to interrupt a good arguement (one of the reasons I like
>reading RAM), just want to assert that the F-15/USAF's ability to
>search, sort and allocate started with the F-14 and the AWG-9
>WCS, which was the first aircraft in the world, IIRC, to have
>capabilities along those lines.
>
>I'd be interesed in your perspective on this Ed.

You'll get no disagreement from me. The Tom's BVR capability and
track-while-scan was new stuff when the AF was still smoking around
the country side in Phantoms.

I was addressing the issue from a strictly AF point of view. The Eagle
community, particularly some creative types like Jeff Cleaver up at
Soesterberg in the late '70s were revising the tactics at a high rate.
He was running two-ships in spreads of up to 20 miles and stacks on
the order of 20k feet. "Detached mutual support" became a possibility.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Brian
March 7th 04, 01:29 AM
"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> > I also learned to fly fighters from brits among pilots from
> >many other nationalities, and i feel that they were the weakest of all
> >the europeans.
>
> Whose better among Euros? While a lot of the countries have some good
> drivers in specialties, the RAF seems to have the highest consistency
> across the tactical spectrum. Germans are good, Italians are pretty
> good, Danes and Norwegians are pretty good, French will tell you they
> are great, Spanish have some good ones...

I'm thinking the Swedes might have something to add in. The Gripen is a
pretty killer plane and leverages a lot of the "net-centric" type tools. The
Viggen is no slouch though it's missiles aren't all that great. They've got
a 4th Generation plane out and they did it reasonably quick (compared to the
Typhoon and F-22). In

Paul F Austin
March 7th 04, 04:03 AM
"Brian" wrote
>
> "Ed Rasimus" wrote
> > > I also learned to fly fighters from brits among pilots from
> > >many other nationalities, and i feel that they were the weakest of all
> > >the europeans.
> >
> > Whose better among Euros? While a lot of the countries have some good
> > drivers in specialties, the RAF seems to have the highest consistency
> > across the tactical spectrum. Germans are good, Italians are pretty
> > good, Danes and Norwegians are pretty good, French will tell you they
> > are great, Spanish have some good ones...
>
> I'm thinking the Swedes might have something to add in. The Gripen is a
> pretty killer plane and leverages a lot of the "net-centric" type tools.
The
> Viggen is no slouch though it's missiles aren't all that great. They've
got
> a 4th Generation plane out and they did it reasonably quick (compared to
the
> Typhoon and F-22). In

From what I've read, the Swedes have decades more "net-centric" operations
experience than the rest of the world. Viggens and Drakens before them were
fully integrated into the Swedish ADGE. Of course that's no more than F-102s
did in the fifties but the Drakens and Viggens also had-between-aircraft
data links that provided automatic cross-linked sensor and aircraft status
information.

Scott Ferrin
March 7th 04, 06:32 AM
On Sat, 06 Mar 2004 13:32:58 -0700, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On 6 Mar 2004 10:06:24 -0800, (monkey) wrote:
>
>>i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
>>you flew them.
>
>I'll be the last to flaunt my currency. The last systems I flew were
>F-23, MiG-29, MiG-31, ASF (a notional Advanced Soviet
>Fighter--paralleling ATF development) and F-15C, but those were all in
>the multi-player interactive domes at Northrop--not real airplanes.
>So, you've got the advantage on me.


I noticed you mentioned the Mig-31 in there. I was wondering
something. maybe you know the answer. I watched a Wings episode a
while back on the Mig-25 and -31 and the Mig-31 seems to be a pretty
impressive machine. My question is, is the reason those Alaskan
F-15Cs got the AESA radars to help them deal with Foxhounds? It just
seems a little strange that 1. more F-15s haven't got them and 2. that
the ones that did are way up in BFE. Also ISTR reading they're going
to be the first in the USAF to get the -9X.

Scott Ferrin
March 7th 04, 09:19 PM
On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 23:03:52 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>
>"Brian" wrote
>>
>> "Ed Rasimus" wrote
>> > > I also learned to fly fighters from brits among pilots from
>> > >many other nationalities, and i feel that they were the weakest of all
>> > >the europeans.
>> >
>> > Whose better among Euros? While a lot of the countries have some good
>> > drivers in specialties, the RAF seems to have the highest consistency
>> > across the tactical spectrum. Germans are good, Italians are pretty
>> > good, Danes and Norwegians are pretty good, French will tell you they
>> > are great, Spanish have some good ones...
>>
>> I'm thinking the Swedes might have something to add in. The Gripen is a
>> pretty killer plane and leverages a lot of the "net-centric" type tools.
>The
>> Viggen is no slouch though it's missiles aren't all that great. They've
>got
>> a 4th Generation plane out and they did it reasonably quick (compared to
>the
>> Typhoon and F-22). In
>
>From what I've read, the Swedes have decades more "net-centric" operations
>experience than the rest of the world. Viggens and Drakens before them were
>fully integrated into the Swedish ADGE. Of course that's no more than F-102s
>did in the fifties but the Drakens and Viggens also had-between-aircraft
>data links that provided automatic cross-linked sensor and aircraft status
>information.
>


Let's not forget the Mig-31 in there either.

Harry Andreas
March 8th 04, 03:02 AM
In article >, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

> On Sat, 06 Mar 2004 13:32:58 -0700, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
>
> >On 6 Mar 2004 10:06:24 -0800, (monkey) wrote:
> >
> >>i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
> >>you flew them.
> >
> >I'll be the last to flaunt my currency. The last systems I flew were
> >F-23, MiG-29, MiG-31, ASF (a notional Advanced Soviet
> >Fighter--paralleling ATF development) and F-15C, but those were all in
> >the multi-player interactive domes at Northrop--not real airplanes.
> >So, you've got the advantage on me.
>
>
> I noticed you mentioned the Mig-31 in there. I was wondering
> something. maybe you know the answer. I watched a Wings episode a
> while back on the Mig-25 and -31 and the Mig-31 seems to be a pretty
> impressive machine. My question is, is the reason those Alaskan
> F-15Cs got the AESA radars to help them deal with Foxhounds? It just
> seems a little strange that 1. more F-15s haven't got them

Stay tuned.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

rnf2
March 11th 04, 02:27 AM
On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 23:04:24 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:

>
>"monkey" > wrote in message
om...
>> i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
>> you flew them. yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask any
>> contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole the
>> RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
>> Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
>> radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
>> like that.
>
>The jag was never designed as a fighter. It was originally intended as an
>advanced trainer (to fit between the gnat (I think?) and the front line
>aircraft.
>
I thought it was a light strike/attack plane, sort of like a larger
landbound A-4...

>Why is single seat operation an advantage in a tactical situation? Apart
>form the obvious of only risking a single crewman at a time
>

Ian
March 11th 04, 06:28 PM
"rnf2" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 23:04:24 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:
>
> >
> >"monkey" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
> >> you flew them. yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask any
> >> contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole the
> >> RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
> >> Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
> >> radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
> >> like that.
> >
> >The jag was never designed as a fighter. It was originally intended as an
> >advanced trainer (to fit between the gnat (I think?) and the front line
> >aircraft.
> >
> I thought it was a light strike/attack plane, sort of like a larger
> landbound A-4...
>
Thats what it turned into because of budget cuts. The original (and can't
find the link now) Staff requirement was for an intermediate airrcraft
between the gnat and hunter (although I may have got those aircraft wrong

Jim Doyle
March 11th 04, 07:49 PM
"Ian" > wrote in message
...
>
> "rnf2" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On Sat, 6 Mar 2004 23:04:24 -0000, "Ian" > wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >"monkey" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > >> i don't want to insult you ed, but fighters have changed a lot since
> > >> you flew them. yes i'll give you that british guys are ok, but ask
any
> > >> contemporary fighter pilot and he/she wil tell you that as a whole
the
> > >> RAF has been lacking any kind of significant single seat experience.
> > >> Jag guys are great, but lets face it, it't got jack **** power and no
> > >> radar - you just can't fight in todays environment with an airplane
> > >> like that.
> > >
> > >The jag was never designed as a fighter. It was originally intended as
an
> > >advanced trainer (to fit between the gnat (I think?) and the front line
> > >aircraft.
> > >
> > I thought it was a light strike/attack plane, sort of like a larger
> > landbound A-4...
> >
> Thats what it turned into because of budget cuts. The original (and can't
> find the link now) Staff requirement was for an intermediate airrcraft
> between the gnat and hunter (although I may have got those aircraft wrong
>
>

IIRC the Jag was intended as a British advanced trainer yet the French had
other ideas; namely a carrier launched strike a/c. I don't know if this was
ever put into operational use, but there were certainly a number of carrier
based trials of the Jag by the French Navy. The undercarriage and tail hook
are designed for carrier operations, the former allowing the excellent
rough(ish) field capability the RAF employed in Norway. MoD budget cuts
forced through the change from advanced trainer to the strike/recon role.

Jim Doyle

David Nicholls
March 13th 04, 07:20 PM
It may be too long ago to be "relevant" to this discussion but the Fleet Air
Arm, flying Harrier FRS1 in the Falklands some 20 years ago apparently never
got into a "dog fight" after the first day of air-to-air combat. They found
that they were functioning in a classic interceptor role (using subsonic a/c
against M2 Mirages!) and achived a kill ratio of some 20 kills for no losses
to enemy aircraft. It is of note that the combat a/c available to the
Argentinians outnumbered the carrier based Harriers by over 10:1. (The AIM9L
was a great leveller of the playing field)
"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On 6 Mar 2004 10:06:24 -0800, (monkey) wrote:
> >
> > > When I talk about a neutral setup
> > >I mean beak to beak, butterfly split type thing. I'm sorry I've seen
> > >the numbers and the F-22 is one mean turning machine.
> >
> > If you butterfly split, for beak-to-beak, you never go BVR, hence you
> > never employ all your systems, never get any mutual support, never
> > exercise any defense against all-aspect, never worry about F-poles,
> > etc. You don't integrate with AWACs, don't play ECM and simply pull
> > on the pole. If you call that "train like you fight" you must be
> > operating in a different military.
> >
> > As for "mean turning machine", it's an aerodynamic fact of life that
> > stealth and agility are often mutually exclusive. Any airplane is a
> > compromise and the Raptor is no exception.
> >
> > Given an effective 9G sustained limit on human physiology, then a
> > corner of 350 to 400 defines the limits of agility. To become a better
> > air/air fighter you broaden the envelope of your weapons. So, don't
> > look for any 1-v-1 marked superiority until there is some great
> > breakthrough in basic physics.
> >
> > > As a matter of
> > >fact I'm of the opinion that a good guy in a Hornet or big mouth 16
> > >charlie will be able to do just fine against the typhoon. I'll send
> > >you a hud tape to prove it if we ever get to exercise with these
> > >guys...
> >
> > You probably won't get any HUD video of Raptors in a Bug or Viper,
> > since full weapons system exercise will mort you before the merge.
>
> Ed, IDR had an article on intraflight datalinks and their effects on
fighter
> operations. In the article they quoted some USAF fighter types as saying
> that using networked tactics that almost no turning and burning occurred.
> IRRC, the guy was quoted as saying that he rarely pulled even 2G and never
> over 3. Can you comment?
>
>

Ed Rasimus
March 13th 04, 07:32 PM
On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 21:20:02 +0200, "David Nicholls"
> wrote:

>It may be too long ago to be "relevant" to this discussion but the Fleet Air
>Arm, flying Harrier FRS1 in the Falklands some 20 years ago apparently never
>got into a "dog fight" after the first day of air-to-air combat. They found
>that they were functioning in a classic interceptor role (using subsonic a/c
>against M2 Mirages!) and achived a kill ratio of some 20 kills for no losses
>to enemy aircraft. It is of note that the combat a/c available to the
>Argentinians outnumbered the carrier based Harriers by over 10:1. (The AIM9L
>was a great leveller of the playing field)

Your final parenthetical says it all. The all-aspect AIM-9L handles
the differential in performance that occurs if you allow the enemy
aircraft to get to the merge. Since the RAF had all-aspect and the
Argentinians did not, they were able to "face shoot" the incoming
fighters and never got to a "dog-fight."

Today, everyone has all-aspect and there's been 20 years of tactics
development. It's the crux of my regular rants regarding the
non-applicability of 1-v-1 dogfighting. Detect early, BVR shoot with
longest missile, counter opposing shot at the point you are detected
(detectable), then face shoot with shorter range weapon, then blow
through for high-angle guns. Separate to comfortable distance, lather,
rinse, repeat.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Drewe Manton
March 13th 04, 08:43 PM
"David Nicholls" > wrote in news:40535ee4.0
@news1.mweb.co.za:

> (The AIM9L
> was a great leveller of the playing field)
>

I've never totally bought this, a look at most of the comments by pilots
involved in the shootdowns indicates that by far the largest majority of
them (if not all) were classic stern-chase shootdowns. The SHARs claimed
many victims, but rarely ever actually stopped the aircraft reaching
their targets - mostly chasing them down afterwords. Blame that on the
lack of effective AEW cover, not the SHAR. We'll never know if the
results would have differed using the AIM-9G/H that they were equipped
with, the AIM-9L may have helped as a more effective missile overall, but
it's all aspect capability wasn't really tested as far as I'm aware.
Please note extensive use of "IIRC" and "As far as I'm aware" in this
post, I welcome any corrections!

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Paul J. Adam
March 13th 04, 10:03 PM
In message >, David Nicholls
> writes
>(The AIM9L
>was a great leveller of the playing field)

Don't think so, from what I've seen, heard and read. Virtually all the
shots taken were rear-aspect from well within the traditional IRAAM
envelope: AIM-9G should have been good, though -9L definitely better if
only for reliability.

I don't recall any of the Argentine strike aircraft jettisoning ordnance
under attack, let alone turning to engage (could easily be wrong, of
course) and they didn't have any fighter cover after the first day or
so.

Key issue seems to have been unescorted strike packages at low level and
fuel limited, without mutual support: hard to write a better scenario
for a Harrier CAP apart from the lack of AEW.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Guy Alcala
March 13th 04, 10:35 PM
Drewe Manton wrote:

> "David Nicholls" > wrote in news:40535ee4.0
> @news1.mweb.co.za:
>
> > (The AIM9L
> > was a great leveller of the playing field)
> >
>
> I've never totally bought this, a look at most of the comments by pilots
> involved in the shootdowns indicates that by far the largest majority of
> them (if not all) were classic stern-chase shootdowns. The SHARs claimed
> many victims, but rarely ever actually stopped the aircraft reaching
> their targets - mostly chasing them down afterwords. Blame that on the
> lack of effective AEW cover, not the SHAR. We'll never know if the
> results would have differed using the AIM-9G/H that they were equipped
> with, the AIM-9L may have helped as a more effective missile overall, but
> it's all aspect capability wasn't really tested as far as I'm aware.
> Please note extensive use of "IIRC" and "As far as I'm aware" in this
> post, I welcome any corrections!

You are correct, there wasn't a single in the face AIM-9L shot, let alone a
kill. All were from the beam aft, most being from the tail against
non-maneuvering targets. There was at least one attempt to take a head-on
shot, but the missile wouldn't lock (this was on 1 May, at medium/high
altitude). The Daggers concerned had almost certainly gone to idle before
the merge, to deny such a shot.

But, in addition to its improved maneuverability/fusing/warhead over the
AIM-9G, the AIM-9L's perceived head-on _capability_ certainly had an effect
on the Argentine Air Force's tactics and morale. The only FQ-capable missile
the AAF had was the R.530, not exactly renowned for its combat record. I've
wargamed this situation, and barring a surprise bounce (unlikely at altitude,
with both sides having good GCI) about the only reasonable approach for the
Mirages is to build up energy beforehand, go idle, hope to get a radar lock
head-on (with a radar that's probably less powerful and certainly less
reliable than the SHAR's) before reaching min. range, shoot an R.530, blow
through while staying high and keep on going until reaching E-pole, then turn
around and head for the mainland while hoping that the SHARs had to bingo to
the carriers in the meantime, and aren't waiting for you to return. The only
advantage the Mirages have is their speed, and they don't have the fuel at
that radius to make a series of slashing attacks. On both occasions on May
1st when Mirages or Daggers went to the merge with the Brits having tallies,
they lost a/c post merge while turning around.

They did try to make a surprise bounce on 1 May, but the British controllers
were on it, and the SHARS were trying to suck them into range:

"'Leader, I have possible trade for you.' It was Glamorgan [control ship]
again. Things were getting busy. 'Three contacts bearing 190 deg. at about
40 miles. They are very high, estimating 38,000 feet [the SHARs were
patrolling at about 12,000 feet, over a cloud deck], and fast. Heading
straight towards you.'

"'Roger.' I thought fast and remembered E-J's [another squadron pilot]
shadow-boxing. 'Steady on North, Soapy [his wingman]. We'll spoof them into
attacking us. Call the ranges, "D" [the RN designation for a controller],
and we'll turn into them late.' I was going to let the Mirages think that
they hadn't been detected and that they had a clear shot at my six o'clock.

"The Glamorgan's 'D' continued to read out the range of the bogeys astern of
us. '30 miles. 28 miles. They are now supersonic. 23 miles. Coming down
the hill [i.e. diving and picking up smash]. 18 miles. 15 miles.'

"'Counter port, Soapy!' Our two SHARs turned hard to the left through 180
deg. Half way through the turn my radar lost its stabilisation.
Maneuvering against the earlier threat [T-34s at low-level] had probably
upset the reference platform. I steadied, nose high, and my eyes searched
hard against the pale blue of the sky to try to pick up the enemy fighters.

"'8 miles.'

"'Tally ho!' This was it. I didn't have blood in my vains any more, just
pure adrenalin. 'Three trails, 12 o'clock high. I'm going for the left-hand
man. You take the right, then well sort out the middle one later.' The
trails were smoke trails coming directly towards us in a steep descent. Were
the Mirages passing through a condensation layer? I couldn't work it out.
My sidewinder cross was already on my chosen target but I could get no
acquisition tone [This is not the failure to achieve lock I mention above, as
will become apparent]. Then I started to make out the target -- it wasn't an
aircraft, it was white, with fins . . . Must be a head-on missile. 'They're
missiles, Soapy! Keep your eyes peeled for aircraft.'

"My excitement subsided as the 'missiles' ran out of steam and plunged
towards the sea below before reaching us. I craned my neck up and around to
try and spot the enemy, but there was just empty blue sky. Not even Soapy
was to be seen. I felt suddenly vulnerable on my own without the cross-cover
from my Number Two.

"'I've lost visual, Soapy. Better head for the clouds [undercast].'

"'I'm already there, Boss.' Soapy was obviously no fool. I felt all the
tension go and laughed -- at least Soapy had had the sense to run for cover
when he lost the picture. We joined up with the help of Glamorgan and
returned to the deck."

From "Sea Harrier over the Falklands" by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
Ward. It's pretty clear that Argentine GCI detected the SHAR course reversal
and the Mirages buggered off. Note that according to the Argentine pilots no
missiles were fired in this action, so the 'missiles' Sharkey saw may have
been jettisoned drop tanks. There apparently was at least one R.530 fired
during the course of 1 May at a SHAR, but (at least at the time of writing of
"Falklands: The Air War" in the mid-80s] it's unclear just when it happened
or who fired it.

Guy

monkey
March 13th 04, 11:52 PM
> >It may be too long ago to be "relevant" to this discussion but the Fleet Air
> >Arm, flying Harrier FRS1 in the Falklands some 20 years ago apparently never
> >got into a "dog fight" after the first day of air-to-air combat. They found
> >that they were functioning in a classic interceptor role (using subsonic a/c
> >against M2 Mirages!) and achived a kill ratio of some 20 kills for no losses
> >to enemy aircraft. It is of note that the combat a/c available to the
> >Argentinians outnumbered the carrier based Harriers by over 10:1. (The AIM9L
> >was a great leveller of the playing field)
>
> Your final parenthetical says it all. The all-aspect AIM-9L handles
> the differential in performance that occurs if you allow the enemy
> aircraft to get to the merge. Since the RAF had all-aspect and the
> Argentinians did not, they were able to "face shoot" the incoming
> fighters and never got to a "dog-fight."
>
> Today, everyone has all-aspect and there's been 20 years of tactics
> development. It's the crux of my regular rants regarding the
> non-applicability of 1-v-1 dogfighting. Detect early, BVR shoot with
> longest missile, counter opposing shot at the point you are detected
> (detectable), then face shoot with shorter range weapon, then blow
> through for high-angle guns. Separate to comfortable distance, lather,
> rinse, repeat.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Just to clarify a few things- When I was talking about a neutral bfm
setup, it was a theoretical case to start some discussion about
individual a/c performances (e.g. equal capability pilots, etc),
because with what I've been told about the Raptor's handling
characteristics I just don't buy the fact that it is in any way
inferior to the Typhoon. I don't think that anyone in the fighter
community will dispute the fact that with todays technology (datalink,
bvr weapons, etc),no formation ever intends to come even close to a
merge with an adversary. However, with that said it is still important
in my opinion to have an aircraft with some sort of turn performance (
Maybe until hi off boresight wpns & HMS become more
predominant)because even in todays days of AWACS and d/l often during
LFEs things degenerate into the short range pickup situation where at
leat a bit of mx is required. It seems no matter what technology is
out there, one leaker always manages to get through in these
exercises. With that said BFM is definitely evolving - I don't know
what other air forces are into but we are definitely favouring the
aggressive heavy pressure gameplan , really emphasing quick TTK, then
getting out of there before soaking up an unseen radar missile.

Drewe Manton
March 14th 04, 12:10 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in
:

> You are correct, there wasn't a single in the face AIM-9L shot, let
> alone a kill.

Thanks for the clarification Guy, nice to know I can be right from time
to time! But in fairness to the nine-Lima I hadn't really considered the
likely effect just knowing it was being employed would've had on the
Argentinian pilot's tactics and morale, so perhaps it's use played a
bigger role than I'd given it credit for just in terms of mental
attitudes on the part of all concerned. . .

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Evan Brennan
March 14th 04, 12:59 AM
Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 21:20:02 +0200, "David Nicholls"
> > wrote:
>
> >It may be too long ago to be "relevant" to this discussion but the Fleet Air
> >Arm, flying Harrier FRS1 in the Falklands some 20 years ago apparently never
> >got into a "dog fight" after the first day of air-to-air combat. They found
> >that they were functioning in a classic interceptor role (using subsonic a/c
> >against M2 Mirages!) and achived a kill ratio of some 20 kills for no losses
> >to enemy aircraft. It is of note that the combat a/c available to the
> >Argentinians outnumbered the carrier based Harriers by over 10:1. (The AIM9L
> >was a great leveller of the playing field)
>
> Your final parenthetical says it all. The all-aspect AIM-9L handles
> the differential in performance that occurs if you allow the enemy
> aircraft to get to the merge.


The boffins at Eglin Air Force Base agreed with Rasimus and Nicholls.

The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a smaller
range of sensitivity to heat.

The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which had a
90-120 degree field of vision, with a more sensitive seeker that could
detect heat created by airflow from the target. The wider scan and
increased sensitivity of the AIM-9L was obviously a big advantage for
the British because it gave them more flexibility, regardless of
whether they attacked from the rear or front.

Guy Alcala
March 14th 04, 03:42 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> > On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 21:20:02 +0200, "David Nicholls"
> > > wrote:
> >
> > >It may be too long ago to be "relevant" to this discussion but the Fleet Air
> > >Arm, flying Harrier FRS1 in the Falklands some 20 years ago apparently never
> > >got into a "dog fight" after the first day of air-to-air combat. They found
> > >that they were functioning in a classic interceptor role (using subsonic a/c
> > >against M2 Mirages!) and achived a kill ratio of some 20 kills for no losses
> > >to enemy aircraft. It is of note that the combat a/c available to the
> > >Argentinians outnumbered the carrier based Harriers by over 10:1. (The AIM9L
> > >was a great leveller of the playing field)
> >
> > Your final parenthetical says it all. The all-aspect AIM-9L handles
> > the differential in performance that occurs if you allow the enemy
> > aircraft to get to the merge.
>
> The boffins at Eglin Air Force Base agreed with Rasimus and Nicholls.
>
> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a smaller
> range of sensitivity to heat.

I've been unable to confirm that Argentina received or used any of the R.530FE IR-homing variant GCUs, instead of
the R.530EM radar homing variant - the heads are interchangeable on the missile body, and they physically
resemble each other so photos aren't much help telling them apart. The chance of an R.530FE being able to pick
up a subsonic SHAR from the FQ falls into the 'slim and none' category, and even if it could, its maneuverability
is so poor that a SHAR that saw it should be able to outmaneuver it with some ease. The second batch of Mirage
IIIEAs were also capable of carrying a pair of Matra Magic IRMs, either separately (which is what the 'book' said
to do when loaded with 1,700l tanks) or simultaneously, which is what the AAF did, ignoring the book. The
Daggers only carried a pair of Shafrir 2 IRMs.

> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which had a
> 90-120 degree field of vision,

Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking,
according to one fairly authoritative source. 60 deg. OB IRMs didn't arrive until the next generation, with the
R-72M and P4. The AIM-9L's better maneuverability allowed it to be launched at greater AoT than earlier models,
which I suspect is what you're thinking of. The third SHAR kill on 1 May was a beam shot ("just behind the wing
line") on a Canberra at very low altitude. The pilot claimed the missile hit the wing root and disappeared into
the fuselage with no obvious effect. If true, it seems likely that it failed to fuse. The Canberra proceeded
along apparently unhurt, so he fired a second time. However, before the second missile could get there, the a/c
'exploded into a dozen large pieces.'

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 14th 04, 03:44 AM
Guy Alcala wrote:

<snip>

> R-72M

Should of course read R-73M.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 14th 04, 06:27 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> Evan Brennan wrote:
>> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
>> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
>> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.

>> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
>> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,

> Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> authoritative source (snip)


I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html


> The chance of an R.530FE being able to pick up a subsonic SHAR from the
> FQ falls into the 'slim and none' category, and even if it could, its
> maneuverability is so poor that a SHAR that saw it should be able to
> outmaneuver it with some ease.


If that was true, it meant Argentine pilots were saddled with another
serious disadvantage. Another issue was reliability of the equipment
-- and their ability to repair and maintain it.

British Sea Harrier pilots who did not have the luxury of the AIM-9L
were known to get their butts kicked real good by French Mirage pilots
in training combats. I don't recall which missile the Frenchies were
using, but I'm sure you'll probably tell us about that and Sharkey
Ward's excuses for their victories. : )

More to the point -- it would have been very interesting to see the
results of combat if the Sea Harrier pilots in the Falklands were
forced to use the infrared Matra 530.

Guy Alcala
March 14th 04, 10:13 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > Evan Brennan wrote:
> >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
>
> >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
>
> > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > authoritative source (snip)
>
> I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
>
> http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html

I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors,
there are several real howlers in it. I don't have the energy to point them all out, but anyone who wants to take a look
can have a good chuckle. Start with the paragraph entitled "Argentine Air Force/Naval Air Arm", where the following
statement is to be found:

"Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) was the country’s large, relatively modern, and capable air force, particularly when compared
to the militaries of most midsized powers. The FAA possessed some frontline aircraft equal to any in the world—including
Mirage III interceptors."

Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off boresight, but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch. I've
also got fairly specific performance data but I'm not going to post it, just a summary that was given to me along with the
performance data. I'm not sure the data was/is in the public domain, even though the missile is, AFAIK, long gone:

-------------------------------------------------

Notes : the first French production AAM was not really a success. The missile
was notably unreliable at launch and had a very limited intercept envelope due
to its long arming time (4 s.), bad fusing and low delta-v. It was estimated
that with the combined performance of the Cyrano Ibis radar and the missile,
probability of success of a forward sector shot with a Mirage IIIC was nil.
OTOH, its long-lasting motor gave it a fair snap-up capability (a feature common
to all French RHMs).Another unwanted characteristic of the missile was its long
flame and very thick smoke plume, which made the weapon not only very visible
but also potentially dangerous for the launcher. The missile became increasingly
unreliable after the first 5 years of service, and was definitively abandoned in
1991. At that time, it had an officially estimated kill probability of 0.35.

R530 IR (1963)
--------------------

The R530 had a modular design and could be fitted either with a homing or an IR
seekerhead. I haven't got physical characteristics of the R530 IR, but from
pictures it looks close to the SARH version (the latter having, in an unusual
way for a radar-guided missile, a blunted nose). The IR seekerhead was very
rarely mounted as it produced no significative gain in performance over the
smaller Sidewinder. The SAT-3501 nitrogen-cooled seekerhead [Guy: I've deleted the specific wavelength range, but mid-IR]
was credited with an all-aspect capability in certain circumstances (high
altitude), but the missile was very poor in this regard. Seeker could be slaved
to the radar (40 deg. off-boresight).
--------------------------------------------


> > The chance of an R.530FE being able to pick up a subsonic SHAR from the
> > FQ falls into the 'slim and none' category, and even if it could, its
> > maneuverability is so poor that a SHAR that saw it should be able to
> > outmaneuver it with some ease.
>
> If that was true, it meant Argentine pilots were saddled with another
> serious disadvantage.

Sure would have been, which is why it would have made far more sense for them to use the radar-homing version, assuming that
they actually had any IR versions. Besides, they had the Magic (now Magic 1, after the introduction of the all-aspect Magic
2 a couple of years after the war).

> Another issue was reliability of the equipment
> -- and their ability to repair and maintain it.
>
> British Sea Harrier pilots who did not have the luxury of the AIM-9L
> were known to get their butts kicked real good by French Mirage pilots
> in training combats. I don't recall which missile the Frenchies were
> using, but I'm sure you'll probably tell us about that and Sharkey
> Ward's excuses for their victories. : )

Matra Magic and/or R.530, and Sharkey says that the pilots who flew the trials were anything but "Aces of the Base." He
also points out that his squadron had flown against and beaten the 527th TFTAS F-5Es, F-15s from Bitburg and F-16s at
Decimomannu, and both the latter a/c in particular were a couple of decades ahead of the Mirage III in 1982, in performance,
weapons and avionics. The Mirage is much overrated as a dogfighter, having the lowest t/w ratio of any Mach 2 fighter and
the usual characteristics of a naturally stable conventional delta without LE flaps. It can do two things really well: go
fast in a straight line owing to low drag, and bleed energy in a turn like nobody's business. In fact, there's probably
only one a/c that can decelerate faster than a delta, and that's the Harrier, using full braking stop.

The Magic seems to have been a fairly typical 2nd generation IRM, although its public specs indicate it had some advantages
over most of its contemporaries. I've been told privately that the reality was rather different, but it certainly should
have been better than the R.530, which may have been marginally okay when used against unmaneuverable bombers at medium or
high altitude, but was essentially useless against maneuvering fighters at medium/low levels. Indeed the R.530's sole known
kill was an Egyptian MiG-19 which never knew it was coming and was flying along fat, dumb and happy, and the Israeli pilot
who fired the shot, Micha Haber, could hardly believe that he'd actually managed to score a hit with the thing. He kept
expecting the radar to break lock or overheat, or the missile to malfunction, the usual results. The AAF, at least,
wouldn't be operating in such hot conditions as the Israelis, which should improve the radar's cooling and thus its
reliability.

> More to the point -- it would have been very interesting to see the
> results of combat if the Sea Harrier pilots in the Falklands were
> forced to use the infrared Matra 530.

Well, let's give them their own missiles, and assume that they'd somehow managed to shoehorn the Lightning's Firestreak or
more likely Red Top onto the SHAR. Lower reliability and performance than the AIM-9L (or AIM-9G, for that matter), but
warheads of triple the size, and in the case of Red Top a mid-IR cooled seeker like the R.530. Probably better performance,
though. Given roughly equal 2nd gen. IRMs, i.e. the Brits with AIM-9G and the AAF with Magic/Shafrir 2, the Brits still win
with their better training and tactics, and the combat results would have been about the same (given that all the shots were
taken in the rear hemisphere), albeit a few more a/c would get away owing to the lower reliability and maneuverability of
the AIM-9G compared to the L. Argentine tactics would have varied somewhat if they didn't have to worry about head-on AIM-9
shots, but not enough to make a significant difference in the outcome.

Now, if you want to postulate some major change in the results, give the Argentine Mirage/Daggers AAR capability plus the
Cyrano IV from the Mirage F1 (or better yet, the entire a/c) and Super 530F RHMs, plus an additional two and preferably four
more KC-130s. A roughly Sparrow-level FQ capability would give the Brits similar problems as the AAF faced, although SARH
shots can certainly be avoided. But the AAF could then take long range FQ shots and wait to get lucky while disrupting the
British CAPs, without needing to close into AIM-9L range. Oh, and they'd want some Matra AS.37 Martel ARMs as well, to
remove the British GCI capability.

Guy

Marcus Fong
March 14th 04, 11:33 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in
:
> Matra Magic and/or R.530, and Sharkey says that the pilots who
> flew the trials were anything but "Aces of the Base." He also
> points out that his squadron had flown against and beaten the
> 527th TFTAS F-5Es, F-15s from Bitburg and F-16s at Decimomannu,
> and both the latter a/c in particular were a couple of decades
> ahead of the Mirage III in 1982, in performance, weapons and
> avionics.

Nick Richardson (SHAR pilot downed by SA-7 over Bosnia)'s book "No
Escape Zone" contains a chapter about his squadron's exercise
against German MiG-29s before they were deployed to Bosnia. I
don't have the book on hand, but IIRC he considered the Fulcrum to
have better performance than the Sea Harrier in the close-in
fight.

In the WVR-only 2-vs-2 match, the SHARs killed both MiG-29s,
although Richardson's opponent got off the first missile (adjudged
defeated by flares), outmanoeuvred him and was lining him up from
behind when he forced an overshoot by VIFFing and fired the
decisive Sidewinder shot.

In the second scenario where BVR shots were allowed, the SHARs
attempted to Doppler-notch the MiGs, but failed to do it properly.
The Fulcrums apparently spotted them trying and deliberately broke
lock anyway, tricking the SHARs into thinking they had lost
contact. They then locked the Harriers up again and killed them
with simulated AA-10s as they closed to the merge.

(It was interesting to read a Western fighter pilot describing how
dangerous the MiG-29 was BVR - this was before the FRS.1s were
replaced by FA.2s. Just goes to show that everything is
relative...)

--Marcus

Guy Alcala
March 14th 04, 08:21 PM
Marcus Fong wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in
> :
> > Matra Magic and/or R.530, and Sharkey says that the pilots who
> > flew the trials were anything but "Aces of the Base." He also
> > points out that his squadron had flown against and beaten the
> > 527th TFTAS F-5Es, F-15s from Bitburg and F-16s at Decimomannu,
> > and both the latter a/c in particular were a couple of decades
> > ahead of the Mirage III in 1982, in performance, weapons and
> > avionics.
>
> Nick Richardson (SHAR pilot downed by SA-7 over Bosnia)'s book "No
> Escape Zone" contains a chapter about his squadron's exercise
> against German MiG-29s before they were deployed to Bosnia. I
> don't have the book on hand, but IIRC he considered the Fulcrum to
> have better performance than the Sea Harrier in the close-in
> fight.

I'd expect it would. About all the SHAR has there is decel and
pointing ability at slow speed, and against R-73s with HMS things
would be tough.

> In the WVR-only 2-vs-2 match, the SHARs killed both MiG-29s,
> although Richardson's opponent got off the first missile (adjudged
> defeated by flares), outmanoeuvred him and was lining him up from
> behind when he forced an overshoot by VIFFing and fired the
> decisive Sidewinder shot.

Kids! Don't try this at home! ;-) Sounds like a typical 'first
exposure to the Harrier' mistake.


In the second scenario where BVR shots were allowed, the SHARs

> attempted to Doppler-notch the MiGs, but failed to do it properly.
> The Fulcrums apparently spotted them trying and deliberately broke
> lock anyway, tricking the SHARs into thinking they had lost
> contact. They then locked the Harriers up again and killed them
> with simulated AA-10s as they closed to the merge.

Oops! Sounds like well-trained MiG pilots. If only RHMs always
worked as well for real. The AA-10's performance in the
Ethiopian/Eritrean squabble was apparently underwhelming.

> (It was interesting to read a Western fighter pilot describing how
> dangerous the MiG-29 was BVR - this was before the FRS.1s were
> replaced by FA.2s. Just goes to show that everything is
> relative...)

Yup. Blue Vixen/AIM-120 would certainly change the odds. I've also
read accounts by U.S. F-16 pilots going against the German MiG-29s.
At first doing WVR against it was tough, owing to the HMS/R-73 combo.
But once they got some experience against it and knew its
capabilities, they could beat it consistently by playing on the a/c's
disadvantages. Practice against your opponent matters, but the enemy
may be reluctant to provide non-lethal training ahead of time ;-)
Anyway, thanks for the steer, that one sounds good. I'll have to try
and find it.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 15th 04, 08:42 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> Evan Brennan wrote:
> > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
>
> > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
>
> > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > authoritative source (snip)
> >
> > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> >
> > http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html
>
> I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is
> bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors, there are several real
> howlers in it (snip)


Yet fewer than we got from Sharkey Ward. : )


> Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off boresight,
but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.


Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
relation to the attacking aircraft.

You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
off-boresight.

Marcus Fong
March 15th 04, 12:23 PM
Guy Alcala > wrote in
:
> Marcus Fong wrote:
>> In the second scenario where BVR shots were allowed, the
>> SHARs attempted to Doppler-notch the MiGs, but failed to
>> do it properly. The Fulcrums apparently spotted them
>> trying and deliberately broke lock anyway, tricking the
>> SHARs into thinking they had lost contact. They then
>> locked the Harriers up again and killed them with
>> simulated AA-10s as they closed to the merge.
>
> Oops! Sounds like well-trained MiG pilots. If only RHMs
> always worked as well for real. The AA-10's performance in
> the Ethiopian/Eritrean squabble was apparently
> underwhelming.

So I gathered, but I wonder how much of that was the
missile's fault and how much was the launch platform's. If
the contents of this article are anywhere near correct, the
baseline MiG-29 and Su-27 are even more underwhelming at long
range than I'd thought:

http://www.buddyboys.net/lessons/wags/SU27_Too_Realistic.shtml

(No RWR in the forward hemisphere when your radar is on?
Locking on takes ten seconds? RWR only displaying the
"highest priority threat" as determined by the computer?
Brr.)

--Marcus

Jim Doyle
March 15th 04, 03:42 PM
"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message
>...
> > Evan Brennan wrote:
> > > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> > > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
> >
> > > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
> >
> > > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > > authoritative source (snip)
> > >
> > > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> > > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> > >
> > >
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html
> >
> > I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is
> > bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors, there are several
real
> > howlers in it (snip)
>
>
> Yet fewer than we got from Sharkey Ward. : )
>
>
> > Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off
boresight,
> but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.
>
>
> Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
> degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
> relation to the attacking aircraft.
>
> You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
> off-boresight.

Since this thread turned to missiles, and knowing little about them, I've
been looking them up. It seems the case that on the majority missile specs
include the 'field of regard' given as the +/- off-boresight angle.

Seems intuitive enough since the OB angle is the same as the
aircraft-to-target angle for all but extremely close encounters (where you'd
be too close for missiles anyway).

Jim D

Evan Brennan
March 15th 04, 07:56 PM
"Jim Doyle" > wrote in message >...
> > > > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> > > > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > > > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
>
> > > > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > > > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
>
> > > > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > > > authoritative source (snip)
> > > >
> > > > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> > > > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > > > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> > > >
> > > >
> http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html

> > > Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off
> boresight,
> > but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.
> >
> >
> > Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
> > degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
> > relation to the attacking aircraft.
> >
> > You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
> > off-boresight.
>
> Since this thread turned to missiles, and knowing little about them, I've
> been looking them up. It seems the case that on the majority missile specs
> include the 'field of regard' given as the +/- off-boresight angle.

> Seems intuitive enough since the OB angle is the same as the
> aircraft-to-target angle for all but extremely close encounters (where you'd
> be too close for missiles anyway).


Corum should have used more specific language.

I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
capabilities better than I can:

http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm

Jim Doyle
March 15th 04, 08:42 PM
"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> "Jim Doyle" > wrote in message
>...
> > > > > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530
that
> > > > > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > > > > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
> >
> > > > > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > > > > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
> >
> > > > > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > > > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > > > > authoritative source (snip)
> > > > >
> > > > > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned
are
> > > > > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > > > > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> >
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html
>
> > > > Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off
> > boresight,
> > > but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.
> > >
> > >
> > > Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
> > > degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
> > > relation to the attacking aircraft.
> > >
> > > You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
> > > off-boresight.
> >
> > Since this thread turned to missiles, and knowing little about them,
I've
> > been looking them up. It seems the case that on the majority missile
specs
> > include the 'field of regard' given as the +/- off-boresight angle.
>
> > Seems intuitive enough since the OB angle is the same as the
> > aircraft-to-target angle for all but extremely close encounters (where
you'd
> > be too close for missiles anyway).
>
>
> Corum should have used more specific language.
>
> I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
> AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
> difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
> capabilities better than I can:
>
> http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm

Cheers for the link Evan. It's answered a few questions!

Jim

Ed Rasimus
March 15th 04, 10:46 PM
On 15 Mar 2004 11:56:50 -0800, (Evan Brennan)
wrote:
>
>I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
>AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
>difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
>capabilities better than I can:
>
>http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm

Interesting info on the site, but let me provide a "non-marketing"
insight. In 1-v-1 maneuvering there are two angles used to describe
the relationship between a pair of adversaries.

Aspect angle refers to the position of one aircraft in relation to
another without regard to aircraft heading. If an aircraft has a 60
degree aspect angle it generally means that the aircraft is positioned
within 60 degrees of the tail of the other. (Recall that a "low
aspect" shot is one in which the shooter is at 6:00 to the target.) It
doesn't describe the relative heading of the two aircraft. So, an
aircraft can be at 60 degrees of aspect without being anywhere near
close to alignment.

Heading Crossing Angle (HCA) or "angle off" refers to the difference
between the two aircraft headings. While two aircraft might have zero
degrees heading crossing angle, the could simultaneously be at 90
degrees of aspect--in other words, shoulder-to-shoulder and parallel
course.

Clearly to get to a low aspect shooting situation, the attacker must
reduce both aspect angle and angle off.

The "off-boresight" angle refers to the location of the target
aircraft relative to the nose of the shooter. This could be a
relatively small angle even though the aspect might be high and the
heading cross angle high as well--visualize a front quartering pass.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Guy Alcala
March 16th 04, 10:07 PM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > Evan Brennan wrote:
> > > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> > > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
> >
> > > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
> >
> > > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > > authoritative source (snip)
> > >
> > > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> > > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> > >
> > > http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html
> >
> > I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is
> > bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors, there are several real
> > howlers in it (snip)
>
> Yet fewer than we got from Sharkey Ward. : )

Sharkey tends to let his prejudices run away with him when he's talking about subjects of which he has no personal knowledge
or experience, but such is not the case when he's talking about the A-A capabilities of the SHAR vs. the AAF: he was rather
conclusively proven right in 1982, to the tune of 22:0.

> > Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off boresight,
> but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.
>
> Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
> degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
> relation to the attacking aircraft.
>
> You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
> off-boresight.

No, Corum very clearly is talking about the seeker FOV, although he seems to use/confuse AOB/AON (Angle off Nose) and FOV
(AoB x 2), almost interchangeably. Quote:

"Armament was the FAA’s most serious deficiency. Its primary air intercept missile (AIM) was an early version of the
French-made Matra 530 infrared air-to-air missile. It suffered from a six-mile range, a very narrow field of vision (30–40
degrees), and an infrared sensor that could lock onto an enemy fighter only from directly behind.6"

It's unclear whether he's referring to AOB or FOV here. It seems to be the latter, in which case his source appears to be
in error, slightly understating it.

"The British Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force (RAF) Harriers could each carry four US-made AIM-9L Sidewinder
heat-seeking missiles. The AIM-9Ls were a generation ahead of the Matras, had a very wide field of vision (90–120 degrees),
and had a much more sensitive infrared seeker that could lock onto the heat created by the airflow over an enemy aircraft.
In
short, the AIM-9Ls gave Harrier pilots a great deal more flexibility and allowed them to engage targets head-on.7"

Clearly he's referring to FOV here, and his source is definitely in error, overstating the AIM-9L FOV (54-80 deg.)
considerably.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 16th 04, 10:08 PM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> "Jim Doyle" > wrote in message >...
> > > > > >> The Argentine pilots used an early version of the Matra 530 that
> > > > > >> suffered from a narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and a
> > > > > >> smaller range of sensitivity to heat.
> >
> > > > > >> The British Sea Harrier pilots carried the US-made AIM-9L which
> > > > > >> had a 90-120 degree field of vision,
> >
> > > > > > Probably more like 54-80 degrees: +-27 degrees off boresight for
> > > > > > acquisition, +-40 deg. OB for tracking, according to one fairly
> > > > > > authoritative source (snip)
> > > > >
> > > > > I won't argue with all the technobabble, but the specs I mentioned are
> > > > > found in 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational
> > > > > View', Dr. James S. Corum. As of this writing, it's online at:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html
>
> > > > Re the R.530EM (SARH) seeker, I've got the following: 40 deg. off
> > boresight,
> > > but has to be within 25 deg. OB at launch.
> > >
> > >
> > > Ah, Mr. Alcala, it's obvious to me that Dr. Corum was talking about
> > > degrees with regards to maximum aspect angle of the target aircraft in
> > > relation to the attacking aircraft.
> > >
> > > You're confusing yourself and everyone else by giving degrees
> > > off-boresight.
> >
> > Since this thread turned to missiles, and knowing little about them, I've
> > been looking them up. It seems the case that on the majority missile specs
> > include the 'field of regard' given as the +/- off-boresight angle.
>
> > Seems intuitive enough since the OB angle is the same as the
> > aircraft-to-target angle for all but extremely close encounters (where you'd
> > be too close for missiles anyway).
>
> Corum should have used more specific language.
>
> I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
> AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
> difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
> capabilities better than I can:
>
> http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm

Unfortunately that link contains so many factual errors that you have to be very careful using it. AIM-9B and "M-2"
have "cryogenically-cooled seekers," and can only home on a target in A/B? Su-27 "Funkers"? And on and on. I'll
continue this in my reply to Ed's post.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 16th 04, 11:33 PM
Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On 15 Mar 2004 11:56:50 -0800, (Evan Brennan)
> wrote:
> >
> >I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
> >AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
> >difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
> >capabilities better than I can:
> >
> >http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm
>
> Interesting info on the site, but let me provide a "non-marketing"
> insight. In 1-v-1 maneuvering there are two angles used to describe
> the relationship between a pair of adversaries.
>
> Aspect angle refers to the position of one aircraft in relation to
> another without regard to aircraft heading. If an aircraft has a 60
> degree aspect angle it generally means that the aircraft is positioned
> within 60 degrees of the tail of the other. (Recall that a "low
> aspect" shot is one in which the shooter is at 6:00 to the target.) It
> doesn't describe the relative heading of the two aircraft. So, an
> aircraft can be at 60 degrees of aspect without being anywhere near
> close to alignment.

Which is also known as AOT (Angle Off the Tail). TAA (Target Aspect
Angle), OTOH, is essentially the inverse, i.e the angle between the
target's velocity vector (or, more often, heading) and the LOS between
target and shooter, so in the situation you describe above TAA would be
120 rather than 60, and you'd want to get to a TAA of 180 (directly
behind), with (ideally, assuming the target is flying straight and level
and you don't need to pull lead) an AON/AOB of 0, i.e. pointing directly
towards the target.

> Heading Crossing Angle (HCA) or "angle off" refers to the difference
> between the two aircraft headings. While two aircraft might have zero
> degrees heading crossing angle, the could simultaneously be at 90
> degrees of aspect--in other words, shoulder-to-shoulder and parallel
> course.

The navy seems to use TCA, track-crossing angle, for this. Maybe it's an
air force/navy thing.

> Clearly to get to a low aspect shooting situation, the attacker must
> reduce both aspect angle and angle off.
>
> The "off-boresight" angle refers to the location of the target
> aircraft relative to the nose of the shooter. This could be a
> relatively small angle even though the aspect might be high and the
> heading cross angle high as well--visualize a front quartering pass.

Yup. Now, back to Corum and Robinson. Corum is describing seeker FOV
limitations when he speaks of 30-40 or 90-120 degrees, and what Ed calls
aspect angle (AoT) when he talks about where the missile can be fired from
(behind/ahead). Robinson has a better grasp of the issues, and the
diagram is helpful, but he still gets many of the details wrong. So I'll
give it a whirl.

FOV/FOR
AOB/AON/look-angle/gimbal limits
Sensitivity

Missile seekers limit missile performance in several ways. FOV/FOR (field
of regard) determines the cone in which a seeker can see the target. This
is important because the a/c has to turn to bring the target into the
seeker FOV, and then keep it there). The seeker AOB (1/2 of the FOV/FOR),
aka look-angle or (sometimes) gimbal limit, i.e the angle off the missile
centerline that the seeker can see, also limits how far off the nose or
tail of a target a missile can be launched (usually Aspect angle/AOT, or
sometimes TAA).

All A-A missiles (AFAIK) use some form of proportional navigation for
guidance, allowing them to use a more energy-efficient lead-pursuit course
rather than the much less efficient pure pursuit course (pure pursuit
means they would always head directly towards the target's current
position. If you were running after someone who was crossing from right
to left in front of you, would you head right for them or head where they
will be at some point in the future, i.e. off to the left of where they
are now?).

Depending on a missile's speed and turning ability, its seeker look
angle/AOB may limit its ability to pull lead, and it will be unable to
pull enough lead to intercept the target while the seeker keeps the target
in sight. This was a big problem on the AIM-9B and its clones, as it only
had a look angle/AOB/gimbal limit of 25 degrees (i.e. FOV of 50 degrees).
If the missile had to pull more than 25 degrees of lead to intercept the
target, the seeker would lose sight of the target and go ballistic. This
meant that the AIM-9B had to be launched in a very narrow (+-15 deg. AOT,
maybe expanding to +-30 if the target was in A/B) cone behind the target,
as it was too slow and unable to pull enough g to follow a target that had
to be led more than 25 degrees, as would be typical of targets at high
TCA. If the missile were faster this would be less of a problem, as it
wouldn't need to lead the target as much (a laser wouldn't need to lead it
at all).

While the the AIM-9B and many other early missiles had look angle limits
of 25 degrees, for technical reasons they were further limited in that the
target had to be acquired and they had to be launched with the seeker
caged in boresight, i.e. looking straight ahead at the target. At some
point after the missile was launched (IIRR it was 0.8 sec. for the early
AIM-9s), the seeker uncaged and the full FOV was available.

This handicapped the missile in two ways. First, it took longer to get
into a firing position, because the launch a/c had to be pointed directly
towards the target; second the missile couldn't be given a 'head start' on
the target by the launch a/c pulling some lead on the target, which would
ease the turn required after launch. This forced the missile to turn very
hard immediately, causing drag and depleting its energy, thus shortening
its maximum range. It might also require a turn greater than the missile
was capable of making, so it might be impossible fo the missile to hit a
target when fired at significant TCA or pulling g. For this and the
look-angle limits mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the AIM-9B was
effectively limited to tracking targets pulling 3g or less.

And finally, there's seeker sensitivity, how strong a signal is required
and, colloquially, what wavelengths they are sensitive to. The AIM-9B and
similar missiles used uncooled seekers, typically lead-sulphide. These
were sensitive to the near-IR spectrum, roughly 1-3 microns. This meant
that they could only track hot metal engine parts, so they could only be
launched from rear aspects where they had a view of the engine. To track
the much cooler exhaust plume required a cooled seeker, one which was also
sensitive to mid-IR (roughly 3-5.5 microns). This allowed launch from
much greater AoT because the plume could be seen from a wider AOT than the
hot engine itself, and also allowed the seeker to lock on from a greater
distance owing to its greater sensitivity in general. Part of the
increased sensitivity was due to a decrease in the seeker Instantaneous
Field of View, IFOV, the angular cone which the seeker could see at any
single moment. IIRR this was 4 or 5 degrees in the AIM-9B, reduced to 2.5
degrees in the 2nd gen. AIM-9s. These seekers were typical of the 2nd
gen. IRMs like the AIM-9D/E/G/H/J, Shafrir 2, R-13M, R-60 and Magic 1. At
least some of these allowed the seeker to be uncaged (and sometimes slaved
to the radar or IRSTS) prior to launch, theoretically making target
acquisition easier and allowing the launch a/c to pull lead prior to
launch, making the missile's job easier. In practice, in a dogfight
targets were usually acquired in boresight, then uncaged to pull lead
before firing.

These second gen. missiles were also generally more maneuverable than the
first gen. variety, often faster as well, and had look angles increased
from 25 to ca. 40 degrees, so the combination of all these features
allowed launch and successful intercept from greater AoT/TCA and/or
against targets pulling more G.

Given adequate sensitivity, cooling theoretically allowed launch from the
forward quarter; both the Red Top and R.530F, along with the later IR
versions of the AIM-4 Falcon, were officially credited with a (limited) FQ
capability, essentially restricted to high altitude, high speed targets
within very limited parameters, owing to both the max. lock-on range and
the limited maneuverability of the missile, which limited its minimum
range and its ability to hit a fast closing target at any distance off
boresight.

The third gen, miisiles, typified by the AIM-9L/M, Magic 2, Python 3 etc.,
had more sensitive and further improved mid-IR seekers and even better
maneuverability, further expanding their ability to be launched from high
AoT/high TCA or from frontal aspects. As the Robinson article says, 4th
gen. is even greater maneuverability, greater seeker FOV, and usually HMS
to make off-boresight lock-on much easier.

Guy

Ed Rasimus
March 17th 04, 12:11 AM
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:33:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On 15 Mar 2004 11:56:50 -0800, (Evan Brennan)
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >I'm no expert on missiles either, but you're forgetting that the
>> >AIM-9L was an 'all-aspect' type. The link below might explain the
>> >difference between measuring aspect angle and off-boresight
>> >capabilities better than I can:
>> >
>> >http://www.monch.com/html/features/Dogfight%20Missiles.htm
>>
>> Interesting info on the site, but let me provide a "non-marketing"
>> insight. In 1-v-1 maneuvering there are two angles used to describe
>> the relationship between a pair of adversaries.
>>
>> Aspect angle refers to the position of one aircraft in relation to
>> another without regard to aircraft heading. If an aircraft has a 60
>> degree aspect angle it generally means that the aircraft is positioned
>> within 60 degrees of the tail of the other. (Recall that a "low
>> aspect" shot is one in which the shooter is at 6:00 to the target.) It
>> doesn't describe the relative heading of the two aircraft. So, an
>> aircraft can be at 60 degrees of aspect without being anywhere near
>> close to alignment.
>
>Which is also known as AOT (Angle Off the Tail). TAA (Target Aspect
>Angle), OTOH, is essentially the inverse, i.e the angle between the
>target's velocity vector (or, more often, heading) and the LOS between
>target and shooter, so in the situation you describe above TAA would be
>120 rather than 60, and you'd want to get to a TAA of 180 (directly
>behind), with (ideally, assuming the target is flying straight and level
>and you don't need to pull lead) an AON/AOB of 0, i.e. pointing directly
>towards the target.
>
>> Heading Crossing Angle (HCA) or "angle off" refers to the difference
>> between the two aircraft headings. While two aircraft might have zero
>> degrees heading crossing angle, the could simultaneously be at 90
>> degrees of aspect--in other words, shoulder-to-shoulder and parallel
>> course.
>
>The navy seems to use TCA, track-crossing angle, for this. Maybe it's an
>air force/navy thing.
>
>> Clearly to get to a low aspect shooting situation, the attacker must
>> reduce both aspect angle and angle off.
>>
>> The "off-boresight" angle refers to the location of the target
>> aircraft relative to the nose of the shooter. This could be a
>> relatively small angle even though the aspect might be high and the
>> heading cross angle high as well--visualize a front quartering pass.
>
>Yup. Now, back to Corum and Robinson. Corum is describing seeker FOV
>limitations when he speaks of 30-40 or 90-120 degrees, and what Ed calls
>aspect angle (AoT) when he talks about where the missile can be fired from
>(behind/ahead). Robinson has a better grasp of the issues, and the
>diagram is helpful, but he still gets many of the details wrong. So I'll
>give it a whirl.
>
>FOV/FOR
>AOB/AON/look-angle/gimbal limits
>Sensitivity
>
>Missile seekers limit missile performance in several ways. FOV/FOR (field
>of regard) determines the cone in which a seeker can see the target. This
>is important because the a/c has to turn to bring the target into the
>seeker FOV, and then keep it there). The seeker AOB (1/2 of the FOV/FOR),
>aka look-angle or (sometimes) gimbal limit, i.e the angle off the missile
>centerline that the seeker can see, also limits how far off the nose or
>tail of a target a missile can be launched (usually Aspect angle/AOT, or
>sometimes TAA).
>
>All A-A missiles (AFAIK) use some form of proportional navigation for
>guidance, allowing them to use a more energy-efficient lead-pursuit course
>rather than the much less efficient pure pursuit course (pure pursuit
>means they would always head directly towards the target's current
>position. If you were running after someone who was crossing from right
>to left in front of you, would you head right for them or head where they
>will be at some point in the future, i.e. off to the left of where they
>are now?).
>
>Depending on a missile's speed and turning ability, its seeker look
>angle/AOB may limit its ability to pull lead, and it will be unable to
>pull enough lead to intercept the target while the seeker keeps the target
>in sight. This was a big problem on the AIM-9B and its clones, as it only
>had a look angle/AOB/gimbal limit of 25 degrees (i.e. FOV of 50 degrees).
>If the missile had to pull more than 25 degrees of lead to intercept the
>target, the seeker would lose sight of the target and go ballistic. This
>meant that the AIM-9B had to be launched in a very narrow (+-15 deg. AOT,
>maybe expanding to +-30 if the target was in A/B) cone behind the target,
>as it was too slow and unable to pull enough g to follow a target that had
>to be led more than 25 degrees, as would be typical of targets at high
>TCA. If the missile were faster this would be less of a problem, as it
>wouldn't need to lead the target as much (a laser wouldn't need to lead it
>at all).
>
>While the the AIM-9B and many other early missiles had look angle limits
>of 25 degrees, for technical reasons they were further limited in that the
>target had to be acquired and they had to be launched with the seeker
>caged in boresight, i.e. looking straight ahead at the target. At some
>point after the missile was launched (IIRR it was 0.8 sec. for the early
>AIM-9s), the seeker uncaged and the full FOV was available.
>
>This handicapped the missile in two ways. First, it took longer to get
>into a firing position, because the launch a/c had to be pointed directly
>towards the target; second the missile couldn't be given a 'head start' on
>the target by the launch a/c pulling some lead on the target, which would
>ease the turn required after launch. This forced the missile to turn very
>hard immediately, causing drag and depleting its energy, thus shortening
>its maximum range. It might also require a turn greater than the missile
>was capable of making, so it might be impossible fo the missile to hit a
>target when fired at significant TCA or pulling g. For this and the
>look-angle limits mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the AIM-9B was
>effectively limited to tracking targets pulling 3g or less.
>
>And finally, there's seeker sensitivity, how strong a signal is required
>and, colloquially, what wavelengths they are sensitive to. The AIM-9B and
>similar missiles used uncooled seekers, typically lead-sulphide. These
>were sensitive to the near-IR spectrum, roughly 1-3 microns. This meant
>that they could only track hot metal engine parts, so they could only be
>launched from rear aspects where they had a view of the engine. To track
>the much cooler exhaust plume required a cooled seeker, one which was also
>sensitive to mid-IR (roughly 3-5.5 microns). This allowed launch from
>much greater AoT because the plume could be seen from a wider AOT than the
>hot engine itself, and also allowed the seeker to lock on from a greater
>distance owing to its greater sensitivity in general. Part of the
>increased sensitivity was due to a decrease in the seeker Instantaneous
>Field of View, IFOV, the angular cone which the seeker could see at any
>single moment. IIRR this was 4 or 5 degrees in the AIM-9B, reduced to 2.5
>degrees in the 2nd gen. AIM-9s. These seekers were typical of the 2nd
>gen. IRMs like the AIM-9D/E/G/H/J, Shafrir 2, R-13M, R-60 and Magic 1. At
>least some of these allowed the seeker to be uncaged (and sometimes slaved
>to the radar or IRSTS) prior to launch, theoretically making target
>acquisition easier and allowing the launch a/c to pull lead prior to
>launch, making the missile's job easier. In practice, in a dogfight
>targets were usually acquired in boresight, then uncaged to pull lead
>before firing.
>
>These second gen. missiles were also generally more maneuverable than the
>first gen. variety, often faster as well, and had look angles increased
>from 25 to ca. 40 degrees, so the combination of all these features
>allowed launch and successful intercept from greater AoT/TCA and/or
>against targets pulling more G.
>
>Given adequate sensitivity, cooling theoretically allowed launch from the
>forward quarter; both the Red Top and R.530F, along with the later IR
>versions of the AIM-4 Falcon, were officially credited with a (limited) FQ
>capability, essentially restricted to high altitude, high speed targets
>within very limited parameters, owing to both the max. lock-on range and
>the limited maneuverability of the missile, which limited its minimum
>range and its ability to hit a fast closing target at any distance off
>boresight.
>
>The third gen, miisiles, typified by the AIM-9L/M, Magic 2, Python 3 etc.,
>had more sensitive and further improved mid-IR seekers and even better
>maneuverability, further expanding their ability to be launched from high
>AoT/high TCA or from frontal aspects. As the Robinson article says, 4th
>gen. is even greater maneuverability, greater seeker FOV, and usually HMS
>to make off-boresight lock-on much easier.
>
>Guy
>

Gosh, I love it when you talk dirty. Next thing you know prospective
fighter pilots will get discouraged and overwhelmed by all of this
techno-babble.

Having lived in the dark ages of tail-chase fighter tactics, the rules
were exceedingly simple. You needed to understand aspect and
angle-off. One dealt with where you were relative to the bandit and
the second related to whether you were parallel or crossing. Reduce
aspect to get behind him. Reduce angle off to get aligned for a shot.

All BFM can be distilled to "Eddie's Three Rules".

First, reduce angles. If you cut the angles to zero, you are dead
astern and pointing at his tail. (Even with modern all aspect
weaponry, if you do rule one you improve your Pk.)

Second, always keep positive delta energy over your opponent. That
means be sure to always be faster or higher than the bandit--ideally,
both.

Third, maneuver out of plane until shooting if on offensive; maneuver
to force the attacker in plane until he's about to shoot if on
defense. That translates as "don't tail chase on offense" and "stuff
him on defense."

In any one-v-one situation that's all there is. "Everything else is
rubbish."

Remember you heard it hear first. Patent pending. Your mileage may
vary.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Guy Alcala
March 18th 04, 03:44 AM
Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:33:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:

<snip>

> Gosh, I love it when you talk dirty.

Ed, I think jogging your memories of Thailand in 1972 for the book has kicked
your libido into overdrive. For the record, I do not resemble, in size, shape
or gender (although I've read that the last could be somewhat ambiguous), an
LBFM ;-)

> Next thing you know prospective
> fighter pilots will get discouraged and overwhelmed by all of this
> techno-babble.

<snip>

But I suspect the FWS/TopGun types, as certainly the missile engineers, will
feel right at home. Indeed, much of the description I gave was condensed
and/or paraphrased from Shaw.

Guy

Yeff
March 18th 04, 03:56 AM
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 03:44:07 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote:

> Ed, I think jogging your memories of Thailand in 1972 for the book has kicked
> your libido into overdrive. For the record, I do not resemble, in size, shape
> or gender (although I've read that the last could be somewhat ambiguous), an
> LBFM ;-)

Last Bohemian Field Marshal?

Yep, spent four years in the Philippines and the bar called LBFM's broke
out the letters as I noted above. What else could it mean?

-Jeff B. (blinking innocently)
yeff at erols dot com

Evan Brennan
March 18th 04, 04:19 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is
> > > bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors, there are several real
> > > howlers in it (snip)
> >
> > Yet fewer than we got from Sharkey Ward. : )
>
> Sharkey tends to let his prejudices run away with him when he's talking about subjects of which he has no personal knowledge
> or experience, but such is not the case when he's talking about the A-A capabilities of the SHAR vs. the AAF: he was rather
> conclusively proven right in 1982, to the tune of 22:0.



Sharkey Ward is an idiot.

The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more impressive, but similar in that
many of the victims were non or barely maneuvering targets. Until
1944, German fighters typically scored lopsided victories against
British fighters. While American and German pilots celebrated their
own skill and courage, they were also smart enough to recognize that
their enemies were saddled with some disavantages. That is where
Sharkey fails. It's a noticable character flaw. He was unable to grasp
that Argentine pilots had many more disadvantages than he, and that
Argentine pilots were more impressed with the AIM-9L than British
piloting skills.

The Argentines had to fly hundreds of miles, had little or no fuel
reserve to dogfight and their jets were usually loaded for surface
attack, not air-to-air combat. Their flights were small because few
aerial tankers were available; no US Navy style Alpha Strikes for
them. Argentine AAMs were pure ****e, assuming they worked at all, and
most of the attack planes did not carry them. Ammo for cannons was
sometimes deleted to save weight. In that case their only defense was
to make a run for it.

Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense, and it
appears that they usually stayed home in case the British tried to
bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard, ten-megaton
explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and filed in the
proper place.

Guy Alcala
March 18th 04, 05:39 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > > I read it (well, as much as I could stand to, but grinding my teeth is
> > > > bad for me). Aside from the numerous minor errors, there are several real
> > > > howlers in it (snip)
> > >
> > > Yet fewer than we got from Sharkey Ward. : )
> >
> > Sharkey tends to let his prejudices run away with him when he's talking about subjects of which he has no personal knowledge
> > or experience, but such is not the case when he's talking about the A-A capabilities of the SHAR vs. the AAF: he was rather
> > conclusively proven right in 1982, to the tune of 22:0.
>
> Sharkey Ward is an idiot.
>
> The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more impressive, but similar in that
> many of the victims were non or barely maneuvering targets. Until
> 1944, German fighters typically scored lopsided victories against
> British fighters. While American and German pilots celebrated their
> own skill and courage, they were also smart enough to recognize that
> their enemies were saddled with some disavantages. That is where
> Sharkey fails. It's a noticable character flaw. He was unable to grasp
> that Argentine pilots had many more disadvantages than he, and that
> Argentine pilots were more impressed with the AIM-9L than British
> piloting skills.

On the contrary, he specifically goes through the threat reduction exercise his AWIs (and he) performed, listing the disadvantages
the AAF faced.

> The Argentines had to fly hundreds of miles, had little or no fuel
> reserve to dogfight and their jets were usually loaded for surface
> attack, not air-to-air combat. Their flights were small because few
> aerial tankers were available; no US Navy style Alpha Strikes for
> them. Argentine AAMs were pure ****e, assuming they worked at all, and
> most of the attack planes did not carry them. Ammo for cannons was
> sometimes deleted to save weight. In that case their only defense was
> to make a run for it.

Virtually every point of which, as well as several others, Sharkey's team brought up in their TRE, and which he specifically
describes in the book. Although all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was. The others were rear-hemisphere only
unlike the AIM-9L, but in practice it made little difference. I am aware of no case where cannon ammo was left behind to save
weight, but will be happy to see a reputable cite from an Argentine pilot to that effect. I can certainly supply numerous cites
from Argentine pilots, or photo references, of Argentine a/c firing their guns during the war. Indeed, Sharkey was, AFAIK, the
sole English fast-jet pilot to be fired upon by Argentine a/c cannon during the war.

Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense, and it

> appears that they usually stayed home in case the British tried to
> bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard, ten-megaton
> explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and filed in the
> proper place.

And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected, and your lack of understanding of the technical issues involved
likewise. Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes, but in this case I felt that some other readers might benefit
from a more accurate description of the technical aspects, as the URLs you provided were notably sloppy, incomplete or inaccurate.

Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos
Aires), in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were
used to fly decoy missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real reason, then the decision was only
made after the results of the combats on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A. The AIM-9L played a part in
that, but British tactics and training was far more important to the exchange ratio.

Guy

Drewe Manton
March 18th 04, 12:52 PM
Guy Alcala > wrote in
:

> Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes,

Don't start now on our account Guy! Brennan's undistilled Anglophobia
leads him round in ever decreasing circles, snapping at his own
arguments. I can only assume it's some kind of previously unknown penis-
envy of all things British! It was quite amusing to come back to this
forum after 17 weeks away training and realise he'd somehow climbed out
of my killfile like a particularly determined slug from the bucket of
beer. . . .

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Ed Rasimus
March 18th 04, 02:38 PM
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 03:44:07 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:33:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
>> > wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>> Gosh, I love it when you talk dirty.
>
>Ed, I think jogging your memories of Thailand in 1972 for the book has kicked
>your libido into overdrive. For the record, I do not resemble, in size, shape
>or gender (although I've read that the last could be somewhat ambiguous), an
>LBFM ;-)

You may be right. The strongest memories I've got of that tour do
relate to extra-aviation activities. But, now at my age, an LBFM has
come to mean a "Light Beer From Miller."
>
>> Next thing you know prospective
>> fighter pilots will get discouraged and overwhelmed by all of this
>> techno-babble.
>
><snip>
>
>But I suspect the FWS/TopGun types, as certainly the missile engineers, will
>feel right at home. Indeed, much of the description I gave was condensed
>and/or paraphrased from Shaw.

I was pulling your chain regarding the high level of technical info
you acquire--you should get out more, maybe take up fishing or golf.

Seriously, it's fun to have the broad range of folks in this group who
really know something about stuff!



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Guy Alcala
March 18th 04, 07:20 PM
Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 03:44:07 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:33:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
> >> > wrote:
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> Gosh, I love it when you talk dirty.
> >
> >Ed, I think jogging your memories of Thailand in 1972 for the book has kicked
> >your libido into overdrive. For the record, I do not resemble, in size, shape
> >or gender (although I've read that the last could be somewhat ambiguous), an
> >LBFM ;-)
>
> You may be right. The strongest memories I've got of that tour do
> relate to extra-aviation activities. But, now at my age, an LBFM has
> come to mean a "Light Beer From Miller."

No doubt you tell your wife that's what it _always_ meant (does she believe it)?
;-)

> >> Next thing you know prospective
> >> fighter pilots will get discouraged and overwhelmed by all of this
> >> techno-babble.
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >But I suspect the FWS/TopGun types, as certainly the missile engineers, will
> >feel right at home. Indeed, much of the description I gave was condensed
> >and/or paraphrased from Shaw.
>
> I was pulling your chain regarding the high level of technical info
> you acquire--you should get out more, maybe take up fishing or golf.

And I wasn't pulling yours, above? ;-) Fishing? Naw. Did that when I was a kid
-- too boring, and I don't like eating them (and me part Portuguese!) so had to
have someone willing to do so if I caught them. Golf? Took lessons when I was a
kid, and played into my teens until I came to the conclusion that it was way too
expensive for the amount of enjoyment I got out of it. So I guess I'll have to
stick to my other recreational pursuits, like X-C skiing, hiking, swimming,
mountaineering (not much, anymore), biking etc. I can't do the high impact sports
any more owing to the accumulation of injuries over the years, which means I've had
to give up pretty much any sport that involves running (back), jumping (ditto; it's
the landings), hitting or throwing (shoulder). I can live without football,
baseball, or basketball okay, but man, do I miss playing doubles volleyball.

> Seriously, it's fun to have the broad range of folks in this group who
> really know something about stuff!

Yup, even makes it worthwhile having to put up with the loons, trolls, bigots etc.
Usually. On a good day.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 18th 04, 07:33 PM
Drewe Manton wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in
> :
>
> > Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes,
>
> Don't start now on our account Guy! Brennan's undistilled Anglophobia
> leads him round in ever decreasing circles, snapping at his own
> arguments.

True, which is why I usually don't bother to read them or reply. But as
long as he is actually making claims that are more or less on topic, I may
choose to reply or rebut them, for whatever benefit others may get out of
that. Should it deteriorate to the usual level of childish insults with no
other content, then I'm sure I'll find something more interesting elsewhere.

> I can only assume it's some kind of previously unknown penis-
> envy of all things British! It was quite amusing to come back to this
> forum after 17 weeks away training and realise he'd somehow climbed out
> of my killfile like a particularly determined slug from the bucket of
> beer. . . .

Time-limited killfile, maybe? Man, I shudder at the thought of my killfile
suddenly losing its memory and re-admitting all the loons and trolls I've
consigned to it over the years, even if many of them moved on once no one
was paying any attention to them. On the other hand, there's old Johnny
Wizard; I no longer bother trying to keep up with his numerous
re-incarnations. That boy's got stamina.

Guy

Peter Kemp
March 18th 04, 09:02 PM
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 19:33:03 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>On the other hand, there's old Johnny
>Wizard; I no longer bother trying to keep up with his numerous
>re-incarnations. That boy's got stamina.

Too true, luckily I just set Agent not to download anything over 2000
lines and he magically disappears :-)

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

Stephen Harding
March 18th 04, 09:55 PM
Guy Alcala wrote:

> Time-limited killfile, maybe? Man, I shudder at the thought of my killfile
> suddenly losing its memory and re-admitting all the loons and trolls I've
> consigned to it over the years, even if many of them moved on once no one
> was paying any attention to them. On the other hand, there's old Johnny
> Wizard; I no longer bother trying to keep up with his numerous
> re-incarnations. That boy's got stamina.

Johnny Wiz is indeed a piece of work.

Funny how images of people pop up into your mind just from
regular reading, without actual visuals involved in shaping
the image.

I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
at "the system".

However he's a manifesto writer at heart, and unfortunately,
there just isn't much opportunity for employment for these
types in today's economy.

But there *are* newsgroups! *Lots* of newsgroups!

So the Wiz gets home from work, fires up his computer, or
perhaps more likely, shuffles off to the public library to
use theirs, and spends the night cranking out these 4000+
line beauties, taking the time to fully justify the lines
as he goes.

Justified lines are very important! Spelling, grammar,
thought organization and sentence structure are irrelevancies.

The post must be long, and it must be fully justified!!!

Hmmm. Speaking of long OT posts with no content...


SMH

Evan Brennan
March 19th 04, 09:13 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > The Argentines had to fly hundreds of miles, had little or no fuel
> > reserve to dogfight and their jets were usually loaded for surface
> > attack, not air-to-air combat. Their flights were small because few
> > aerial tankers were available; no US Navy style Alpha Strikes for
> > them. Argentine AAMs were pure ****e, assuming they worked at all, and
> > most of the attack planes did not carry them. Ammo for cannons was
> > sometimes deleted to save weight. In that case their only defense was
> > to make a run for it.
>
> Virtually every point of which, as well as several others, Sharkey's team
> brought up in their TRE


Cite?

If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
Sharkey. He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )


> all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was.


The Sidewinder wasn't ****e -- but it wasn't used either. This issue
is largely irrelevant because very few Argentine sorties carried
missiles after 1st May 1982. Re: Argentine Mirage and Dagger fighters
from 'Air War in the Falklands', Christopher Chant (2001):

" FAA, now fearing that Vulcan bombers could strike on strategic
targets, had decided to reserve the Mirage IIIEA fighters of Groupo 8
de Caza for defense of the mainland bases. So with the exception of a
few more sorties over the Falkland Islands, where they carefully
avoided any Sea Harrier fighters, the Mirage IIIEA force spent the
rest of the war at readiness on airfields that could have been
threatened "

" From this day forward the Dagger was employed as fighter-bomber
rather than a fighter, and for the rest of the war did not operate
over the Falklands with air-to-air missiles. Thus in the remaining six
weeks of the war British pilots were faced by many forms of danger,
but not missile-armed Argentine fighters "

Jeff Ethell's 'Air War South Atlantic' (1983) cites A-4 pilot Lt.
Rotolo: " We never mounted Sidewinders on our Skyhawks because our
mission was always one of attack, never air-to-air combat "



> Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense, and it
> > appears that they usually stayed home in case the British tried
to
> > bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard, ten-megaton
> > explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and filed in the
> > proper place.
>
> And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected


British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


> and your lack of understanding of the technical issues involved
> likewise. Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes,
> but in this case I felt that some other readers might benefit from
> a more accurate description of the technical aspects, as the URLs
> you provided were notably sloppy, incomplete or inaccurate.


Guy, you can't even put your NON-technical appeals in credible form! I
don't see why anyone should believe your continuous stream of
technical minutae is entirely "accurate".



> Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
> available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
> had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
> Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
> holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
> air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
> in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
> is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
> missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
> reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
> on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.


There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
preposterous argument flows from another.


> > Argentine pilots were more impressed with the AIM-9L than British
> > piloting skills.

> British tactics and training was far more important to the exchange ratio.


Re: Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):

" Fuel restrictions prevented them from making zig-zag maneuvers to
evade would-be pursuers or re-runs, or selecting secondary
targets...once they penetrated San Carlos Bay, they had to proceed
posthaste to the first available target...one had to be careful
disturbing the Harriers, which having been alerted to their presence,
lay in wait for them as they returned to the mainland...These
interceptors were well aware that the intuders carried no air-to-air
missiles, and that in order to use their cannon, they had to to be rid
of their external stores which could sacrifice the mission...Add to
all this the handicap to these aircraft represented by the task force
Sidewinders, which turned the pilot's jobs into child's play, for they
knew that Argentine Mirage-IIIs, whether flying interception,
diversion, or escort, could not join the melee for lack of fuel "

Re: Moro's opinion of British ground attack pilot training:

" It is quite probable that, in the wake of their experience in the
Falklands, the British may have beefed up their bombing crews' target
practice. Argentine pilots were to remark jokingly that their British
colleagues had been unable, throughout the whole of the conflict, to
"hit the broad side of a barn" said "barn" (the landing strip at
Puerto Argentino) having been 1,300 yards long and and 50 yards wide "

But, I'm sure that Argentine jet pilots would agree that international
training was another lynchpin for the British. Harrier pilots had
prewar ACM combats against Skyhawk and Mirage aircraft (and Dagger was
similar to Mirage) so they had time to consider tactics well in
advance. As far as I know, the Argentine squadrons did not have any
prewar ACM exercises vs. Harriers.

Presidente Alcazar
March 19th 04, 09:34 AM
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 16:55:13 -0500, Stephen Harding
> wrote:

>I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
>store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
>to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
>at "the system".

Well, after experiencing the legendary Serdar Argic and his cult of
personality, I came to the conclusion that all usenet contributors
were basically frustrated loons, and it was all just a question of
degree (although the needle was off the scale with Serdar). But then
I realised this also logically applied to me, so I discarded that
piece of demented insight with all despatch.

Gavin Bailey

--

Fochinell

"Ancient Scottish battle cry" painted on the side of a Spitfire Mk. XIV in 1944
- presumably without Air Ministry approval.

Evan Brennan
March 19th 04, 10:07 AM
Drewe Manton > wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in
> :

> It was quite amusing to come back to this
> forum after 17 weeks away training and realise he'd somehow climbed out
> of my killfile like a particularly determined slug from the bucket of
> beer. . . .


Guinness? ; )

No thread containing comments about the Falklands is ever complete
without some MantonRantin'. I predict that when the latest returns
come in for 'Sea Harrier Over the Falklands', we'll have pretty
conclusive proof that 10-year-olds are winning the intellectual
tug-of-war with their publishing executive counterparts.

Drewe Manton
March 19th 04, 10:49 AM
Presidente Alcazar > wrote in
:

>
> Well, after experiencing the legendary Serdar Argic and his cult of
> personality, I came to the conclusion that all usenet contributors
> were basically frustrated loons, and it was all just a question of
> degree (although the needle was off the scale with Serdar). But then
> I realised this also logically applied to me, so I discarded that
> piece of demented insight with all despatch.

No no, you were perfectly correct to begin with.
<WHIBBLE>
--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

March 19th 04, 03:43 PM
Presidente Alcazar >
wrote:

>On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 16:55:13 -0500, Stephen Harding
> wrote:
>
>>I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
>>store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
>>to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
>>at "the system".
>
>Well, after experiencing the legendary Serdar Argic and his cult of
>personality, I came to the conclusion that all usenet contributors
>were basically frustrated loons, and it was all just a question of
>degree (although the needle was off the scale with Serdar). But then
>I realised this also logically applied to me, so I discarded that
>piece of demented insight with all despatch.
>
>Gavin Bailey

Congratulations Gavin!...insight is almost never 20-20...you done
good!... :)
--

-Gord.

Ian
March 19th 04, 04:07 PM
"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message
>...
<snip>
> British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> falling on Stanley airfield. : )
>

May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

Guy Alcala
March 20th 04, 10:17 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > The Argentines had to fly hundreds of miles, had little or no fuel
> > > reserve to dogfight and their jets were usually loaded for surface
> > > attack, not air-to-air combat. Their flights were small because few
> > > aerial tankers were available; no US Navy style Alpha Strikes for
> > > them. Argentine AAMs were pure ****e, assuming they worked at all, and
> > > most of the attack planes did not carry them. Ammo for cannons was
> > > sometimes deleted to save weight. In that case their only defense was
> > > to make a run for it.
> >
> > Virtually every point of which, as well as several others, Sharkey's team
> > brought up in their TRE
>
> Cite?

Well, you could start on page 56, where he discusses with his AWIs what preparation needs to be done, jump to page 66, where
he talks about Alan Curtis' experience of the A-4 and Mirage and how that info will come in handy, then to pages 73 and 74,
where he describes a conversation with a couple of friends on the strengths and weaknesses he sees, and then read all of
Chapter 9 which goes into the threat reduction exercise in some detail, especially as to AAF strike ranges, radar and
weapons capabilities (of both sides), AAR limitations, etc. Pg. 125-126 have a bit, pg. 129 talks about the limitations of
Port Stanley Airfield for fast jets, and their are various other small bits scattered throughout the book which you'll have
to re-read to find.

> If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
> do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
> Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
> Sharkey.

the Epilogue states what mistakes he felt were made by the British, and what actions he felt should be taken, and little
else other than commenting that it's unlikely that the Falklands could be reinforced in time to prevent their being taken in
a surprise attack given less than a couple of day's warning, a fact that is demonstrably true. And this time, there's a
nice 8,600 foot runway that can take any a/c in the Argentine fleet, eliminating their geographical disadvantage. Do you
disagree with his analysis?

> He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
> that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
> Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )

Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat". Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of
the appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human
Factors that Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War." Of course, he could have used that title for
the entire book, perhaps with the added subtitle "In the opinion of the CO of 801 Squadron, along with his personal
experiences." But perhaps you missed the following, on pg. 288 of the LGtFC:

"What is the fighter pilot's job when he is faced with an air combat situation against other fighters? It is 'to use his
aeroplane as a weapon system with which he can destroy any enemy aircraft that are menacing him or threatening the security
of the resources that he is there to protect.' and he must do this without letting the enemy threaten him.

"How does he carry out his task?"

And he then goes on to give some general rules, quickly discusses fighter performance issues, weapons issues, and BFM,
restricted to 1 v. 1, stating what he believes the key characteristics of a successful fighter are, points out that
multi-aircraft combat may well change the equation. He then devots a single paragraph about how a/c like the SHAR may well
be able to beat a/c of suprior book performance like the Mirage III, and various teens, talks about how weapon systems may
affect tactics, and fnally, in just about the only specific reference to the Operational and technical factors in the war,
other than the short mention of the Mirage III above, writes in regard to STOVL capability:

"The inability of the Argentine fighters to do this cost Argentina the Falklands War. If they could have operated from the
short runway at Port Stanley, the Task Force's job would have been vastly more difficult."

While it amy be arguable that this inability cost them the war, his conclusiomn in the second sentence is undeniable. I
know you must agree, because that single advantage would have eliminated AAF/CANA range problems, while increasing those of
the Brits.


>
> > all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was.
>
> The Sidewinder wasn't ****e -- but it wasn't used either.

The only version of the AIM-9 the Argentineans had was the AIM-9B and that's the next thing to ****, and vastly inferior to
either the Shafrir 2 or Magic. But we both agree it was never carried, so I considered it irrelevant and left it completely
out of my calculations.

> This issue
> is largely irrelevant because very few Argentine sorties carried
> missiles after 1st May 1982.

No, the issue isn't irrelevant, it's the heart if the matter. We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

> Re: Argentine Mirage and Dagger fighters
> from 'Air War in the Falklands', Christopher Chant (2001):
>
> " FAA, now fearing that Vulcan bombers could strike on strategic
> targets, had decided to reserve the Mirage IIIEA fighters of Groupo 8
> de Caza for defense of the mainland bases. So with the exception of a
> few more sorties over the Falkland Islands, where they carefully
> avoided any Sea Harrier fighters, the Mirage IIIEA force spent the
> rest of the war at readiness on airfields that could have been
> threatened "

Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st. So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and
decided to throw in the A-A towel.

> " From this day forward the Dagger was employed as fighter-bomber
> rather than a fighter, and for the rest of the war did not operate
> over the Falklands with air-to-air missiles. Thus in the remaining six
> weeks of the war British pilots were faced by many forms of danger,
> but not missile-armed Argentine fighters "

Yup. And again, why not? They had the a/c, they had the missiles, and they had the pilots. The Dagger was marginally
better for CAP/escort than the Mirage III despite its lack of radar, because it carried more internal fuel. And yet they
forfeited the match and gave the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a moral ascendancy over
them.

> Jeff Ethell's 'Air War South Atlantic' (1983) cites A-4 pilot Lt.
> Rotolo: " We never mounted Sidewinders on our Skyhawks because our
> mission was always one of attack, never air-to-air combat "

Yup. Please note the rest of the quote from Rotolo:

"What were we briefed to do if jumped by Sea Harriers? Well, we had a lot of experience of air combat maneuvering, but in
the A-4 there was not much choice. Not only were we too slow, but we knew very well we could not outmaneuver the Sea
Harrier. All we could do was try to escape at full throttle at low level."

Now there's a pilot who's beaten before he starts. Too slow? Well, in the A-4B (A-4Q to the Argentine Navy), yeah, they're
slower than a SHAR but not all that much, especially when they've jettisoned the racks and tanks. But can't outmaneuver the
SHAR?! Hell, the A-4 can still outmaneuver most of the teen-series, and you can always make yourself a tougher target even
if you're at a disavantage. Just ask the Canberra pilot who managed to make a SHAR miss with 2 AIM-9Ls at low altitude.
But if you want to solve all the SHAR's tracking problems and give them a dead six shot on a non-maneuvering target, then
doing nothing but running away is the way to go about it. Not exactly good tactics there.

BTW, Rotolo was a Navy (CANA) A-4 pilot, and AFAICT, they were the only Argentine Skyhawks to be fitted for AIM-9s, and only
had the AIM-9B. But carrying it really wasn't an option, because the A-4B only has three pylons, and if they carried AIM-9s
on the wing pylons they're limited to a single fuel tank on the C/L, and probably couldn't even make the round trip (barring
a lot more KC-130s being available). Both Navy and Air Force A-4s had to operate with two wing tanks to have sufficient
range, carrying a bomb or bombs on the C/L.

Speaking of bad tactics, let's go up the page a bit, to the comments by Ruben Zini of Grupo 5:

"We were briefed to avoid dogfights [Guy: a good idea in general] and escape at low level and alone, 'every man for
himself.'"

Apparently they didn't consider the concept of mutual support important. But you can bet that a few 20mm rounds in the
general direction of a SHAR might rattle a pilot's aim, even if they missed. And it sure beats passively accepting their
fate, which in effect is what many of the pilots did.

> > Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense, and it
> > > appears that they usually stayed home in case the British tried
> to
> > > bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard, ten-megaton
> > > explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and filed in the
> > > proper place.
> >
> > And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected
>
> British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> falling on Stanley airfield. : )

Said what same thing?

> and your lack of understanding of the technical issues involved

> > likewise. Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes,
> > but in this case I felt that some other readers might benefit from
> > a more accurate description of the technical aspects, as the URLs
> > you provided were notably sloppy, incomplete or inaccurate.
>
> Guy, you can't even put your NON-technical appeals in credible form! I
> don't see why anyone should believe your continuous stream of
> technical minutae is entirely "accurate".

Given that you have trotted out as evidence sources that are full of easily spotted, in some cases quite ludicrous errors,
you are clearly unable to evaluate the accuracy of the technical minutiae. Picking one at random, care to talk about
whether Coram's description of the TPS-43's radar's range and capabilities is accurate, as this is a source you seem to put
a great deal of faith in? That's the sort of technical minutiae you claim to be credible.

> > Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
> > available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
> > had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
> > Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
> > holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
> > air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
> > in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
> > is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
> > missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
> > reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
> > on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.
>
> There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
> preposterous argument flows from another.

In other words, you are unable to rebut, so will just ignore it and hope we don't notice.

> > > Argentine pilots were more impressed with the AIM-9L than British
> > > piloting skills.
>
> > British tactics and training was far more important to the exchange ratio.
>
> Re: Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
> Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
> Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):

Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine
sources, it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the Junta's propaganda during the war. Here's a fairly
typical review:

"A glaring gap exists in the historical coverage of the Falklands War. That gap is due to the British monopoly in the
writing of this war's history. The reader picks up Moro's book hoping and expecting to find a welcome new perspective, that
of Argentina. The hopeful reader is destined to be disappointed, as the book is beset by severe deficiencies that render its
value as negligible. The major flaw of this work is its credibility. The accounts presented are an obvious mixture of fact
and fantasy that result in even the accurate narrations being cast in doubt. Wild claims of the aircraft carrier HMS
Invincible being bombed and severely damaged are a good example, as are claims for British aircraft downed in fantastic
numbers. Argentine forces are portrayed as heroic and effective to the extent that the uninformed is liable to believe that
Argentina won the war. The reader is left frustrated, as it seems that the British accounts must be tainted with a lack of
objectivity on occasion. Ruben Moro, however, does little but thicken the fog of uncertainty. Another disturbing flaw is the
style in which the book is written. It is devoid of any objective and academic character, and is consumed by emotive and
partisan rhetoric. At times the reader is impressed that he is reading an official history of the Galtieri Junta, published
by the Ministry of Information of the time. History is yet to be graced by a serious and dependable Argentinian perspective
of this war."

You might try to find a copy (Spanish only, I'm afraid) of the book by Pablo Carballo of Grupo 5, "Dios Y Los Halcones". He
flew many of the more important missions, and doesn't seem to have the hysterical and/or histrionic tone of many of the more
"official" sources, at least as far as I was able to puzzle out between my junior high-school Spanish and Babelfish. But
the most objective sources I've read about the Argentine (and British) sides of the air war are still written by British or
American authors, "Falklands: The Air War" being the essential source, with "Air War South Atlantic" being wuite good
considering it came out so soon after the war. Salvador Mafe' Huertas Osprey book on the Mirage III/V contains many good
accounts and pictures from Argentine pilots, and I'm told his book on the Mirage's combat record is also good.

> " Fuel restrictions prevented them from making zig-zag maneuvers to
> evade would-be pursuers or re-runs, or selecting secondary
> targets

Fuel was certainly an issue, although not quite to that extent. The translation may be the problem here.

> ...once they penetrated San Carlos Bay, they had to proceed
> posthaste to the first available target...

Because of the defenses, not fuel. BTW, that was one of the reasons Clapp and Thompson chose San Carlos Water, despite a
couple of disadvantages, including it being closer to the Argentine air bases compared to some of the other options, like
Cow and Volunteer bays.

> one had to be careful
> disturbing the Harriers, which having been alerted to their presence,
> lay in wait for them as they returned to the mainland...

Assuming they hadn't hit them on the way in. Without doing a full count, AFAIR not a single Dagger was shot down while
returning to base; they were all shot down on the way in before they reached the AOA. The Skyhawks were slower, and they
were shot down both coming and going.

> These
> interceptors were well aware that the intuders carried no air-to-air
> missiles, and that in order to use their cannon, they had to to be rid
> of their external stores which could sacrifice the mission...

False. Are the SHAR pilots supposed to be mind readers, so they can know that the Daggers weren't carrying missiles? And
who says they couldn't fire cannon without dropping stores? This would come as news to both Dagger and Skyhawk pilots.

> Add to
> all this the handicap to these aircraft represented by the task force
> Sidewinders, which turned the pilot's jobs into child's play, for they
> knew that Argentine Mirage-IIIs, whether flying interception,
> diversion, or escort, could not join the melee for lack of fuel "

It's awfully hard to "Join the melee" if you're sitting back at base or only fly decoy missions that chose never to close
within range. Which doesn't explain why the Daggers couldn't have joined the melee if they had been tasked to fly escort,
but they'd stopped doing so after May 1st.Oh, and as far as the Brit Sidewinders "turning the pilot's job's into child's
play," we've got Rotolo and Zini demonstrating that their tactics were the culprits.

> Re: Moro's opinion of British ground attack pilot training:
>
> " It is quite probable that, in the wake of their experience in the
> Falklands, the British may have beefed up their bombing crews' target
> practice. Argentine pilots were to remark jokingly that their British
> colleagues had been unable, throughout the whole of the conflict, to
> "hit the broad side of a barn" said "barn" (the landing strip at
> Puerto Argentino) having been 1,300 yards long and and 50 yards wide "

If he was referring to the RAF Vulcans, I might agree although much of that was due to the limitations of the weapon system,
and they did put the first bomb of the first mission on the runway. But in the case of the SHARS the comment is pretty
silly, as (with the exception of a couple of attacks, when some lay-down HE was used) they were using VT-fused bombs to
attack the airport facilities and a/c, not trying to crater the runway. They considered the latter to be almost pointless,
as they would be unable to keep it out of action unless they dedicated virtually every Harrier sortie to the job. So they
decided to keep everyone awake by each a/c dropping a VT-fused 1,000 lber on the airport, on the way to their CAP Station.
Minimal cost to them, harasses the troops on the ground, may get lucky occasionally.

> But, I'm sure that Argentine jet pilots would agree that international
> training was another lynchpin for the British. Harrier pilots had
> prewar ACM combats against Skyhawk

Not that I'm aware of, but Alan Curtis, at least, had flown them with the RAN.

> and Mirage aircraft (and Dagger was
> similar to Mirage) so they had time to consider tactics well in
> advance.

Not the pilots with the task force, but again Curtis had some experience in the back seat of one.


> As far as I know, the Argentine squadrons did not have any

> prewar ACM exercises vs. Harriers.

Correct, and especially in the case of the Harrier, that can be important. Even so, both sides tried to fight at altitudes
where they had the advantage: the SHARs at medium/low altitude, and the Mirage/Daggers up high. The SHARs refused to go up
to play, and the M/Ds didn't want to come down. But they should have, as that's where the strikers were, just to give the
SHARs something to think about. None of that explains the poor tactical formations used by the Argentine Mirage/Dagger
pilots on 1 May. You don't fly welded wing in a combat area.

Brigadier Crespo did do a few things right, like refusing to get involved in a battle for air superiority prior to the
landings and depleting his forces. OTOH, you could say that this reflected a lack of aggressiveness on his side, which
contributed to the morale advantage that the Brits established on May 1st. He should have provided escorts to the strikes
after May 1st.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 20th 04, 10:29 AM
Ian wrote:

> "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> m...
> > Guy Alcala > wrote in message
> >...
> <snip>
> > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> > falling on Stanley airfield. : )
> >
>
> May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
> smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
> cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

Doubt it, since the first raid hit the runway almost dead center, albeit
long (the first bomb of the stick hit the runway, the next just off the
edge, with the rest continuing off to the southwest). The second raid was
slightly short for range but straddling, but considerably off for line if
they were aiming at the middle of the runway like the first raid. The stick
was centered perhaps 200 feet (eyeballing the recon photo) off the west end
of the runway. They were using radar offsets; at least the first raid
(according to Middlebrook) used Mengeary Point, a couple of miles short of
and almost on a direct line from the runway on the run-in heading of 235
deg.M (the runway is aligned 085/265), as the offset.

Guy

Peter Stickney
March 20th 04, 04:35 PM
In article >,
Stephen Harding > writes:
> Guy Alcala wrote:
>
>> Time-limited killfile, maybe? Man, I shudder at the thought of my killfile
>> suddenly losing its memory and re-admitting all the loons and trolls I've
>> consigned to it over the years, even if many of them moved on once no one
>> was paying any attention to them. On the other hand, there's old Johnny
>> Wizard; I no longer bother trying to keep up with his numerous
>> re-incarnations. That boy's got stamina.
>
> Johnny Wiz is indeed a piece of work.
>
> Funny how images of people pop up into your mind just from
> regular reading, without actual visuals involved in shaping
> the image.
>
> I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
> store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
> to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
> at "the system".

Fryolator Driver at a Tim Horten's I suspect. IIRC, (I couldn't be
arsed to check), Whizzer's in Alberta, somewhere. I suspect that his
potential girlfriend ran off with an USAnian.

> However he's a manifesto writer at heart, and unfortunately,
> there just isn't much opportunity for employment for these
> types in today's economy.
>
> But there *are* newsgroups! *Lots* of newsgroups!
>
> So the Wiz gets home from work, fires up his computer, or
> perhaps more likely, shuffles off to the public library to
> use theirs, and spends the night cranking out these 4000+
> line beauties, taking the time to fully justify the lines
> as he goes.
>
> Justified lines are very important! Spelling, grammar,
> thought organization and sentence structure are irrelevancies.
>
> The post must be long, and it must be fully justified!!!

What really must be chapping his ass is that, given the close ties
between the U.S. Law Enforcement types, and the RCMP, (and the
duration that he's been reposting his. uhm. stuff) he's been
thoroughly checked out, and deemed as far too inconsequential to
bother with.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Guy Alcala
March 21st 04, 02:55 AM
Guy Alcala wrote:

> Evan Brennan wrote:
>
> > Guy Alcala > wrote in message

<snip>

> > > all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was.
> >
> > The Sidewinder wasn't ****e -- but it wasn't used either.
>
> The only version of the AIM-9 the Argentineans had was the AIM-9B and that's the next thing to ****, and vastly inferior to
> either the Shafrir 2 or Magic. But we both agree it was never carried, so I considered it irrelevant and left it completely
> out of my calculations.

<snip>

Let me add a qualification to my statement that the AIM-9B "was never carried," as my memory was bugging me so I went looking
for a cite. It was definitely never carried by naval strike A-4Qs, but apparently was carried by them when used in the air
defense role from 25 de Mayo, before she returned to harbor and the A-4Qs moved to Rio Grande. From "Falklands: The Air War,"
pg. 39, in the chapter on 3 Escuadrilla:

"The carrier force was not involved in the fighting of 1 May but, by the early hours of 2 May, '25 de Mayo' had established that
the British fleet was approximately miles away to her south-east and Task Force 79 remained at action stations. Following the
earlier launching of nine unproductive air defence sorties from '25 de Mayo' there had been much activity during the night by
the two opposing carrier groups and CANA was prepared to take offensive action at first light on 2 May. The 3 Escuadrilla crews
were called to a mission brieifing at 0500Z (it took two hours to complete) and were told that all eight Skyhawks would be
launched against the British fleet. Each was armed with iron bombs and the Skyhawks would have to fly without the benefit of
accompanying missile-equipped a/c."

This accords with my memory of reading another source that said they flew AD missions armed with AIM-9Bs, and I believe I've
seen a photo of an a/c so armed during the war, but I don't remember where I read/saw it. It wouldn't be the first time that
A-4s had been used in such a role from carriers when no other fast jets were available -- the USN did the same thing in Vietnam
when they sent some of their CVSs to operate as limited attack carriers, and I think the RAN used their A-4s for Ad as well as
strike. "F:TAW" is usually an extremely reliable source, but Rotolo states that this never was done. I'll have to call these
missions unconfirmed unless I can find some more evidence, preferably a photo or personal account.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 21st 04, 05:37 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
> > do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
> > Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
> > Sharkey. He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
> > that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
> > Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )

> Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat".
> Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of the
> appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the
> Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human Factors that
> Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War."


Ahhh, I get it. So the fact that the Argentine jets had little or
no fuel reserves for 'ACM' is not a signicant factor that affects
the outcome of 'ACM'?

The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands. You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.


> We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
> they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"


Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.


> Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
> So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided
> to throw in the A-A towel.


But fuel restrictions prevented the fighters from manuevering
much in the first place (and they did not) and that's the main
fact that you keep ignoring. All they did is take a few potshots,
with little actual manuevering, positioning and set-up for shots.
At least one missile was fired out of range, at least one was
fired way out of its envelope, and at least one misfired and
tumbled off its launch rail.

If you think that the Argentine fighters had enough gas to do
ACM in better quality and quantity, you'll have to prove it.
You'll also have to prove that their weapon systems were
consistently functioning as advertised.


> > > >Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense,
> > > >and it appears that they usually stayed home in case the British
> > > >tried to bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard,
> > > >ten-megaton explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and
> > > >filed in the proper place.
> > >
> > > And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected
> >
> > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British
> > bombs falling on Stanley airfield. : )
>
> Said what same thing?


The part about the Mirages being reserved in case the British
bombed the mainland, of course.



> > > Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
> > > available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
> > > had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
> > > Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
> > > holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
> > > air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
> > > in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
> > > is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
> > > missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
> > > reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
> > > on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.
> >
> > There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
> > preposterous argument flows from another.
>
> In other words, you are unable to rebut


Your interpretations are not based on facts -- the one about there
being 'plenty of Daggers available for A-A escort', and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.



> > Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
> > Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
> > Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):
>
> Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from
> another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine sources,
> it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the
> Junta's propaganda during the war.


If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.

Sharkey probably alienated every service he came into contact with.
His book is nothing more than a vanity piece designed to discredit
all his enemies. This is a man who entered a huge bureaucracy, only
to be disappointed when he found that it was a huge bureaucracy.
Even in the Epilogue of his book, Sharkey can't stop bitching; he
simply returns to his favorite themes:

1) The RAF is evil -- they robbed the RN of everlasting glory.
2) The RN is evil -- they wouldn't listen to Sharkey either.
3) The MOD is evil -- they wouldn't buy more Sea Harriers.

I wonder who has first dibs on the movie rights?

Guy Alcala
March 21st 04, 09:46 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
> > > do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
> > > Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
> > > Sharkey. He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
> > > that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
> > > Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )
>
> > Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat".
> > Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of the
> > appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the
> > Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human Factors that
> > Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War."
>
> Ahhh, I get it. So the fact that the Argentine jets had little or
> no fuel reserves for 'ACM' is not a signicant factor that affects
> the outcome of 'ACM'?

Sure it does, just as the fact that the CVs were operating so far to the east affected the SHAR's CAP time and their ability
to chase retreating Argentine a/c to the west. But those are factors specific to that particular war, not BFM in general or
the role of fighters, which is what the appendix was clearly about.

> The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
> on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
> the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
> Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.

I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out where you think I did. Fuel reserves played a part,
weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played a part, GCI played a part (with the advantage on the
Argentine side here, as the Brits had no radar equivalent to the TPS-43). If you go back to my post of last Sunday, which I
think was the one you dismissed as full of technical minutiae, you can read the following:
---------------------------------------------------------

Now, if you want to postulate some major change in the results, give the
Argentine Mirage/Daggers AAR capability plus the
Cyrano IV from the Mirage F1 (or better yet, the entire a/c) and Super 530F
RHMs, plus an additional two and preferably four
more KC-130s. A roughly Sparrow-level FQ capability would give the Brits
similar problems as the AAF faced, although SARH
shots can certainly be avoided. But the AAF could then take long range FQ
shots and wait to get lucky while disrupting the
British CAPs, without needing to close into AIM-9L range. Oh, and they'd
want some Matra AS.37 Martel ARMs as well, to
remove the British GCI capability.
---------------------------------------------------------

Gee, why do you suppose I mentioned the Mirage/Daggers needing AAR capability and the Argentine AF needing more refueling
capability, plus better FQ weapons/radars, as necessary to cause some "major change in the results"? Could it be that I
think these "technical minutiae" were important to the outcome? You really need to work on the old reading comp. and/or
memory skills. Of course, if you don't bother to read the posts in the first place, as was apparently the case here, then
you're going to keep sticking your foot in your mouth.


> You have
> implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
> manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
> May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
> them, and even less later. More to follow.

I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM (I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was
"maneuvering, positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think I've claimed otherwise, please provide a
cite.

> > We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
> > they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"
>
> Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
> We already know the Skyhawks did not.

According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May, with 11 launched (there were also 10 or 12 Mirage A/A
sorties flown. They'd moved 4 to Comodoro Rivadavia, 4 to Rio Gallegos, and kept four back at Mariano Moreno near Buenos
Aires). I've got the following specifics for 1 May, from that source and Mafe' Huertas "Mirage III/V":

Toro Flight, pilots Moreno/Volponi, t/o from Rio Grande some time after 0945Z (local time was Zulu - 4hrs), CAP (all Dagger
A/A missions carried 3 x 1,300l tanks, 2 x Shafrir 2, 250 rds 30mm. For reasons unknown to me they never carried 2 x 1,700l
tanks plus a 1,300l tank, which the Mirage/Dagger can do), intercepted by Kent/Haigh at 1125+Z, a/c merged with GCI on both
sides but neither side got tallies on the other despite both sides circling before breaking off (the Daggers using A/B).

Foco flight, Gonzalez/Bernhardt, t/o from Rio Grande about 1300Z, escort/cover for several Skyhawk flights, intercepted by
Harriers but results inconclusive again.

Ciclon flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from unk. base probably about 1600Z, escort/cover or possibly CAP, no contact.

Dardo Flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from San Julian ca. 1930Z, escort/cover for Skyhawks, contacts apparently nil.

Fierro flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from San Julian ca. 1940Z, escort/cover for Skyhawks, contacts apparently nil.

Fortin flight, Donadille/Senn, t/o from San Julian ca. 1945Z immedately following Torno, a Dagger strike flight
(Dimeglio/Faget/Roman), escort for Torno (Torno attacked Arrow/Alacrity/Glamorgan off Port Stanley, causing minor damage,
after first looking in Berkeley sound and not finding any targets). SHAR CAP got to within 5 miles of Torno on egress (the
3 Torno a/c were flying at 45, 23 and 33kft to make interception more difficult), but broke off the chase for fuel and
because Fortin was closing on the SHARs. Note that San Julian put up 9 out of the 10 Daggers (6 CAP/3strike) at the base
virtually simultaneously.

Rubio flight, Ardiles (his wingman developed technical problems and aborted on t/o, so he was a single rather than the pair
that Hale/Penfold believed), t/o from Rio Grande ca.1955Z, CAP, intercepted by Hale/Penfold, Ardiles made shallow dive from
33kft towards SHARs at ca. 20kft, fired Shafrir from FQ at Hale which apparently tracked, was shot down by Penfold ca. 2040Z
(F:TAW says 1941Z; there is a discrepancy in the times between sources, but assuming the t/o time is accurate then 2040/41
would be correct) while climbing and turning in A/B.

To cover the Mirage missions more quickly, on 1 May they dispatched either 10 or 12 sorties, each flight involving two a/c:
Fiera flight, Tablon, Limon, Dardo, Buitre* (Garcia-Cuerva/Perona, who'd also made up 'Limon'. *"F:TAW" says they were
Dardo, but also says that was one of the morning flights), and one other flight claimed but not identified in Mafe'
Huertas. after 1 May, it appears that the two remaining Mirages were withdrawn to Comodoro Rivadavia where they apparently
flew some AD sorties along the Andes, a/c being redeployed back to Rio Gallegos in early June to fly decoy missions.


> > Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
> > So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided
> > to throw in the A-A towel.
>
> But fuel restrictions prevented the fighters from manuevering
> much in the first place (and they did not) and that's the main
> fact that you keep ignoring.

As I pointed out above in my quote from my previous post, I'm not ignoring it. There was virtually no developed ACM in the
war, a point that Sharkey also makes. But so what? No one wants to maneuver; they want to kill on the first pass and haul
ass.

> All they did is take a few potshots,
> with little actual manuevering, positioning and set-up for shots.

True for both sides. The SHARs typically made (at most) one 180 deg. turn onto the target's tail and fired, which is the
way most kills have been scored in air combat since it began.

> At least one missile was fired out of range, at least one was
> fired way out of its envelope, and at least one misfired and
> tumbled off its launch rail.

Most of the "missiles" claimed fired on 1 May by Argentine pilots, including the tumbler, were actually drop tanks. The
Fuerza Aerea states one of their Mirages launched an R.530, and Ardiles seems to have launched a Shafrir. There may have
been a couple of other launches they weren't admitting, but not many.

> If you think that the Argentine fighters had enough gas to do
> ACM in better quality and quantity, you'll have to prove it.

Again, I've never claimed anything of the sort, any more than I've claimed that the SHARs typically had enough fuel to do
so. Both sides were seriously fuel constrained. The Daggers had fuel for about 3-5 minutes on CAP over East Falkland, but
that was enough to make a difference, because they knew when the strikes would be there too. The Mirages were even more
limited in time, but again, they knew when they had to be there. Only one striker was shot down that day, a Canberra that
was the victim of a good radar pickup while flying a bit too high. The other three a/c lost were CAP/escorts, and they
kept the SHARs busy so the strikers could get in and out without loss. Ardiles shouldn't have been there by himself, but no
doubt felt it was important that he go. Fortin flight may have saved Torno flight from a SHAR CAP; certainly the SHAR
pilots didn't want to get into an A/A hassle while low on fuel and a long way from the carriers.

> You'll also have to prove that their weapon systems were
> consistently functioning as advertised.

The fact that a Shafrir seems to have been successfully launched from head-on indicates that in at least in that one
instance, the missile worked better than advertised. The R.530 is almost unemployable from head-on even if everything's
working properly, and the Mirages never got into a position where they could fire a Magic.

> > > > >Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense,
> > > > >and it appears that they usually stayed home in case the British
> > > > >tried to bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard,
> > > > >ten-megaton explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and
> > > > >filed in the proper place.
> > > >
> > > > And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected
> > >
> > > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British
> > > bombs falling on Stanley airfield. : )
> >
> > Said what same thing?
>
> The part about the Mirages being reserved in case the British
> bombed the mainland, of course.

I'm aware of the claim, and of the claim that they were worried that Chile might start something. The FAA did sit alert on
their bases during that time, for both reasons, using both Daggers and Mirages. But on 1 May, they also launched a whole
bunch of A/A CAP/escort missions, versus none afterwards that were likely to contact the Brits.

> > > > Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
> > > > available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
> > > > had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
> > > > Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
> > > > holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
> > > > air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
> > > > in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
> > > > is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
> > > > missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
> > > > reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
> > > > on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.
> > >
> > > There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
> > > preposterous argument flows from another.
> >
> > In other words, you are unable to rebut
>
> Your interpretations are not based on facts -- the one about there
> being 'plenty of Daggers available for A-A escort',

I've detailed 12 CAP/escort Dagger sortie 'facts' on 1 May for you, above.

> and your conspiracy
> theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
> not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.

Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits
after 1 May, which is what they did.

>
> > > Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
> > > Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
> > > Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):
> >
> > Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from
> > another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine sources,
> > it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the
> > Junta's propaganda during the war.
>
> If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.

Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side, which he played no small part in achieving.

> Sharkey probably alienated every service he came into contact with.

Probably. He does come across as having a chip on his shoulder.

> His book is nothing more than a vanity piece designed to discredit
> all his enemies.

Which he does successfully in some areas, and less so in others. His opinion of Woodward as an ignorant, arrogant subdriver
who was clueless about AAW (and amphibious warfare) was shared by both Clapp and Thompson, although they tend to put it more
diplomatically.

> This is a man who entered a huge bureaucracy, only
> to be disappointed when he found that it was a huge bureaucracy.

So what? He did quite well in that bureaucracy, in the job he was well suited for.

> Even in the Epilogue of his book, Sharkey can't stop bitching; he
> simply returns to his favorite themes:
>
> 1) The RAF is evil -- they robbed the RN of everlasting glory.

Yes. It is tiresome.

>
> 2) The RN is evil -- they wouldn't listen to Sharkey either.

Not evil, just wrong. BTW, Woodward is on record, prior to the war, as being against the FAA having a fixed-wing element.

> 3) The MOD is evil -- they wouldn't buy more Sea Harriers.

Same comment. And I agree with Sharkey's analysis of the situation in the Falklands since the Brits built Mt. Pleasant
airfield. Without several days of warning, all the Brits have done is eliminate Argentine range/basing problems, because
there's no way in hell they can reinforce in time. The forces currently there aren't all that much stronger than NP 8901
was in 1982, and now they've got to cover not only Stanley airfield but also Mt. Pleasant. Sure, they've got Tristar
cargo/tankers now, and C-17s. But how long will it take them to get the spearhead battalion to the Falklands, once they
decide to go? At a block speed of 460 kts, which assumes non-stop from the UK (and is undoubtedly high), it will take a
minimum of 15 hours just to get there, assuming they just happen to have several tankers pre-positioned at Ascension so they
don't have to stop, which is unlikely. Figure two days as a very optimistic minimum with 3-4 more likely, to get a company
of troops from the UK, allowing time for the government to make the decision, the troops to get themselves organized and
their gear to the appropriate airfield (and the a/c to get there as well), tankers in place, diplomatic moves made to try
and find some place to land if the airfields are already taken when they get there (as they almost certainly will be), etc.
Not that I think an invasion is likely, but then neither did the FCO in 1982.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 21st 04, 09:41 PM
"Ian" > wrote in message >...
> "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> m...
> > Guy Alcala > wrote in message
> >...
> <snip>
> > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> > falling on Stanley airfield. : )
> >
>
> May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
> smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
> cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?



The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
bomb hit.

Guy Alcala
March 21st 04, 09:49 PM
DAN wrote:

> Hi Guy,
>
> I love your description of the events. Not having half of the time it would take
> to read the reference books myself, reading your excerpts is the next best thing
> :)

Glad you enjoy them, and I hope you find the time to do some reading yourself. I
tend to post long excerpts in hopes that people will find them so interesting that
they'll read the book.

> On whether the Brit pilots had experience against the Mirage:
> >Not the pilots with the task force, but again Curtis had some experience in
> >the back seat of one.
>
> IIRC the French helped out the Brats by specifically running a series of mock
> attacks with Super Standards and Mirages against the task force when it departed
> for the south.

I've read that, but not in any source (so far) that I'm willing to put a depend on.
Sharkey mentions ACM exercises between AdlA Mirages and UK-based SHARs while the
task force was on its way south, with the results forwarded to the task force.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 21st 04, 10:07 PM
Guy Alcala wrote:

<snip>

> To cover the Mirage missions more quickly, on 1 May they dispatched either 10 or 12 sorties, each flight involving two a/c:
> Fiera flight, Tablon, Limon, Dardo, Buitre* (Garcia-Cuerva/Perona, who'd also made up 'Limon'. *"F:TAW" says they were
> Dardo, but also says that was one of the morning flights), and one other flight claimed but not identified in Mafe'
> Huertas.

On further reading of Mafe' Huertas, the evidence for G-C and Perona being "Dardo" flight rather than "Buitre", as claimed in
"F:TAW", is stronger. On page 169, Huertas writes that Dardo launched at 1530, Buitre at 1553. He then says that "by 16:10
hrs, Buitre (Garcia-Cuerva and Perona -- their second sortie of the day) had reached the northern end of Pebble Island", which
is an impossiblity if Buitre's t/o time is correct, as Pebble Island is about 330-350nm from Rio Gallegos. No way they could
fly that distance in 17 minutes, but 40 minutes (which matches Dardo's t/o time) would work out nicely. On page 170, after
describing the shootdowns of G-C and Perona, he writes "Shortly after the dramatic end to 'Dardo' section, Buitre landed back at
Rio Gallegos without engaging the Sea Harriers", which also indicates that he switched the two a page earlier.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 21st 04, 10:37 PM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> "Ian" > wrote in message >...
> > "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> > m...
> > > Guy Alcala > wrote in message
> > >...
> > <snip>
> > > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> > > falling on Stanley airfield. : )
> > >
> >
> > May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
> > smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
> > cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?
>
> The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
> mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
> and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
> bomb hit.

One bomb from the Vulcan. According to "F:TAW", two 1,000 lbers from a stick of three
dropped by Bertie Penfold in a lay-down delivery on 1 May also hit, but given the shallow
angle and lack of height and speed (they were para-retarded), they just scabbed the runway
and were a relatively minor problem. They would have needed to use something like Durandal
or BAT to have a chance of cratering the runway seriously form that profile. IIRR, the
Brits did have to repair the scabs after the war, though. IIRR the details of the damage
found on the runway and the repairs required are in "The Falklands aftermath: Picking up
the Pieces" by Lt. Gen (ret.) Edward Fursdon.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 21st 04, 11:18 PM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message
>...
> Evan Brennan wrote:
> > The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
> > on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
> > the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
> > Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.
>
> I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out
> where you think I did.

But you said:
"they [Mirages] avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided to
throw in the A-A towel"

I said there wasnt' much ACM in the first place, for lack of fuel.
And, everyone but yourself agrees that the bombing by the Vulcan
influenced Argentina to reserve the Mirage for local air defense.


> Fuel reserves played a part

The main part, where Argentine fast jets were concerned.

Then there's the huge advantage of the AIM-9L on the British side;
then the prewar ACM exercises that gave the British an important
edge. Then there was the matter of the Black Buck raid that caused
redeployment of the Mirage. The Harrier itself was a lesser factor,
in comparison.


> weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played
> a part


The Argentine Mirage pilots felt they may have had a better chance
in a brief fight at high altitude, where their aircraft (but not
necessarily their missiles) had better performance. And better fuel
efficiency. But the Harrier pilots were unwilling to climb up there to
meet them.


> > You have
> > implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
> > manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
> > May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
> > them, and even less later. More to follow.
>
> I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM
> (I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was "maneuvering,
> positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think
> I've claimed otherwise, please provide a cite.


Well you did say the Daggers and Mirages "forfeited the match and gave
the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a
moral ascendancy over them" -- not because there was any question of
Argentine jets having enough fuel to carry out dogfights using their
inferior missiles.

To repeat, there wasn't much ACM anyhow but you seemed to be implying
that there was, and that it suddenly stopped mainly because of the
Harrier.


> > > We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
> > > they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"
> >
> > Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
> > We already know the Skyhawks did not.
>
> According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May,
> with 11 launched


Since when is '11' a "large number" of sorties?'. : )


> > and your conspiracy
> > theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
> > not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.
>
> Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other
> reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits after 1 May


This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


> > If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.
>

> Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side


I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

Guy Alcala
March 22nd 04, 05:10 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message
> >...
> > Evan Brennan wrote:
> > > The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
> > > on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
> > > the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
> > > Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.
> >
> > I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out
> > where you think I did.
>
> But you said:
> "they [Mirages] avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
> So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided to
> throw in the A-A towel"

Yes, I did, and they did.

> I said there wasnt' much ACM in the first place, for lack of fuel.

And I agree that was one of the issues. It still doesn't explain why the
fuel wasn't lacking on 1 May, but was subsequently.

> And, everyone but yourself agrees that the bombing by the Vulcan
> influenced Argentina to reserve the Mirage for local air defense.

I never said that it wasn't one of the factors (actually worries about Chile
seem to have been of equal if not greater significance). I question whether
such a decision would have been reached if they hadn't felt so totaly
outclassed by the Brits on 1 May. But again, even if they wished to hold
the Mirages back, the Daggers had the fuel to be effective. If they can
make it all the way to Port Stanley with 100nm on the deck carrying bombs
and 50 or so without on the way back, they sure as hell can get to the San
Carlos area using a high altitude cruise, with a reasonable amount of fuel
for CAP.

> > Fuel reserves played a part
>
> The main part, where Argentine fast jets were concerned.

Certainly a significant part, especially with the Mirages.

> Then there's the huge advantage of the AIM-9L on the British side;

Not a huge advantage, and one more psychological than practical, but it was
unquestionably there. As I've previously stated, the Brits would have won
just the same if they'd only had AIM-9Gs, with a slightly lower number of
kills and pK, and might even have lost a SHAR or two. Let's be clear here:
Do you think Argentina would have won if that had been the case?

> then the prewar ACM exercises that gave the British an important
> edge.

As far as being much better trained in general than the argentine pilots,
and having the confidence of knowing that they had beaten far better
aircraft/weapon systems than Mirages, I'd agree. As far as the limited
tests against the Mirage, I doubt that was all that important. It was
obvious that the Mirage would want to take the fight towards the upper right
side of the envelope, while the Harriers wanted to be closer to the lower
left. Since neither side got into fully developed ACM, the fine points of
each a/c's performance advantages/disadvantages were essentially irrelevant
-- it was sight, turn, shoot, repeat or bug out as appropriate.

> Then there was the matter of the Black Buck raid that caused
> redeployment of the Mirage.

Aactually, it appears that the redeployment may have been even less than I
supposed. Huertas says they flew AD sorties from Rio Gallegos throughout,
mainly over the Andes and around Tierra del Fuego, and provides an account
by the Grupo 8 Ops officer, Major Sanchez, who did just that. He mentions
that he returned once to Rio Gallegos from a decoy mission over the
Falklands that had lasted "more than two hours [not exactly short on
endurance there, although obviously they were avoiding combat], and as my
a/c was being refueled on the ramp I received an urgent scramble order, so
the refueling was cut short and I launched with only internal fuel."

If they could fly missions to East Falkland on 1 May and then again much
later in the month, all the while maintaining an AD alert commitment, they
clearly could have done so during the critical 21-25 May period.
Personally, I'd have been tempted to launch escort missions with Magics only
and three tanks, or maybe mix the older and newer Mirages, giving the lead
just an R.530 and two tanks (no Magics or O/B pylons/racks), and the wingman
two Magics and 3 tanks, to boost endurance. Worth a try.

But let's assume that the reasons given for not flying Mirage escorts was
based purely on the perceived Vulcan threat. That doesn't explain why they
didn't use Daggers as escorts.

> The Harrier itself was a lesser factor,
> in comparison.

Except that it was the Harrier that was shooting them down, and which was
almost as fuel limited as they were.

> > weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played
> > a part
>
> The Argentine Mirage pilots felt they may have had a better chance
> in a brief fight at high altitude, where their aircraft (but not
> necessarily their missiles) had better performance. And better fuel
> efficiency. But the Harrier pilots were unwilling to climb up there to
> meet them.

Of course they were unwilling; you don't fight where your opponents fight
best, but make him fight where you fight best. Both sides adhered to that
philosophy, which is why most of the combats on 1 May were inconclusive --
it's just good tactics, and Sharkey covers all of this in his rules 1
through 4 of the Layman's Guide. Where the Argentine pilots fell down was
in not applying Rule 5, especially after 1 May: "The fifth rule is to
approach every fight in a _totally_ aggressive manner but without ignoring
Rules 1 to 4. Under-confidence and a half-hearted approach never won any
battle, either in the air or the ground. The pilot's motto should always be
'You can if you think you can!'"

It's clear from comments by Zini, Rotolo etc. that the AAF A-4 pilots
considered themselves as good as lost if a SHAR spotted them, and the
Mirage/Dagger pilots seem to be in just about the same mood post 1 May.

> > > You have
> > > implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
> > > manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
> > > May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
> > > them, and even less later. More to follow.
> >
> > I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM
> > (I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was "maneuvering,
> > positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think
> > I've claimed otherwise, please provide a cite.
>
> Well you did say the Daggers and Mirages "forfeited the match and gave
> the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a
> moral ascendancy over them" -- not because there was any question of
> Argentine jets having enough fuel to carry out dogfights using their
> inferior missiles.

Yes, I did, which exactly describes the situation. The AAF Mirage/Daggers
had gone 0:3 on 1 May, and conceded the fight from that point on. The
Daggers at least had enough fuel to fight for a couple of minutes, although
they'd be dumb to do so if they could avoid it. Slashing attacks should be
the name of their game.

> To repeat, there wasn't much ACM anyhow but you seemed to be implying
> that there was, and that it suddenly stopped mainly because of the
> Harrier.

And to repeat, at no point did I ever say there was much ACM, nor did I
imply it. I said they stopped flying CAP/escort missions after 1 May,
conceding the A/A battle to the Brits. They did, end of story.

> > > > We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
> > > > they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"
> > >
> > > Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
> > > We already know the Skyhawks did not.
> >
> > According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May,
> > with 11 launched
>
> Since when is '11' a "large number" of sorties?'. : )

On 1 May, the AAF planned to launch 28 A-4 strike sorties, 6 Canberra strike
sorties, plus 10 Mirage and 12 Dagger escort sorties, a total of 56. The
actual totals were slightly different, as the Daggers launched some strike
sorties as well and the Mirages apparently put up a couple more. Only 35
sorties "reached targets"; apparently none of the A-4 sorties did, and only
three of the Dagger strikers. When you only launch 15 or so total Dagger
sorties on 1 May, 11 (12 planned) is a large number, especially when you add
in the Mirages. 21 or 23 out of perhaps 60 is a goodly total, and as a
percentage of sorties that did their jobs, it's far higher. Of course, if
you want to claim that 11 or 21/23 isn't "large" under any circumstances, I
suggest you check out how many SHAR sorties there were on 1 May, and then
remember that many of these would be sent up when no AAF a/c were present.

> > > and your conspiracy
> > > theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
> > > not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.
> >
> > Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other
> > reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits after 1 May
>
> This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
> authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
> strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
> that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
> mainland.
>

But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland, they returned to flying
missions to East Falkland later (while still sitting AD alert) , they just
wouldn't put the Mirages in a position where they might come into contact
with SHARs. The Vulcans were still at Ascension, able to attack any point
in Argentina.

> > > If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.
> >
>
> > Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side
>
> I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
> regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
Mirage/Dagger? 11:0. What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots
against Sharkey's squadron? AFAIK, they never flew against them when he was
CO, but 801 flew against far better a/c, and more than held their own. Do I
think this means that the SHAR is the world's greatest fighter and can never
be beaten by Mirages (or any other a/c), no matter who's flying them, what
weapons they have or what the tactical situation is? Of course not. I'm on
record repeatedly over the years repeating the favorite saying of a friend
of mine: "The most important factor in A/A combat is the quality of the
ejection seat baggage." Operational and technical factors can also play a
large part, as they did here. The Harrier can be beaten, just as any a/c
can be. But if you listened to the conventional wisdom before the war, both
the usual clueless pundits as well as numerous professionals who should have
known better said that the SHAR didn't stand a chance against the Mirage.
Sharkey said Bull****! (in the same way that Adm. Leach said that Britain
could retake the Falklands, when the Army and Navy CoSs along with Nott were
doing their doom and gloom bit), and he was right in the only arena that
mattered, that of actual combat. That's success.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 24th 04, 04:33 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
> > authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
> > strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
> > that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
> > mainland.
> >
>
> But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland


The facts prove that they did.


> they returned to flying missions to East Falkland later


Only a few.

Evan Brennan
March 24th 04, 04:49 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > > If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.
> > >
>
> > > Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side
> >
> > I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
> > regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )
>
> And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
> Mirage/Dagger? 11:0.


Troll. 2:0 is closer to the truth.

The Sea Harriers shot down ONE Mirage; and only ONE of the Daggers
they shot down was carrying "actual missiles". ; )


> What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots against Sharkey's
> squadron?


Maybe you should ask Sharkey.

Guy Alcala
March 27th 04, 10:33 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
> > > authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
> > > strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
> > > that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
> > > mainland.
> > >
> >
> > But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland
>
> The facts prove that they did.
>
> > they returned to flying missions to East Falkland later
>
> Only a few.

Nice to see you're now admitting that, in fact, they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland but did indeed continue to fly
missions over the Falklands, just as Grupo 8's Ops Officer Maj. Sanchez stated in the quote I provided. Just to drive the
point home, here's a quote from a source you seem to out a lot of credence in (which says a lot), Moro's "The History of the
South Atlantic Conflict", pp. 217-18, referring to the missions flown on D-Day, 21 May:

"The first diversionary mission [unclear if he's referring to Mirages or Lear Jets here] commenced at 0930 hours, and the
first attack squadron, code-named Nandu' (Ostrich) left the runway at 0944 hours [Guy Note: Apparently Southern Argentine
time, GMT-3, vs, the GMT-4 kept in Buenos Aires and the Falklands]. It comprised three Mirage-V Daggers. The mission:
attack naval targets in San Carlos Strait [Falkland Sound]. They were followed a minute later by the Perros (Dogs), backed
up, at 0953 and 0955 hours, by the Zorros (Foxes) and the Leones (Lions), flying identical formations on a mission with a
single objective. At 0956 and 100 hours, two flights of Mirage IIIs, _configured for air to air combat, screamed off to fly
top cover_."

Unfortunately, as a general rule these later escort/decoy missions were unproductive as they stayed up high, so the SHARs
ignored them and stayed low for the strikers. No combats resulted, but combat wasn't necessarily required, as long as they
could occupy the SHARs so that the strikers could get through. This didn't happen for the reasons stated above. The excuse
for the lack of aggressiveness from the Argentine side is that the Mirages couldn't come down low for lack of fuel. Let's
look at that claim again, delving once again into the technical minutiae you consider so unimportant.

The Mirages had an internal fuel capacity of 2,940l (777 USG), 470l (124 USG) less than the Daggers, so they were
undoubtedly more fuel limited. But they were even more fuel limited owing to decisions made by the Argentines themselves.
To start, with the strikers at low altitude and the SHARS likewise, there was absolutely no point in hauling around the
R.530. While it might provide some minimal threat at medium/high altitude, on the deck it was so much extra baggage,
especially when the Mirages had Magics available. Dumping the R.530s and replacing them with a 1,300l (343 USG) C/L drop
tank would have more than compensated (applying the rough rule of thumb for jets, that 1/2 of the fuel in a drop tank is
used to push the tank's extra drag, that provides 650l extra) for the Dagger's greater internal fuel load, and bought them
several minutes of endurance, even at low altitude.

But the even more basic point, which shows the whole Argentine claim about fuel limitations being the primary reason the
Mirages stopped challenging the SHARs as fallacious, is where the Mirages were based. Throughout the war, the Mirages
operated from a single southern airbase. The AAF fighter/strikers operated from 3 main bases during the war. From north to
south, they're San Julian, Rio Gallegos, and Rio Grande. Here are the distances from each base to Port Stanley, from three
different sources ("The Royal Navy and the Falklands War," "Falklands: the Air War" and the World Distance Calculator,

http://www.infoairports.com/freeservices/worlddistance.html

using the base lat/long. as given in F:TAW):

San Julian - Port Stanley: 395nm / -- / 410nm

Rio Gallegos - Port Stanley: 420nm / 428nm / 430nm

Rio Grande - Port Stanley: 380nm / 381nm / 384nm

Guess which base the Mirages operated from throughout, despite the range/endurance limitations which became apparent on 1
May. That's right, the one furthest from the Falklands -- Rio Gallegos, along with Grupo 5's A-4Bs. At a minimum, moving
the Mirages from Rio Gallegos to Rio Grande would have eliminated 80nm from the round-trip distance, up to a maximum of
92nm. Put another way, assuming the Mirages would be cruising at 8 to 9 miles per minute (480-540kts), basing them at Rio
Grande saves them 9 to 10 minutes of fuel. Applying the rule of thumb that fuel burn at SL is triple that at the
tropopause, that still gives them 3+ minutes of extra endurance at SL, and this is without dumping the R.530 and replacing
it with a drop tank.

If they couldn't put them at Rio Grande for some reason, they could move them to San Julian (and move the Grupo 4 A-4Cs to
Rio Gallegos if necessary. That's where the KC-130s were based, so that would make sense), and still gain at least 40nm of
endurance. The Daggers were based at San Julian and Rio Grande throughout, so it made absolutely no sense to put the
shorter-ranged Mirages at Rio Gallegos, and then complain about how fuel-limited they were. BTW, San Carlos is between 38
and 52nm closer to the various bases than Port Stanley is. So, the idea that unsolvable fuel restrictions were the major
reason behind the Mirages being unable/unwilling to get into combat with the SHARs after 1 May is manifestly false.

However, even if you still believe the Mirages were too fuel-limited to be effective, that still doesn't explain why Daggers
weren't used for escort/cover on 21 May and subsequent, as the vast majority of Dagger sorties were so tasked on 1 May.
Some might say that it was because every sortie was needed for strike, but what mattered wasn't the number of strike sorties
launched, but how many made it to the target. Forfeiting the a/a battle had several negative effects for the AAF; it made
the strikers sitting ducks if the SHARs caught them, caused many sorties to be turned away by the controllers because SHARs
were in the area, and allowed the SHARs to operate against the strikers with ever increasing confidence, worrying less and
less about potential threats from escorts. These limitations were especially critical on 21-25 May, when the AoA was still
being established.

The escorts don't have to shoot down a single SHAR to be effective, they just have to keep them busy and/or looking over
their shoulder so the strikers can get through. It wouldn't have taken much; even a single two-ship escort/low-level CAP
per strike mission might have made a significant difference. And even if the escorts themselves get shot down, that's still
preferable to losing strikers, especially the Grupo 5 A-4Bs. At least the escorts would have a good chance of running away
from the SHARs, something the A-4s generally couldn't manage without a big head start, or the SHAR being at the end of its
CAP time.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 27th 04, 11:21 AM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > > > > If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.
> > > >
> >
> > > > Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side
> > >
> > > I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
> > > regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )
> >
> > And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
> > Mirage/Dagger? 11:0.
>
> Troll. 2:0 is closer to the truth.

No, 11:0 is the truth, 3:0 against A/A tasked Mirage/Daggers, with the other 8 being A/G tasked a/c. And one of the latter
was the only Dagger to take a gunshot at a SHAR (if you believe Moro, a SHAR was shot down in this attack, which undoubtedly
comes as a great surprise to Captain Donadille, who took the shots, and Sharkey (or maybe Steve Thomas), who was apparently
the target. Thomas was hit by what is claimed to be 20mm fire from Port Howard shortly afterwards, suffering minor damage,
but you could at least postulate that this was really 30mm fire from Donadille, even if the damage isn't comparable and
Donadille was apparently nowhere near Thomas at any point during the fight. What we do know is that Moro's account on pg.
225 is entirely wrong:

"But, in one of the aerial turns executed by the pilots in the course of their dogfight, a British plane presented its
underbelly to Dagger No. 1 (Captain Donadille), which lost no time in pumping in a heavy stream of cannon fire. Apparently
the British plane, its fuel tanks ruptured, went down in the sea short of its carrier. Nevertheless, the day went to his
mates, for in the course of this action, all three Daggers were knocked out of the skies."

I see I was overstating things -- the above account isn't entirely wrong -- he did get the part about all three Daggers
being shot down correct.


> The Sea Harriers shot down ONE Mirage;

Plus one with an assist by the Argentine AAA at Port Stanley. That one was unlikely to be able to land safely, given holed
fuel tanks and damaged controls on a too short runway. After those two plus Ardiles' Dagger, the AAF forfeited the A/A
battle, leaving the SHARs nothing else to do but pick off the A/G-tasked Daggers and A-4s.

> and only ONE of the Daggers
> they shot down was carrying "actual missiles". ; )

Indeed, quite a change from 1 May, when 11 out of 14 Daggers were so armed. Oh, but that's right, they weren't tasked A/A
after that because they didn't have adequate range at low altitude. Apparently they had adequate range to make it all the
way to Port Stanley (not by the most direct route) from San Julian on 1 May, while carrying a pair of 500 lb. bombs and
flying the last 100nm or so inbound on the deck, plus a bit more during the return. But not sufficient range to carry a
pair of AAMs and the same external fuel load to the San Carlos area on 21 May and subsequent, a 50nm shorter radius, and
without having to make a 100+nm run at SL (after all, they want to attract the attention of the SHARs, so can hold off their
descent until arriving in the area). Yeah, who could possibly question that logic? Now maybe, just maybe, the drag of O/B
mounted missiles is so high compared to bombs mounted on the aft fuselage stations, that they really can't manage it despite
all the above. And pigs might fly, too.

> > What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots against Sharkey's
> > squadron?
>
> Maybe you should ask Sharkey.

Maybe you should, since you're the one who claimed that there had been such combats.

Guy

Guy Alcala
March 29th 04, 03:33 AM
Guy Alcala wrote:

> Evan Brennan wrote:
>
> > "Ian" > wrote in message >...
> > > "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> > > m...
> > > > Guy Alcala > wrote in message
> > > >...
> > > <snip>
> > > > British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
> > > > fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
> > > > falling on Stanley airfield. : )
> > > >
> > >
> > > May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
> > > smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
> > > cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?
> >
> > The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
> > mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
> > and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
> > bomb hit.
>
> One bomb from the Vulcan. According to "F:TAW", two 1,000 lbers from a stick of three
> dropped by Bertie Penfold in a lay-down delivery on 1 May also hit, but given the shallow
> angle and lack of height and speed (they were para-retarded), they just scabbed the runway
> and were a relatively minor problem. They would have needed to use something like Durandal
> or BAT to have a chance of cratering the runway seriously form that profile. IIRR, the
> Brits did have to repair the scabs after the war, though. IIRR the details of the damage
> found on the runway and the repairs required are in "The Falklands aftermath: Picking up
> the Pieces" by Lt. Gen (ret.) Edward Fursdon.

I've now retrieved Fursdon (btw, it's Maj. Gen. (ret.) not Lt. Gen. as I wrote) from a distant
library. He arrived via C-130 from Ascension in Stanley on 27 July 1982 -- here's the damage
the Royal Engineers told him they had to repair:

"The airfield at Stanley had been built by British contractors in the late Seventies to cater
for the short-haul Fokker a/c operated by Argentina, in fact by the [AAF], flying between the
Falklands and Argentina. Its runway was 4,100 feet long and 150 feet wide and designed to
Load Classification Number (LCN) 16 but was subsequently estimated, with an increased pavement
thickness, to be of LCN 30 standard.

"During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber and Harrier raids, and
had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shalow scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had
temporarily back-filled the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to continue to fly in C-130
Hercules transports right up to the end. They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.

"By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500 'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59
Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the northern half of the runway ready to accept the
first British Hercules on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing on a rough
runway during the war wouldn't be taken afterwards. One of the Argentine C-130s almost
crashed on takeoff during the war when a main gear wheel hit the corner of the
roughly-repaired Vulcan crater]. The craters had compacted 'fill' and were topped by sheets
of AM2 matting, secured by four-feet long steel pins, taken from a conveniently placed
abandoned stockpile brought to the Island in the early Seventies by Argentinians in connection
with a runway which was never completed*. The 'scabs' were effectively repaired with Bostik
276, which is a magnesium phosphate cement/fine aggregate mixture.

"The focus now turned on the southern part of the runway which included one huge crater made
by the RAF Vulcan's 1,000 lb. bomb. This alone took more than 1,000 square meters of the old
Argentine AM2 matting to repair. 'We were in fact really very relieved that only one Vulcan
bomb had actually hit the runway', said a weary Sapper.

"By 1 July No. 3 Troop of 11 Field Squadron had completed the repairs and the whole runway was
again usuable, but both the crater and the 'scab' repair areas called for constant monitoring
and maintenance. Nevertheless the reopened runway withstood a further 77 Hercules and several
hundred Harrier landings, operationally vital to the Garrison, before it was closed for
extension and complete re-surfacing on the evening of 15 August."

The upgrade was so that F-4s could operate from it, and involved using AM2 to cover the entire
runway and extend it to 6,100 feet, boosting the LCN to 45, adding five arrester gears,
increasing apron area five times, adding three dispersals with hangars, lights, power, fuel
etc. It was realised early in the war that this would need to be done, so materiel orders and
design had continued while it was still being fought. The runway itself was completed and
reopened for traffic on 27 August.

*Fursdon may be in error here. Argentina had built a short AM-2 matting runway at Hooker's
Point, to use while the hard surface runway was being debated and then built. However, during
1978 or 1979, high winds lifted the matting and essentially destroyed the runway. Ewen
Southby-Tailyour was in command of NP 8901 at the time the runway was destroyed, and describes
it in his book "Reasons in Writing." The 'stockpile' may have been matting etc. that was
salvaged, or it may have been left over from the original construction as Fursdon says.
Things tended to move slowly in the Falklands pre-war, so it's easy to believe that this stuff
could be sitting around for several years. Southby-Tailyour mentions that the Royal Marine
barracks at Moody Brook had been condemned as unfit for human occupancy, first in 1918 and
again in 1945, but was still in use with only minor repairs in 1982! The war finally
destroyed it.

Guy

Alistair Gunn
March 29th 04, 01:08 PM
Guy Alcala twisted the electrons to say:
> One bomb from the Vulcan.

Well it's pretty much typical (IMHO) of Evan Brennan to make much of the
solitary bomb hit from the (3?) Vulcan raids - the reasons for which have
been well covered in in smn before - however it did occur to me that it's
curious that he regards the Vulcan raids as ineffective, yet believes
that Argentina held its Mirages back for air-defence of the mainland.
(Where they worried about ineffective raids on Argentina perhaps? :-)

> [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing on a rough runway
> during the war wouldn't be taken afterwards. One of the Argentine
> C-130s almost crashed on takeoff during the war when a main gear wheel
> hit the corner of the roughly-repaired Vulcan crater].

I think another possible factor is the differing fuel loads for a C-130
doing Stanley -> Argentina, as opposed to Stanley -> Wideawake ...
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...

Guy alcala
March 31st 04, 04:31 AM
Alistair Gunn > wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala twisted the electrons to say:
> > One bomb from the Vulcan.
>
> Well it's pretty much typical (IMHO) of Evan Brennan to make much of the
> solitary bomb hit from the (3?) Vulcan raids - the reasons for which have
> been well covered in in smn before - however it did occur to me that it's
> curious that he regards the Vulcan raids as ineffective, yet believes
> that Argentina held its Mirages back for air-defence of the mainland.
> (Where they worried about ineffective raids on Argentina perhaps? :-)

He is a bit inconsistent;-) BTW, my ability to respond will be
limited for a few days. My 11 year-old monitor died Sunday evening,
going out in a blaze of glory. Well, maybe not glory, but let's just
say that seeing flames light up the computer case beside (and wall
behind) it convinced me that it was time for a replacement ;-)

> > [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing on a rough runway
> > during the war wouldn't be taken afterwards. One of the Argentine
> > C-130s almost crashed on takeoff during the war when a main gear wheel
> > hit the corner of the roughly-repaired Vulcan crater].
>
> I think another possible factor is the differing fuel loads for a C-130
> doing Stanley -> Argentina, as opposed to Stanley -> Wideawake ...

Possible, although the Argentine a/c were carrying much heavier cargo
loads into Stanley while going light on fuel. Fursdon, who flew down
from Ascension in July, flew in one of the probe and auxiliary-tank
modified C-130s. The forward part of the cabin was almost full of two
cylindrical fuel tanks, leaving just enough room on either side for
pax in the fold-up seats, while the rear was carrying cargo and pax.
It was also necessary for the a/c to tank twice on the way down, to
give them enough fuel in case they had to abort the mission for
weather and return to Ascension. The trip was about 14 hours one-way,
and one of the RAF loadmasters told Fursdon that one of the a/c had
required three round-trips before it was finally able to land at
Stanley, aborting over the airfield on both of the incomplete
missions. 28 hours straight in a Herc would tax just about any
passenger, and to have to do it three times in a short period would
definitely not be on my wish list.

Guy

Evan Brennan
March 31st 04, 06:26 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> One of the Argentine C-130s almost crashed on takeoff during the war when a
> main gear wheel hit the corner of the roughly-repaired Vulcan crater]


"Almost" crashed? How many Harriers have almost crashed?

Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports operated
33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
would like us to believe.


> "The focus now turned on the southern part of the runway which included one huge crater made
> by the RAF Vulcan's 1,000 lb. bomb. This alone took more than 1,000 square meters of the old
> Argentine AM2 matting to repair. 'We were in fact really very relieved that only one Vulcan
> bomb had actually hit the runway', said a weary Sapper.


Maybe you and Alistair Gunn should pass around a collection plate to
have the crater enshrined.

David Nicholls
March 31st 04, 06:32 AM
> Possible, although the Argentine a/c were carrying much heavier cargo
> loads into Stanley while going light on fuel. Fursdon, who flew down
> from Ascension in July, flew in one of the probe and auxiliary-tank
> modified C-130s. The forward part of the cabin was almost full of two
> cylindrical fuel tanks, leaving just enough room on either side for
> pax in the fold-up seats, while the rear was carrying cargo and pax.
> It was also necessary for the a/c to tank twice on the way down, to
> give them enough fuel in case they had to abort the mission for
> weather and return to Ascension. The trip was about 14 hours one-way,
> and one of the RAF loadmasters told Fursdon that one of the a/c had
> required three round-trips before it was finally able to land at
> Stanley, aborting over the airfield on both of the incomplete
> missions. 28 hours straight in a Herc would tax just about any
> passenger, and to have to do it three times in a short period would
> definitely not be on my wish list.
>
> Guy

It is fascinating that the only supply chain for spares to the task force in
1982 was to fly the spare part to Wideawake, then do the 28 hour round trip
by C130 (with multiple refuelings from Victors) to drop the part in a water
tight bag (and float) to be picked up by a RN helo and transfered to the
required ship!! It was of note that the maximum speed of the C130 was below
the stall speed of a Victor unless both were in a dive - so that's how you
refueled. The RN was kept fully operational in this manner with no ships
falling out of the line for lack of spares! It is a bit like invading Japan
from California with only the Midway airfield available in the middle!

David

Presidente Alcazar
March 31st 04, 07:59 AM
On 30 Mar 2004 19:31:11 -0800, (Guy alcala)
wrote:

>He is a bit inconsistent;-) BTW, my ability to respond will be
>limited for a few days. My 11 year-old monitor died Sunday evening,
>going out in a blaze of glory. Well, maybe not glory, but let's just
>say that seeing flames light up the computer case beside (and wall
>behind) it convinced me that it was time for a replacement ;-)

Typically spurious rationale advanced to justify further
slef-indulgent PC equipment purchases to a sceptical wife. We've all
been there. Extra marks for the flames though - very convincing
touch.

Gavin Bailey

--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

March 31st 04, 05:48 PM
(Guy alcala) wrote:

> 28 hours straight in a Herc would tax just about any
>passenger, and to have to do it three times in a short period would
>definitely not be on my wish list.
>
>Guy

I'll say!...we occasionally did it on Argus but that a/c is
designed for that kind of thing...bunks and easy-chairs etc.
--

-Gord.

Peter Kemp
March 31st 04, 11:40 PM
On 30 Mar 2004 21:26:39 -0800, (Evan Brennan)
wrote:

>Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
>> One of the Argentine C-130s almost crashed on takeoff during the war when a
>> main gear wheel hit the corner of the roughly-repaired Vulcan crater]
>
>
>"Almost" crashed? How many Harriers have almost crashed?
>
>Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
>facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
>1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports operated
>33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
>cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
>Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
>would like us to believe.

Don't talk tosh - Guy specifically stated that the runway was still
useable....

"The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled the five large craters,
enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up
to the end"

Neither did he leave out many facts in a detailed description of the
damage to the runway and the repairs to it.

SO you're the one doing the spin doctoring.......as usual.

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

Guy alcala
April 1st 04, 03:35 AM
(Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > One of the Argentine C-130s almost crashed on takeoff during the war when a
> > main gear wheel hit the corner of the roughly-repaired Vulcan crater]
>
>
> "Almost" crashed? How many Harriers have almost crashed?
>
> Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
> facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
> 1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports operated
> 33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
> cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
> Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
> would like us to believe.

Even, you really need to take off your dark goggles occasionally. You
might then have less trouble reading the portion of my post
immediately preceding the part which you quoted out of context, to
wit:

"During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber
and Harrier raids, and had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shallow
scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled
the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to
continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up to the end.
They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.

"By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500
'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the
northern half of the runway ready to accept the first British Hercules
on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing on a rough
runway during the war wouldn't be taken afterwards."

Which part of this, especially the note in the last sentence, did you
have problems comprehending?

> > "The focus now turned on the southern part of the runway which included one huge crater made
> > by the RAF Vulcan's 1,000 lb. bomb. This alone took more than 1,000 square meters of the old
> > Argentine AM2 matting to repair. 'We were in fact really very relieved that only one Vulcan
> > bomb had actually hit the runway', said a weary Sapper.
>
>
> Maybe you and Alistair Gunn should pass around a collection plate to
> have the crater enshrined.

Why would we need to do so? The only reason either of us mentioned it
was because you were referencing an anecdotal quote provided by Moro;
I merely provided the facts. How you get from there to our supposed
worship of the crater, I have no idea (or perhaps you think we're
claiming some great accuracy for the Vulcan, but I admit that I'm
unable to follow your convoluted thought processes, not having to
process everything first through an anti-British filter). BTW, what
crater? The runway has long since been shortened and narrowed, to
3,013' x 63' (from 4,100' x 150' pre-war, extended to 6,100' x 150' in
the immediate aftermath, until RAF Mt. Pleasant was opened in 1995),
presumably to make it less useful in a war while still allowing the
FIGAS Islanders to land at Stanley. The AM-2 etc. was packed up and
shipped off to the UK, there presumably to be warehoused in case it's
needed.

Guy

Guy alcala
April 1st 04, 03:46 AM
"David Nicholls" > wrote in message >...

<snip>

> It is fascinating that the only supply chain for spares to the task force in
> 1982 was to fly the spare part to Wideawake, then do the 28 hour round trip
> by C130 (with multiple refuelings from Victors) to drop the part in a water
> tight bag (and float) to be picked up by a RN helo and transfered to the
> required ship!! It was of note that the maximum speed of the C130 was below
> the stall speed of a Victor unless both were in a dive - so that's how you
> refueled. The RN was kept fully operational in this manner with no ships
> falling out of the line for lack of spares! It is a bit like invading Japan
> from California with only the Midway airfield available in the middle!

I've always thought that the RN could have really used something like
a V-22 COD in 1982. The ability to land vertically on a large number
of ships would sure make a lot of sense for those countries that can't
afford a CTOL carrier. KV-22 tankers would have really made things
sweet, because that would have allowed the V-22 CODs to land on many
ships midway between Ascension and the TF, or even land and refuel at
Tristan da Cunha'. If the a/c has to take off vertically, limiting
its fuel load, it can immediately top-off from the KV-22 (which would
also takeoff vertically from the same place), eliminating all that
tedious round-trip flying to and from Ascension by Victors and/or
C-130s.

Guy

Guy alcala
April 1st 04, 03:51 AM
Presidente Alcazar > wrote in message >...
> On 30 Mar 2004 19:31:11 -0800, (Guy alcala)
> wrote:
>
> >He is a bit inconsistent;-) BTW, my ability to respond will be
> >limited for a few days. My 11 year-old monitor died Sunday evening,
> >going out in a blaze of glory. Well, maybe not glory, but let's just
> >say that seeing flames light up the computer case beside (and wall
> >behind) it convinced me that it was time for a replacement ;-)
>
> Typically spurious rationale advanced to justify further
> slef-indulgent PC equipment purchases to a sceptical wife.

I will deny, to the last breath in my body, that my rationale is
spurious, that I'm being self-indulgent, and that I have a wife,
sceptical or otherwise. I have sedulously avoided such legal
complications, preferring my relationships to
be of a more informal (and non-legally-binding) nature ;-)

Guy

Evan Brennan
April 1st 04, 04:33 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
>> Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
>> facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
>> 1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports
operated
>> 33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
>> cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
>> Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
>> would like us to believe.

> Even, you really need to take off your dark goggles occasionally. You
> might then have less trouble reading the portion of my post
> immediately preceding the part which you quoted out of context, to
> wit:

> "During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber
> and Harrier raids, and had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shallow
> scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled
> the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
> shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to
> continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up to the end.
> "By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500
> 'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the
> northern half of the runway ready to accept the first British Hercules
> on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing
> They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
> to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.


So what? I said you did not mention the 33 flights by the C-130s. You
mentioned one specific flight in which a Hercules (supposedly) "almost
crashed".

I don't know how much plainer I can make it.


>> Maybe you and Alistair Gunn should pass around a collection plate
to
>> have the crater enshrined.

> Why would we need to do so? The only reason either of us mentioned it
> was because you were referencing an anecdotal quote provided by Moro;
> I merely provided the facts. How you get from there to our supposed
> worship of the crater, I have no idea


Your longwinded response and rather astonishing selectiveness towards
"facts" suggests otherwise. : )

Evan Brennan
April 1st 04, 04:51 AM
Peter Kemp > wrote in message >...
> >Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
> >facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
> >1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports operated
> >33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
> >cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
> >Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
> >would like us to believe.
>
> Don't talk tosh - Guy specifically stated that the runway was still
> useable....


But no mention of the 33 Argentine C-130 missions into Stanley or the
amount of supplies and personnel they carried. There was a remark
about one flight concerning a plane that almost crashed. This means
you are spin doctoring.

>
> "The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled the five large craters,
> enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up
> to the end"
>
> Neither did he leave out many facts in a detailed description of the
> damage to the runway and the repairs to it.
>
> SO you're the one doing the spin doctoring.......as usual.


You're getting petty now. Give it a rest.

Presidente Alcazar
April 1st 04, 01:28 PM
On 31 Mar 2004 18:51:14 -0800, (Guy alcala)
wrote:

>> Typically spurious rationale advanced to justify further
>> slef-indulgent PC equipment purchases to a sceptical wife.
>
>I will deny, to the last breath in my body, that my rationale is
>spurious, that I'm being self-indulgent, and that I have a wife,
>sceptical or otherwise.

For most unmarried men, the bank manager performs a similar function
when it comes to quashing fond dreams with the icy blast of stern
disapproval, backed by desolate financial reality.

> I have sedulously avoided such legal
>complications, preferring my relationships to
>be of a more informal (and non-legally-binding) nature ;-)

I should give an honourable mention to my brother at this point, whose
valiant attempt to infiltrate a new, ridiculously over-spec PC into
his house after a subtle re-badging of the casing with the label for
an entry-level workstation so narrowly failed to escape the eternal
vigilance of the domestic management.

Gavin Bailey


--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

Alistair Gunn
April 1st 04, 03:01 PM
Guy alcala twisted the electrons to say:
> The runway has long since been shortened and narrowed, to
> 3,013' x 63' (from 4,100' x 150' pre-war, extended to 6,100' x 150' in
> the immediate aftermath, until RAF Mt. Pleasant was opened in 1995),
> presumably to make it less useful in a war while still allowing the
> FIGAS Islanders to land at Stanley.

One wonders if someone thought to include the odd piece of explosive
under what's left of the runway - "just in case" you understand ...

Afterall, it was bad enough the RAF having to go round the Vulcan
preservation groups borrowing pieces of equipment (mostly relating to the
refuelling probe) - if Argentina has another go, they'd have to go and
borrow entire Vulcans! <grins>
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...

Peter Twydell
April 1st 04, 06:21 PM
In article >, Presidente
Alcazar > writes
>On 31 Mar 2004 18:51:14 -0800, (Guy alcala)
>wrote:
>
>>> Typically spurious rationale advanced to justify further
>>> slef-indulgent PC equipment purchases to a sceptical wife.
>>
>>I will deny, to the last breath in my body, that my rationale is
>>spurious, that I'm being self-indulgent, and that I have a wife,
>>sceptical or otherwise.
>
>For most unmarried men, the bank manager performs a similar function
>when it comes to quashing fond dreams with the icy blast of stern
>disapproval, backed by desolate financial reality.
>
>> I have sedulously avoided such legal
>>complications, preferring my relationships to
>>be of a more informal (and non-legally-binding) nature ;-)
>
>I should give an honourable mention to my brother at this point, whose
>valiant attempt to infiltrate a new, ridiculously over-spec PC into
>his house after a subtle re-badging of the casing with the label for
>an entry-level workstation so narrowly failed to escape the eternal
>vigilance of the domestic management.
>
>Gavin Bailey
>
>
>--
>
>Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
>Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
>than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

You chaps have got it all wrong!

SWMBO relies on her PC for her work (as I do on mine), so it has to be
reasonably fast. She's also heavily into digital photography, so needs
plenty of power for that. Her latest idea is a digital camcorder (first
grandbrat on the way), so even more oomph will be needed for editing. I
just need to convince her that she needs the GBP 750 one, not the GBP
250 type. Extensive testing at Duxford will be called for.

My PC is a tad slower, but has the memory for scanning.

Last monitor that failed on me just emitted a plume of smoke and a nasty
smell, but no flames, I'm glad to say.

So no problems with SWMBO on the PC front, but aviation books are
another matter...
--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

Peter Kemp
April 1st 04, 11:45 PM
On 31 Mar 2004 19:51:21 -0800, (Evan Brennan)
wrote:

>Peter Kemp > wrote in message >...
>> >Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
>> >facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
>> >1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports operated
>> >33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
>> >cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
>> >Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
>> >would like us to believe.
>>
>> Don't talk tosh - Guy specifically stated that the runway was still
>> useable....
>
>
>But no mention of the 33 Argentine C-130 missions into Stanley or the
>amount of supplies and personnel they carried.

>> "The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled the five large craters,
>> enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up
>> to the end"

Seems to mention multiple Hercules flights to me, but not the number
33 or the amount of cargo carried in and out. IF those figures are
*so* important to you, I'd suggest you were the one being petty.

>There was a remark
>about one flight concerning a plane that almost crashed. This means
>you are spin doctoring.

S******.....
---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

Guy alcala
April 2nd 04, 05:53 AM
(Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> >> Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
> >> facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
> >> 1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports
> operated
> >> 33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
> >> cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
> >> Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
> >> would like us to believe.
>
> > Even, you really need to take off your dark goggles occasionally. You
> > might then have less trouble reading the portion of my post
> > immediately preceding the part which you quoted out of context, to
> > wit:
>
> > "During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber
> > and Harrier raids, and had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shallow
> > scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled
> > the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
> > shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to
> > continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up to the end.
> > "By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500
> > 'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the
> > northern half of the runway ready to accept the first British Hercules
> > on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing
> > They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
> > to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.
>
>
> So what? I said you did not mention the 33 flights by the C-130s. You
> mentioned one specific flight in which a Hercules (supposedly) "almost
> crashed".

Oh, please. What exactly did you think I was referring to when I
wrote "The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled the five large
craters . . . enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules
transports right up to the end"? I also didn't specifically mention
the numerous flights by Fokker Fellowships and Friendships as well as
the CANA Electras which also continued to fly in during the war, which
Moro never mentions. As it happens, one of the navy's Electras
appears to have been the last a/c to land at Stanley with a load from
the mainland and then return.

> I don't know how much plainer I can make it.

Nor do I, but it appears no matter how plainly I make it, you'll still
ignore any parts which disagree with your biases.


> >> Maybe you and Alistair Gunn should pass around a collection plate
> to
> >> have the crater enshrined.
>
> > Why would we need to do so? The only reason either of us mentioned it
> > was because you were referencing an anecdotal quote provided by Moro;
> > I merely provided the facts. How you get from there to our supposed
> > worship of the crater, I have no idea
>
>
> Your longwinded response and rather astonishing selectiveness towards
> "facts" suggests otherwise. : )

Oh, you mean like where the facts I selected were the actual damage
repairs the runway required, rather than relying on an anecdotal quote
from a highly-biased source like Moro, as you apparently do? But
here's your chance to dazzle us with your analytical skills, and show
us that you're trying to be objective. You have Moro, and from
references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:

1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
(Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
16" on the ship),

2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
Sound when attacked,

3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
been hit by a British air attack,

4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?

Using just those three sources, you have enough info to conclusively
prove or disprove the first three of Moro's claims, and can easily
argue the other based on basic physical phenomena. I don't have Moro
handy at the moment, but I think he discusses this attack around page
296, and you'll especially want to pay attention to the photos showing
what is stated in "Air War South Atlantic" to be during and
post-attack photos of HMS Plymouth," especially the frame from the gun
camera of one of the Daggers involved, as Moro claims that this is in
fact another ship entirely. I think they're between pps 172-173.

We await your reply. Please, everyone else hold off your comments
until we give Evan a chance to show us his prowess as an analyst of
the reliability of Moro's claims in this matter.

Guy

Evan Brennan
April 3rd 04, 05:41 AM
(Guy alcala) wrote in message >...
> (Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> > Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > >> Spin Doctor Guy Alcala has again left out a number of inconvenient
> > >> facts -- thirty-three inconvenient facts, in this case. Between May
> > >> 1st and June 13th, 1982, Argentine C-130 Hercules transports
> operated
> > >> 33 flights into the airfield at Port Stanley, carrying 434 tons of
> > >> cargo and 514 personnel. They also managed to evacuate 264 wounded.
> > >> Evidently, the crater was not quite the detriment you and the RAF
> > >> would like us to believe.
>
> > > Even, you really need to take off your dark goggles occasionally. You
> > > might then have less trouble reading the portion of my post
> > > immediately preceding the part which you quoted out of context, to
> > > wit:
>
> > > "During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber
> > > and Harrier raids, and had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shallow
> > > scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled
> > > the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
> > > shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to
> > > continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports right up to the end.
> > > "By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500
> > > 'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59 Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the
> > > northern half of the runway ready to accept the first British Hercules
> > > on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing
> > > They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
> > > to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.
> >
> >
> > So what? I said you did not mention the 33 flights by the C-130s. You
> > mentioned one specific flight in which a Hercules (supposedly) "almost
> > crashed".
>
> Oh, please. What exactly did you think I was referring to when I
> wrote "The Argentinians had temporarily back-filled the five large
> craters . . . enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules
> transports right up to the end"? I also didn't specifically mention
> the numerous flights by Fokker Fellowships and Friendships as well as
> the CANA Electras which also continued to fly in during the war, which
> Moro never mentions. As it happens, one of the navy's Electras
> appears to have been the last a/c to land at Stanley with a load from
> the mainland and then return.
>
> > I don't know how much plainer I can make it.
>
> Nor do I, but it appears no matter how plainly I make it, you'll still
> ignore any parts which disagree with your biases.
>
>
> > >> Maybe you and Alistair Gunn should pass around a collection plate
> to
> > >> have the crater enshrined.
>
> > > Why would we need to do so? The only reason either of us mentioned it
> > > was because you were referencing an anecdotal quote provided by Moro;
> > > I merely provided the facts. How you get from there to our supposed
> > > worship of the crater, I have no idea
> >
> >
> > Your longwinded response and rather astonishing selectiveness towards
> > "facts" suggests otherwise. : )
>
> Oh, you mean like where the facts I selected were the actual damage
> repairs the runway required, rather than relying on an anecdotal quote
> from a highly-biased source like Moro, as you apparently do? But
> here's your chance to dazzle us with your analytical skills, and show
> us that you're trying to be objective. You have Moro, and from
> references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
> Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
> want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
> era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
>
> 1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
> (Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
> 16" on the ship),
>
> 2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
> Sound when attacked,
>
> 3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
> been hit by a British air attack,
>
> 4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
> Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?
>
> Using just those three sources, you have enough info to conclusively
> prove or disprove the first three of Moro's claims, and can easily
> argue the other based on basic physical phenomena. I don't have Moro
> handy at the moment, but I think he discusses this attack around page
> 296, and you'll especially want to pay attention to the photos showing
> what is stated in "Air War South Atlantic" to be during and
> post-attack photos of HMS Plymouth," especially the frame from the gun
> camera of one of the Daggers involved, as Moro claims that this is in
> fact another ship entirely. I think they're between pps 172-173.
>
> We await your reply. Please, everyone else hold off your comments
> until we give Evan a chance to show us his prowess as an analyst of
> the reliability of Moro's claims in this matter.
>
> Guy


(Guy alcala) wrote in message >...
> > Your longwinded response and rather astonishing selectiveness towards
> > "facts" suggests otherwise. : )
>
> Oh, you mean like where the facts I selected were the actual damage
> repairs the runway required, rather than relying on an anecdotal quote
> from a highly-biased source like Moro, as you apparently do? But
> here's your chance to dazzle us with your analytical skills, and show
> us that you're trying to be objective. You have Moro, and from
> references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
> Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
> want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
> era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
>
> 1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
> (Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
> 16" on the ship),
>
> 2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
> Sound when attacked,
>
> 3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
> been hit by a British air attack,
>
> 4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
> Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?
>
> Using just those three sources, you have enough info to conclusively
> prove or disprove the first three of Moro's claims,



You really are a pathetic goofball.

The British claimed that their surface-to-air weapon systems shot down
at least 52 Argentine planes, but only 20 were confirmed. And yet
you're still whining about Moro.

At least your usual incoherence and poorly aimed shots were especially
appropriate for April Fool's Day.

Guy alcala
April 3rd 04, 09:58 PM
(Evan Brennan) wrote in message <snip>

> You really are a pathetic goofball.

Ah, just as I suspected, you know you don't have a leg to stand on as
far as the facts go, so you result to ad hominem attacks.

> The British claimed that their surface-to-air weapon systems shot down
> at least 52 Argentine planes, but only 20 were confirmed. And yet
> you're still whining about Moro.

If ppointing out that Moro is a highly unreliable source is whining in
your book, then I'll happily plead guilty, especially since you seem
to base so many of your claims on verbatim quotes from him. Unlike
Moro, any historian who is actually trying to be objective accepts
that overclaiming happens on all sides in wartime, and that the only
losses each side can be _sure_ of during a war are their own. That
the British SA systems overclaimed during the war, claims which were
published in "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons" white paper, was
established quite early (1983) by Ethell and Price, and has been
accepted as fact ever since by every historian. Moro cites Ethell and
Price as a major source, and occasionally quotes from them, so he was
certainly aware of the appendix where they discussed the issue at some
length.

And yet, while discussing the British (over)claims in the white paper
(pp 325-326), rather than citing Ethell and Price as independent,
objective confirmation of his own claim that the number of shootdowns
were optimistic, he never mentions them. What possible reason could
he have for failing to mention this outside confirmation from
reputable historians, especially when he never hesitates to say that
he has confirmation of his many dubious (and often laughable) claims
from unnamed, unofficial sources in Britain? Let me suggest a reason:
Mentioning Ethell and Price's research confirming British SA
overclaims would establish their objectivity, and then might raise the
likelihood (indeed, certainty) in the reader's mind that the Argentine
side's SA claims, which Moro accepts at face value, were equally
overblown, as Ethell and Price list figures completely agreeing with
British admitted losses.

Unless, that is, you believe that the Argentine armed forces figures
for British a/c losses, as repeated by Moro, are accurate. Let's
review his claims for British a/c losses:

"1. According to official [British] sources -- 35* (11 fixed-wing and
24 helicopters)

"2. According to our own figures -- 66 (28 fixed-wing and 38
helicopters).

"3. According to unofficial British sources -- 77 (31 fixed-wing and
46 helicopters)."

*Ethell and Price and every other source I'm aware of only list 10
fixed-wing losses, 6 SHAR and 4 GR.3.

So tell me, which set of figures do you think is most accurate? If
you believe, as Moro does (or professes to), that the British engaged
in a huge conspiracy to cover-up the extent of their losses, then you
must believe in either no. 2 or 3. Unfortunately for Moro, no
reputable historian, including Ethell and Price, agrees with him.
Moro's claims are often ludicrously easy to disprove, often using the
very same sources which he used. Or rather, failed to use, either
because he didn't understand that the info was there, or because the
info disagreed with his own pre-conceived beliefs so he chose not to
use it.

Just taking a single case, do you believe that the Argentine defenses
round Port Stanley shot down four SHARs during the attack on the
airfield on 1 May, instead of the single SHAR damaged in the tail by a
20mm hit, admitted by the British?

Personally, I rate Moro as reliable when he's quoting flight callsigns
and t/o times, fairly reliable when he's describing what the AAF
believed was going on during the war, and very unreliable when he's
making the numerous overblown and silly claims which permeate the
book. YMMV, and apparently does.

Once again, I give you the opportunity to show us your analytical
skills as to Moro's reliability, on just one of his many controversial
claims, and one easily proved or disproved from the very sources that
Moro used. To repeat:

You have Moro, and from
> > references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
> > Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
> > want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
> > era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
> >
> > 1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
> > (Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
> > 16" on the ship),
> >
> > 2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
> > Sound when attacked,
> >
> > 3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
> > been hit by a British air attack,
> >
> > 4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
> > Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?
> >
> > Using just those three sources, you have enough info to conclusively
> > prove or disprove the first three of Moro's claims, and can easily
> > argue the other based on basic physical phenomena. I don't have Moro
> > handy at the moment, but I think he discusses this attack around page
> > 296, and you'll especially want to pay attention to the photos showing
> > what is stated in "Air War South Atlantic" to be during and
> > post-attack photos of HMS Plymouth," especially the frame from the gun
> > camera of one of the Daggers involved, as Moro claims that this is in
> > fact another ship entirely. I think they're between pps 172-173.

You can demonstrate for us that you're attempting to be objective
about Moro as a source, or you can confirm what we all believe, that
you'll accept any claim no matter how ludicrous, if it bolsters your
prejudices. We're pretty sure which path you'll choose, but go ahead
and surprise us.

> At least your usual incoherence and poorly aimed shots were especially
> appropriate for April Fool's Day.

Apparently every day is April Fool's day for you, but here's your
chance to take a break from that.

Guy

Guy Alcala
April 5th 04, 06:00 AM
Alistair Gunn wrote:

> Guy alcala twisted the electrons to say:
> > The runway has long since been shortened and narrowed, to
> > 3,013' x 63' (from 4,100' x 150' pre-war, extended to 6,100' x 150' in
> > the immediate aftermath, until RAF Mt. Pleasant was opened in 1995),
> > presumably to make it less useful in a war while still allowing the
> > FIGAS Islanders to land at Stanley.
>
> One wonders if someone thought to include the odd piece of explosive
> under what's left of the runway - "just in case" you understand ...

You might just still be able to land a Herc there under good conditions, by
day. Per AFPAM 10-1403, the minimum size runway for a C-130 in assualt
operations is 3,000' x 60'. At night on a wet runway, it would be extremely
dicey, although NVGs and a good ILS (or better yet ILS-quality GPS) approach
might make it possible. At the moment, there's only an NDB there, so the AAF
would need to bring ILS equipment with them.

Personally, I'd think that RAF Mt. Pleasant would have had appropriate
cavities designed in under the runway, but the problem would be getting
enough warning time to place the explosives. I assume that they wouldn't
normally be in situ, but I leave it up to Kevin Brooks or anyone else with
military engineering experience to say what the practice would be. It just
strikes me as breaking all sorts of safety regs, especially as Mt. Pleasant
is the sole APOE for external flights, the civilian LanChile flights from
Punta Arenas as well as the RAF TriStars from Brize Norton (via Ascension).
It is an interesting point, though. Having two airstrips nominally
compatible with Hercs, separated by 30 miles and with only a Company Group to
defend both of them, seems like a really bad idea, especially as the Military
Command and the Government are separated the same way. If they can't put
Stanley out of service (and are willing to do so, accepting that it could be
a false alarm), then the only reasonable action is to abandon it and just
defend Mt. Pleasant, in hopes that reinforcements can arrive from the UK in
time. But they'd pretty much have to be paras, because even if the Argentine
Army/Marines can't take Mt. Pleasant before the transports (let's assume
C-17s) arrive, they can certainly position soldiers with MANPADS, if not more
sophisticated systems, on all likely approach paths.

It's an interesting question as to just how Argentina would go about
attacking the Falklands now. I think their best bet would be to land SF by
sub, and then drop their sole Parachute battalion ("Regiment" in the
Ejercito) near/around one of the airfields, probably Stanley, and then
(assuming they've captured the runway in usable condition) bring in at least
one more battalion, or at least some heavy weapons/vehicles, by air. If they
could manage a simultaneous (with the para battalion) landing of a Marine
battalion by helo/landing craft, that would certainly be worthwhile. They're
in a lot worse shape now as far as amphibious ops than they were in 1982, as
they lack an LST/LVTPs, don't have a carrier, and are extremely limited in
ships with medium helo spots (and helo transport capability). They can move
LCVPs to the Falklands on one of the three civil transports they have under
charter, but they're hardly ideal as troop transports. Still, if the trip is
fairly short (i.e., from one of the nearby mainland ports), it might be
doable.

> Afterall, it was bad enough the RAF having to go round the Vulcan
> preservation groups borrowing pieces of equipment (mostly relating to the
> refuelling probe) - if Argentina has another go, they'd have to go and
> borrow entire Vulcans! <grins>

I think a GR.4 with Enhanced Paveway (LGB/GPS/INS) would do the job just
fine, although the crew would be getting more than a little antsy by the time
they finally landed back at Ascension;-) And the RN SSNs have Tomahawk now,
although I can't remember if they've got any unitary warheads or just the
bomblets.

Guy

Guy Alcala
April 5th 04, 06:18 AM
Presidente Alcazar wrote:

> On 31 Mar 2004 18:51:14 -0800, (Guy alcala)
> wrote:
>
> >> Typically spurious rationale advanced to justify further
> >> slef-indulgent PC equipment purchases to a sceptical wife.
> >
> >I will deny, to the last breath in my body, that my rationale is
> >spurious, that I'm being self-indulgent, and that I have a wife,
> >sceptical or otherwise.
>
> For most unmarried men, the bank manager performs a similar function
> when it comes to quashing fond dreams with the icy blast of stern
> disapproval, backed by desolate financial reality.

I'm a simple man, Senyor Presidente (how does one get a tilde over an n in
text-only?) I don't require the latest and most expensive, just what
works. As it happens, a friend knew of a friend of his who had a 17"
monitor he'd been meaning to get rid of, and who gave it to me. My old
monitor was a 15" and 17" is bigger than I need (my friend even offered me
his 22" monitor gratis as he's upgrading, but I have absolutely nowhere to
put such a behemoth). You can't get 15" monitors nowadays and besides, who
am I to look a gift in the mouth. Turns out the thing wouldn't turn on when
I got it home, so back to square one. And then, while I was out on a walk
this afternoon, not three blocks from my place I came upon a computer desk
with a NEC 17" monitor sitting on top of it on the curb, with a
hand-printed sign reading "Free" on a piece of cardboard. Hustling home I
got my car and brought the monitor home, plugged it in and connected it up,
and I'm back in business. It's not quite as clear as my old monitor, but
it works just fine, and the price was right. ;-) It's nice to live so
close to Silicon Valley and be surrounded by large numbers of people who
find getting rid of their "old", now worthless (for such is the pace of
change) but perfectly functional monitors to be a major hassle, and who ask
nothing more of you than that you take it off their hands. Now all I've
got to do is get rid of two broken monitors ;-)

Guy

Guy Alcala
April 5th 04, 06:23 AM
Peter Twydell wrote:

<snip>

> Last monitor that failed on me just emitted a plume of smoke and a nasty
> smell, but no flames, I'm glad to say.

Nasty smell is right. Long after I'd shut it off the smell was still very
strong, leading me to suspect that it was toxic and/or that there was some
insulation still smoldering inside. Since it was a bit cold that night, and
leaving the window and front door open to get maximum flow through was a bad
option, I finally just stuck the whole thing outside. I don't know what
kind of chemicals are in that stuff, but I know I don't want to breathe it.

Guy

April 5th 04, 08:32 PM
Guy Alcala > wrote:


> Now all I've got to do is get rid of two broken monitors ;-)
>
>Guy
>

Should have brought your broken monitors back and set them on the
desk there... :)
--

-Gord.

Drewe Manton
April 5th 04, 09:10 PM
"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in
:

> Should have brought your broken monitors back and set them on the
> desk there... :)
>

You're a bad man. A very bad man!

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Guy Alcala
April 5th 04, 10:26 PM
" wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote:
>
>
> > Now all I've got to do is get rid of two broken monitors ;-)
> >
> >Guy
> >
>
> Should have brought your broken monitors back and set them on the
> desk there... :)

Don't think it hadn't occurred to me;-) But I figure, considering
what the "new" one cost me I can certainly afford the minor
inconvenience of taking these two in for recycling/refurbishment.

Guy

Presidente Alcazar
April 6th 04, 09:08 AM
On Mon, 05 Apr 2004 21:26:21 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>> > Now all I've got to do is get rid of two broken monitors ;-)
>>
>> Should have brought your broken monitors back and set them on the
>> desk there... :)
>
>Don't think it hadn't occurred to me;-) But I figure, considering
>what the "new" one cost me I can certainly afford the minor
>inconvenience of taking these two in for recycling/refurbishment.

Au contraire. What you actually need to do is install them on a desk
in an art gallery, and give them a title like "The Destiny of Commuter
Hope - A commentary on the intersection of technology and society in
the 21st century". Don't forget to grow a goatee, though. And drop
the surname. Then flog it for ten thousand dollars as a challenging,
contemporary modern art installation.

Further valuable contemporary art pointers can be secured by ordering
my handbook for followers of my movement, "The Haroshivi
Post-Modernist Disruptivist Movement" (Emperor's New Clothes
Publishers, 2004). Send your cheques for $29.99 to "Contemporary Art
Schooling and Help" (or just "CASH" for short) at the usual address.
Remember, this reference book is not available in the shops.

Coming soon: "JSF: Military-Industrial White Elephant or Triumph of
21st-Century Conceptual Art?".

Gavin Bailey
--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

Guy Alcala
April 6th 04, 10:52 PM
Presidente Alcazar wrote:

> On Mon, 05 Apr 2004 21:26:21 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >> > Now all I've got to do is get rid of two broken monitors ;-)
> >>
> >> Should have brought your broken monitors back and set them on the
> >> desk there... :)
> >
> >Don't think it hadn't occurred to me;-) But I figure, considering
> >what the "new" one cost me I can certainly afford the minor
> >inconvenience of taking these two in for recycling/refurbishment.
>
> Au contraire. What you actually need to do is install them on a desk
> in an art gallery, and give them a title like "The Destiny of Commuter
> Hope - A commentary on the intersection of technology and society in
> the 21st century".

I haven't decided which I prefer among these three: "Man's crisis of
identity in the latter half of the twentieth century," "The Idiot in
Society," or "Archaeology Today".*


> Don't forget to grow a goatee, though. And drop
> the surname. Then flog it for ten thousand dollars as a challenging,
> contemporary modern art installation.

Just as long as I don't have to lie writhing on the desk in my underwear
while smearing myself with human excrement and rhythmically burping. I
draw the line at performance art ;-) But can't I keep the surname and lose
the first name? If a Spanish surname was good enough for Dali, it's good
enough for me.

> Further valuable contemporary art pointers can be secured by ordering
> my handbook for followers of my movement, "The Haroshivi
> Post-Modernist Disruptivist Movement" (Emperor's New Clothes
> Publishers, 2004). Send your cheques for $29.99 to "Contemporary Art
> Schooling and Help" (or just "CASH" for short) at the usual address.
> Remember, this reference book is not available in the shops.
>
> Coming soon: "JSF: Military-Industrial White Elephant or Triumph of
> 21st-Century Conceptual Art?".

Say, didn't you co-author "Semiotic Deconstruction of Social-semiotically
Constructed Reality"?

Guy

*Bonus points for recognizing the source of these.

Guy Alcala
April 7th 04, 10:24 AM
Evan has apparently declined my offer to analyse Moro's claim below for
accuracy (to absolutely no one's surprise), so to amuse myself I'll do so, to
show just how easy it is to disprove it, based on the technical minutiae that
Evan apparently finds so difficult to deal with.

For those who don't have access to Moro, here's his account of the Dagger
attack on June 8th, verbatim. My notes and interjections are in square
brackets, although I have resisted the temptation to make comments about
Moro's overly dramatic (for what purports to be a history) prose:

"The Mystery of the Frigate Plymouth.

"Just after all hell had broken loose in the wake of the A4-B [Sic. A-4B]
blitz [on Sir Tristram and Galahad at Port Pleasant], two formations of
Mirage-Vs Daggers, code-named Perro (Dog) and Gato (Cat), screamed in over
Pleasant Bay [False; they were over Falkland Sound, ca. 50 miles to the NW],
bristling with 500-pound bombs [some of the mission pilots agree, others say
1,000 lbers], gunners' trigger fingers at the ready on 30mm cannon. They bore
in from the west, and as they came in, they spotted a frigate in the inlet
that was going to great lengths to conceal its presence. But it proved to be
too late. The planes hugged the elevations around Pleasant Peninsula [False:
see above], then lunged for the prey, coming in at 30 deg. on both the bow and
the port side. Again bombs fell and cannons blazed as they made their attack
run over the hapless vessel, whose gunners cut loose with everything they had
in a vain attempt to drop their tormentors from the skies. The attackers
returned to base without a single loss [True]. Where had the British CAPs
been at the moment of truth? Something was strangely amiss with the Sea
Harriers [This inference is part of Moro's claim that both Hermes and
Invincible had been hit and damaged by AAF bombs/CANA Exocets, for which the
evidence Moro uses is even more tenuous than for this case].

"The wounded frigate turned and, making slow headway (three knots), left the
bay on an easterly heading. Apparently, four of the eight bombs hit the
ship's structure [True]. Initial reports from Great Britain indicated that
none of them detonated, but later reports from the same sources told a
different tale [False. None detonated, although one set off a depth charge].

"At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center
picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area [Sure, they did! See end of post].
There was no logical explanation for this, since there had been no Argentine
attacks in that area [False]. Then, unexpectedly [only to Moro], Hastings and
Jenkins revealed in late 1983 that the Rothesay class frigate Plymouth had
been attacked by Argentine aircraft (Mirage-V and A4-B) at the exact point
where radiation had been detected in Falkland Sound. A later publication
[also 1983 according to my copy] (Ethel [Sic.] and Price) re-states the
Plymouth's position at the same location.

"What really happened? British officials seemed to waffle in the days
immediately following the June 8 attack. Argentine analysts could be certain
only of the events reported by their own men: that a Class [Sic. Type] 12
frigate had sustained an attack in Pleasant Bay by air-launched 500-pound
bombs. This was confirmed by aerial photographs [he is presumably referring
to gun camera film from the Daggers rather than post-strike recon photos, as
no such missions were flown to the area]. Data provided on the attack against
the frigate [presumably the one supposedly attacked in Pleasant Bay] report
serious damage [overstates the case] by the bombs from the Mirage-Vs which had
not been revealed by the infrared radiation, thus agreeing with the original
British report [of the attack on HMS Plymouth in Falkland Sound] that the
bombs had failed to detonate."

"The process of deduction has enabled the following events to be surmised
[here's where he really steps off the edge into fantasy based on wishful
thinking]:

1. The frigate targeted by the Daggers in Pleasant Bay was similar to the
Plymouth. One of the Argentine pilots saw the Marks F-16 during the attack,
indicating that the frigate would be the HMS Diomede (similar to the Plymouth)
[we'll be back to this].

2. The Plymouth may have fallen victim to a mistaken attack by a Harrier
squadron flying cover against Argentine troops at Port Howard, under adverse
weather conditions and poor visibility [nice of him to admit that those were
the conditions].

"The Royal Navy has sought to explain the events by attributing to Argentine
Flyers 'an understandable navigational error,' which is not borne out
becauseof the distances involved and the pinpoint precision of the Mirage-V's
navigation system."

I then summarized these claims and asked Evan to analyse them, as follows:

You have Moro, and from[i]
> > references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
> > Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
> > want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
> > era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
> >
> > 1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
> > (Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
> > 16" on the ship),
> >
> > 2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
> > Sound when attacked,
> >
> > 3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
> > been hit by a British air attack,
> >
> > 4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
> > Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?

Okay, how long does it take to determine, using only the three sources I
mentioned above and which Moro certainly had available to him, whether his
claims are valid? Not counting the time to retrieve the books from the shelf,
library or what have you, I estimate between 30 seconds and one minute. Let's
start with the simplest part first - Moro agrees that Plymouth was attacked
while in Falkland Sound, indeed she was only a little way outside San Carlos
Water on her way to an NGS mission of West Falkland when she was attacked.
Numerous photos of her show her burning as she retreats back into San Carlos
Water, so her position is agreed by all sides.

Moro claims that the Daggers were absolutely sure of their position and
attacked a frigate in Pleasant Bay, and no Argentine attack, by Daggers or any
other a/c, was made on a ship in Falkland Sound that day. Further, he claims
that the ship attacked was a "Class 12" frigate, and that one of the pilots
saw "F-16" on the ship, indicating it was HMS Diomede. Let's ignore the
information (which Moro had available to him in "Falklands: The Air War") that
Diomede didn't deploy to the South Atlantic until well after the war was over;
for the sake of argument we'll assume that British claims to that effect are
all part of the big cover-up Moro charges the Brits with.

So, what proof do with have from the Argentine side as to what ship was
attacked by the Daggers that day? Their gunsight camera film, of course,
which Moro cites as proof. Fortunately for us, still frames of that film have
been widely released by the AAF and published in numerous sources, including
one photo in "Air War South Atlantic". And here's where Moro's claim falls
completely apart. The frigate in the Dagger gunsights is very clearly a
Rothesay class, of which only two were with the task force at the time,
Plymouth and Yarmouth.

Even assuming HMS Diomede was in the South Atlantic at the time, it can't be
her, because Diomede was a broad-beam Leander. The difference between the two
classes is instantly recognizable from the beam, which is the angle all the
attacks were made, as shown by the gun camera film. The photo in "AWSA" is
cropped so only the section of the ship from the turret aft to the funnel is
visible, but that's more than enough. Rothesay class ships have the funnel
just aft of the mast and raked slightly aft, the two forming a noticeable V at
the base. Leanders have the funnel well aft of the mast (guesstimating 30-50
feet), and the funnel is vertical not raked. In the gun camera photos, the
funnel and mast are together, and the latter is raked. In gun camera photos
available in other sources the other recognition features are plainly visible
- Rothesays have the weather deck stepped-down aft of the Limbo mortar, while
in Leanders the deck continues level all the way to the stern. Unmodified
broad-beam Leanders like Diomede have a mainmast aft mounting a Type 965
radar; Rothesays lack both mast (well, they have a sort of stump) and radar.
The ship in the photos has a stepped down weather deck, and no mainmast or
Type 965. In other words, the Dagger gunsight photos are conclusive as to the
ship type they attacked, and it was a Rothesay, not a Leander like Diomede.
Unless, of course, Moro wants to contend that his own side was participating
with the British in the great conspiracy to cover up British losses ;-)

What about the "F-16" one of the pilots believed he saw? British frigates and
destroyers had painted out their hull-side pennant numbers during the war (HMS
Yarmouth seems to have been an exception, as her port-side pennant number
"F101" is visible in photos taken while she was alongside the sinking HMS
Ardent), apparently leaving their pennant numbers only on the counter. As an
aside, the AAF released gun camera film of the Dagger attack on Broadsword on
21 May, where they apparently 'added' a pennant number, F08, to the picture.
Unfortunately for Argentine credibility, that number had last been used in the
1960s by HMS Urania; Broadsword's own pennant number was F88. Of course, the
Brits _could_ have painted a false pennant number on her themselves, but
normal practice was to just paint them out entirely, and besides, she could be
identified from her sister Brilliant by the difference in her funnel, number
or no number. This was definitely a case where they should have left well
enough alone.

Getting back on track, we know the ship wasn't Diomede (or any other Leander),
so how could the pilot have thought he saw "F-16"? I'll point out that the
attacks were made at speeds between 550-575 knots, at an angle to the ship,
the pilots were being shot at, and the ship was making quite a lot of smoke,
not exactly conditions conducive to reading a number accurately. And yet, the
pilot did a pretty good job -- HMS Plymouth's pennant number was F126, and the
photo of her at anchor in San Carlos Water shortly after the attack appears to
show that the '2' has been somewhat worn away. It's a bit hard to say for
sure because funnel smoke and possibly smoke from the fire is drifting across
the stern, making the number hard to see at all, at least in the print in the
book.

Finally, getting back to the "big coverup" theory of Moro, couldn't it be that
there were more Rothesays in the theater during the war than the Brits
admitted, and it was one of _those_ which was attacked in Port Pleasant? A
reasonable question, except for the gun camera photos and the numerous photos
taken of the damage to HMS Plymouth, immediately after the attack. In every
still frame I've seen of the attack on Plymouth, including the one reprinted
in "AWSA", a hole can be seen in the after end of the funnel about half way
up, made by one of the bombs (which passed through without exploding) of the
first Dagger to attack. So, we know that whichever Rothesay they attacked, it
will have that entrance hole in the funnel, and also show signs of the bomb's
exit on the other side. AWSA has three photos related to the attack; the gun
camera still mentioned above, and two photos showing the damage to Plymouth
immediately after she'd anchored in San Carlos Water shortly after the attack,
both of which, including a closeup of the funnel, show the hole in the funnel
and the damage made by the bomb's exit.

But maybe the ship was hit in Port Pleasant, then steamed around to San Carlos
Water? At the 3 knots that Moro claims, that would be quite a feat to get
there in daylight, as it's well over 90nm by sea -- even at 28 knots they
couldn't make it given the time the attack occurred. In short, the total time
needed to analyse and disprove Moro's claim, based primarily on evidence from
_his own side_ along with other sources he used, was considerably less than
the time it took you to read the above. And that ignores Commodore Clapp's
account (which hadn't been published when Moro wrote his book) that no frigate
was anywhere near Port Pleasant at the time, because Clapp didn't feel they
could add anything to the defense beyond a couple of 20 or 40mm guns, owing to
the short warning time and surrounding terrain that would prevent radar-guided
weapons from working; it would just be another target. Clapp also said that
he'd tasked Plymouth with a NGS mission against a target in West Falkland,
that he'd wanted her to stay inside the headlands of the entrance to SCW to
keep her inside the AA defenses, but her Captain had decided he preferred a
firing position outside it.

There are numerous other sources which Moro failed to use or didn't have
access to at the time, which just pile proof on proof as to the British
version of events rather than Moro's being the correct one. For instance,
what about Moro's claim that the Daggers couldn't have been in Falkland Sound,
owing to the pinpoint precision of their navigation system? While some French
built Mirage 5s had INS or Doppler nav systems, the Israeli-built Daggers
don't seem to have had anything like that at the time. Here's Salvador Mafe'
Huertas, who interviewed several Grupo 6 pilots, describing their fit at the
time of the war in "Dassault Mirage III/V":

"The equipment was fairly basic, with VOR, DME, ILS and an Israeli-developed
RWR . . . At the beginning of 1982, the FAA [Fuerza Aerea Argentina; I've used
AAF for them to avoid confusion with the British FAA] was working with the
Israelis on a plan to update and modernize its Daggers, but the whole scheme
was brought to an abrupt halt by the Argentine occupation of a little-known
group of islands in the South Atlantic."

This upgrade did eventually come about, known as the "Finger" program,
completed in several stages finishing up with Finger IIIB. It included an
INS. So it appears that the Daggers lacked "pin-point" navigation capability
at the time; even the best INS at the time would drift ca. 1 mile/hr, not
enough to put them in Falkland Sound instead of ca. 50 miles away in Port
Pleasant, but "pin-point" only in relative terms. VOR/TACAN is line of sight,
so that's out of the question on the deck even if they hadn't been well out of
range. Further indication of their lack of onboard navigation systems, if
that were needed, is provided by the following account of the mission in Mafe'
Huertas, describing the lead up to the attack:

"The five remaining a/c [one Dagger had suffered a bird-strike just after
take-off] were joined by Learjet TC-23 [Sic. T-23. Trasnports that were
primarily used or modified for cargo hauling added the 'C' after the 'T' --
the Lears were just plain 'T', as contemporary photos show] of Grupo 1 de
Aerofotografico, which would act as pathfinder, _using its state of the art
navigation system [Omega and INS] to guide the formation towards the
south-west coast of West Falkland_ [my emphasis]. From there, the Daggers
would establish a northwest heading towards Falkland Sound, intending later to
turn east, crossing southern east Falkland to make the attack from the west.
The weather began to deteriorate, and in order to avoid the worst of the low
cloud, rain and snow squalls, the formation deviated slightly from from the
planned route. Crossing Falkland Sound on their north-easterly heading they
were amazed to find the Type 12 frigate [actually Rothesay class, but they
were slightly modified Type 12s, the Whitby class], HMS Plymouth (F 126)."

Surprise having been lost for an attack in Port Pleasant, they decided to
attack her instead. Finally, we come to Moro's most ludicrous claim of all
regarding this incident:

"At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center [in Stanley]
picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area."

I wrote in an earlier post that this one could be argued (more accurately,
debunked) based on basic physical phenomena. I leave it to the rest of you to
evaluate the likelihood of some kind of IR sensor being able to detect a ship
on fire, when the detector is located at least 50nm away from the supposed
fire, with no direct line of sight to it (lots of several hundred foot high
hills in the way), and the weather is low cloud, rain and snow squalls, i.e.
lots of moisture in the air to absorb IR radiation and reduce the range to
near zero.

So, if any of you are tempted to read Ruben Moro's "The History of the South
Atlantic Conflict," you're now aware of the effort Moro put in establishing
the 'truth' of his more unlikely claims. Objective history, it ain't, but it
does serve to illustrate the mindset of nationalist partisans like Moro. He
reminds me of Venik, Mikhael Petukhov, et al., but at least Moro was an actual
participant in the war (he was a Lt. Col. at the time flying C-130s, possibly
including some missions into Stanley).

Guy

Lee Hutchinsom
April 8th 04, 09:35 PM
I don't know if its heplfull but a Workmate of mine served aboard HMS
Plymouth during the conflict and has in the past related to me this tale of
when they were attacked by the daggers, the bomb hits and the depth charge
being triggered - i guess something like this would tend to stick in your
memory!!

He also said something about them bringing down an A4. There is A4 wreckage
in the museum that the Plymouth now is.

I'll have to give him a call and see if he can give me a few more details

BTW HMS Plymouth is now part of the Historic Warships Collection in
Birkenhead UK along with HMS Onyx, a Diesel Sub that also took part in the
conflict.

Lee Hutch

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Evan has apparently declined my offer to analyse Moro's claim below for
> accuracy (to absolutely no one's surprise), so to amuse myself I'll do so,
to
> show just how easy it is to disprove it, based on the technical minutiae
that
> Evan apparently finds so difficult to deal with.
>
> For those who don't have access to Moro, here's his account of the Dagger
> attack on June 8th, verbatim. My notes and interjections are in square
> brackets, although I have resisted the temptation to make comments about
> Moro's overly dramatic (for what purports to be a history) prose:
>
> "The Mystery of the Frigate Plymouth.
>
> "Just after all hell had broken loose in the wake of the A4-B [Sic. A-4B]
> blitz [on Sir Tristram and Galahad at Port Pleasant], two formations of
> Mirage-Vs Daggers, code-named Perro (Dog) and Gato (Cat), screamed in over
> Pleasant Bay [False; they were over Falkland Sound, ca. 50 miles to the
NW],
> bristling with 500-pound bombs [some of the mission pilots agree, others
say
> 1,000 lbers], gunners' trigger fingers at the ready on 30mm cannon. They
bore
> in from the west, and as they came in, they spotted a frigate in the inlet
> that was going to great lengths to conceal its presence. But it proved to
be
> too late. The planes hugged the elevations around Pleasant Peninsula
[False:
> see above], then lunged for the prey, coming in at 30 deg. on both the bow
and
> the port side. Again bombs fell and cannons blazed as they made their
attack
> run over the hapless vessel, whose gunners cut loose with everything they
had
> in a vain attempt to drop their tormentors from the skies. The attackers
> returned to base without a single loss [True]. Where had the British CAPs
> been at the moment of truth? Something was strangely amiss with the Sea
> Harriers [This inference is part of Moro's claim that both Hermes and
> Invincible had been hit and damaged by AAF bombs/CANA Exocets, for which
the
> evidence Moro uses is even more tenuous than for this case].
>
> "The wounded frigate turned and, making slow headway (three knots), left
the
> bay on an easterly heading. Apparently, four of the eight bombs hit the
> ship's structure [True]. Initial reports from Great Britain indicated
that
> none of them detonated, but later reports from the same sources told a
> different tale [False. None detonated, although one set off a depth
charge].
>
> "At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center
> picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
> vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area [Sure, they did! See end of
post].
> There was no logical explanation for this, since there had been no
Argentine
> attacks in that area [False]. Then, unexpectedly [only to Moro], Hastings
and
> Jenkins revealed in late 1983 that the Rothesay class frigate Plymouth had
> been attacked by Argentine aircraft (Mirage-V and A4-B) at the exact point
> where radiation had been detected in Falkland Sound. A later publication
> [also 1983 according to my copy] (Ethel [Sic.] and Price) re-states the
> Plymouth's position at the same location.
>
> "What really happened? British officials seemed to waffle in the days
> immediately following the June 8 attack. Argentine analysts could be
certain
> only of the events reported by their own men: that a Class [Sic. Type] 12
> frigate had sustained an attack in Pleasant Bay by air-launched 500-pound
> bombs. This was confirmed by aerial photographs [he is presumably
referring
> to gun camera film from the Daggers rather than post-strike recon photos,
as
> no such missions were flown to the area]. Data provided on the attack
against
> the frigate [presumably the one supposedly attacked in Pleasant Bay]
report
> serious damage [overstates the case] by the bombs from the Mirage-Vs which
had
> not been revealed by the infrared radiation, thus agreeing with the
original
> British report [of the attack on HMS Plymouth in Falkland Sound] that the
> bombs had failed to detonate."
>
> "The process of deduction has enabled the following events to be surmised
> [here's where he really steps off the edge into fantasy based on wishful
> thinking]:
>
> 1. The frigate targeted by the Daggers in Pleasant Bay was similar to the
> Plymouth. One of the Argentine pilots saw the Marks F-16 during the
attack,
> indicating that the frigate would be the HMS Diomede (similar to the
Plymouth)
> [we'll be back to this].
>
> 2. The Plymouth may have fallen victim to a mistaken attack by a Harrier
> squadron flying cover against Argentine troops at Port Howard, under
adverse
> weather conditions and poor visibility [nice of him to admit that those
were
> the conditions].
>
> "The Royal Navy has sought to explain the events by attributing to
Argentine
> Flyers 'an understandable navigational error,' which is not borne out
> becauseof the distances involved and the pinpoint precision of the
Mirage-V's
> navigation system."
>
> I then summarized these claims and asked Evan to analyse them, as follows:
>
> You have Moro, and from[i]
> > > references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
> > > Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
> > > want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
> > > era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
> > >
> > > 1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
> > > (Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
> > > 16" on the ship),
> > >
> > > 2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
> > > Sound when attacked,
> > >
> > > 3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
> > > been hit by a British air attack,
> > >
> > > 4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
> > > Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?
>
> Okay, how long does it take to determine, using only the three sources I
> mentioned above and which Moro certainly had available to him, whether his
> claims are valid? Not counting the time to retrieve the books from the
shelf,
> library or what have you, I estimate between 30 seconds and one minute.
Let's
> start with the simplest part first - Moro agrees that Plymouth was
attacked
> while in Falkland Sound, indeed she was only a little way outside San
Carlos
> Water on her way to an NGS mission of West Falkland when she was attacked.
> Numerous photos of her show her burning as she retreats back into San
Carlos
> Water, so her position is agreed by all sides.
>
> Moro claims that the Daggers were absolutely sure of their position and
> attacked a frigate in Pleasant Bay, and no Argentine attack, by Daggers or
any
> other a/c, was made on a ship in Falkland Sound that day. Further, he
claims
> that the ship attacked was a "Class 12" frigate, and that one of the
pilots
> saw "F-16" on the ship, indicating it was HMS Diomede. Let's ignore the
> information (which Moro had available to him in "Falklands: The Air War")
that
> Diomede didn't deploy to the South Atlantic until well after the war was
over;
> for the sake of argument we'll assume that British claims to that effect
are
> all part of the big cover-up Moro charges the Brits with.
>
> So, what proof do with have from the Argentine side as to what ship was
> attacked by the Daggers that day? Their gunsight camera film, of course,
> which Moro cites as proof. Fortunately for us, still frames of that film
have
> been widely released by the AAF and published in numerous sources,
including
> one photo in "Air War South Atlantic". And here's where Moro's claim
falls
> completely apart. The frigate in the Dagger gunsights is very clearly a
> Rothesay class, of which only two were with the task force at the time,
> Plymouth and Yarmouth.
>
> Even assuming HMS Diomede was in the South Atlantic at the time, it can't
be
> her, because Diomede was a broad-beam Leander. The difference between the
two
> classes is instantly recognizable from the beam, which is the angle all
the
> attacks were made, as shown by the gun camera film. The photo in "AWSA"
is
> cropped so only the section of the ship from the turret aft to the funnel
is
> visible, but that's more than enough. Rothesay class ships have the
funnel
> just aft of the mast and raked slightly aft, the two forming a noticeable
V at
> the base. Leanders have the funnel well aft of the mast (guesstimating
30-50
> feet), and the funnel is vertical not raked. In the gun camera photos,
the
> funnel and mast are together, and the latter is raked. In gun camera
photos
> available in other sources the other recognition features are plainly
visible
> - Rothesays have the weather deck stepped-down aft of the Limbo mortar,
while
> in Leanders the deck continues level all the way to the stern. Unmodified
> broad-beam Leanders like Diomede have a mainmast aft mounting a Type 965
> radar; Rothesays lack both mast (well, they have a sort of stump) and
radar.
> The ship in the photos has a stepped down weather deck, and no mainmast or
> Type 965. In other words, the Dagger gunsight photos are conclusive as to
the
> ship type they attacked, and it was a Rothesay, not a Leander like
Diomede.
> Unless, of course, Moro wants to contend that his own side was
participating
> with the British in the great conspiracy to cover up British losses ;-)
>
> What about the "F-16" one of the pilots believed he saw? British frigates
and
> destroyers had painted out their hull-side pennant numbers during the war
(HMS
> Yarmouth seems to have been an exception, as her port-side pennant number
> "F101" is visible in photos taken while she was alongside the sinking HMS
> Ardent), apparently leaving their pennant numbers only on the counter.
As an
> aside, the AAF released gun camera film of the Dagger attack on Broadsword
on
> 21 May, where they apparently 'added' a pennant number, F08, to the
picture.
> Unfortunately for Argentine credibility, that number had last been used in
the
> 1960s by HMS Urania; Broadsword's own pennant number was F88. Of course,
the
> Brits _could_ have painted a false pennant number on her themselves, but
> normal practice was to just paint them out entirely, and besides, she
could be
> identified from her sister Brilliant by the difference in her funnel,
number
> or no number. This was definitely a case where they should have left well
> enough alone.
>
> Getting back on track, we know the ship wasn't Diomede (or any other
Leander),
> so how could the pilot have thought he saw "F-16"? I'll point out that
the
> attacks were made at speeds between 550-575 knots, at an angle to the
ship,
> the pilots were being shot at, and the ship was making quite a lot of
smoke,
> not exactly conditions conducive to reading a number accurately. And yet,
the
> pilot did a pretty good job -- HMS Plymouth's pennant number was F126, and
the
> photo of her at anchor in San Carlos Water shortly after the attack
appears to
> show that the '2' has been somewhat worn away. It's a bit hard to say for
> sure because funnel smoke and possibly smoke from the fire is drifting
across
> the stern, making the number hard to see at all, at least in the print in
the
> book.
>
> Finally, getting back to the "big coverup" theory of Moro, couldn't it be
that
> there were more Rothesays in the theater during the war than the Brits
> admitted, and it was one of _those_ which was attacked in Port Pleasant?
A
> reasonable question, except for the gun camera photos and the numerous
photos
> taken of the damage to HMS Plymouth, immediately after the attack. In
every
> still frame I've seen of the attack on Plymouth, including the one
reprinted
> in "AWSA", a hole can be seen in the after end of the funnel about half
way
> up, made by one of the bombs (which passed through without exploding) of
the
> first Dagger to attack. So, we know that whichever Rothesay they
attacked, it
> will have that entrance hole in the funnel, and also show signs of the
bomb's
> exit on the other side. AWSA has three photos related to the attack; the
gun
> camera still mentioned above, and two photos showing the damage to
Plymouth
> immediately after she'd anchored in San Carlos Water shortly after the
attack,
> both of which, including a closeup of the funnel, show the hole in the
funnel
> and the damage made by the bomb's exit.
>
> But maybe the ship was hit in Port Pleasant, then steamed around to San
Carlos
> Water? At the 3 knots that Moro claims, that would be quite a feat to get
> there in daylight, as it's well over 90nm by sea -- even at 28 knots they
> couldn't make it given the time the attack occurred. In short, the total
time
> needed to analyse and disprove Moro's claim, based primarily on evidence
from
> _his own side_ along with other sources he used, was considerably less
than
> the time it took you to read the above. And that ignores Commodore
Clapp's
> account (which hadn't been published when Moro wrote his book) that no
frigate
> was anywhere near Port Pleasant at the time, because Clapp didn't feel
they
> could add anything to the defense beyond a couple of 20 or 40mm guns,
owing to
> the short warning time and surrounding terrain that would prevent
radar-guided
> weapons from working; it would just be another target. Clapp also said
that
> he'd tasked Plymouth with a NGS mission against a target in West Falkland,
> that he'd wanted her to stay inside the headlands of the entrance to SCW
to
> keep her inside the AA defenses, but her Captain had decided he preferred
a
> firing position outside it.
>
> There are numerous other sources which Moro failed to use or didn't have
> access to at the time, which just pile proof on proof as to the British
> version of events rather than Moro's being the correct one. For instance,
> what about Moro's claim that the Daggers couldn't have been in Falkland
Sound,
> owing to the pinpoint precision of their navigation system? While some
French
> built Mirage 5s had INS or Doppler nav systems, the Israeli-built Daggers
> don't seem to have had anything like that at the time. Here's Salvador
Mafe'
> Huertas, who interviewed several Grupo 6 pilots, describing their fit at
the
> time of the war in "Dassault Mirage III/V":
>
> "The equipment was fairly basic, with VOR, DME, ILS and an
Israeli-developed
> RWR . . . At the beginning of 1982, the FAA [Fuerza Aerea Argentina; I've
used
> AAF for them to avoid confusion with the British FAA] was working with the
> Israelis on a plan to update and modernize its Daggers, but the whole
scheme
> was brought to an abrupt halt by the Argentine occupation of a
little-known
> group of islands in the South Atlantic."
>
> This upgrade did eventually come about, known as the "Finger" program,
> completed in several stages finishing up with Finger IIIB. It included an
> INS. So it appears that the Daggers lacked "pin-point" navigation
capability
> at the time; even the best INS at the time would drift ca. 1 mile/hr, not
> enough to put them in Falkland Sound instead of ca. 50 miles away in Port
> Pleasant, but "pin-point" only in relative terms. VOR/TACAN is line of
sight,
> so that's out of the question on the deck even if they hadn't been well
out of
> range. Further indication of their lack of onboard navigation systems, if
> that were needed, is provided by the following account of the mission in
Mafe'
> Huertas, describing the lead up to the attack:
>
> "The five remaining a/c [one Dagger had suffered a bird-strike just after
> take-off] were joined by Learjet TC-23 [Sic. T-23. Trasnports that were
> primarily used or modified for cargo hauling added the 'C' after the
'T' --
> the Lears were just plain 'T', as contemporary photos show] of Grupo 1 de
> Aerofotografico, which would act as pathfinder, _using its state of the
art
> navigation system [Omega and INS] to guide the formation towards the
> south-west coast of West Falkland_ [my emphasis]. From there, the Daggers
> would establish a northwest heading towards Falkland Sound, intending
later to
> turn east, crossing southern east Falkland to make the attack from the
west.
> The weather began to deteriorate, and in order to avoid the worst of the
low
> cloud, rain and snow squalls, the formation deviated slightly from from
the
> planned route. Crossing Falkland Sound on their north-easterly heading
they
> were amazed to find the Type 12 frigate [actually Rothesay class, but they
> were slightly modified Type 12s, the Whitby class], HMS Plymouth (F 126)."
>
> Surprise having been lost for an attack in Port Pleasant, they decided to
> attack her instead. Finally, we come to Moro's most ludicrous claim of
all
> regarding this incident:
>
> "At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center [in
Stanley]
> picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
> vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area."
>
> I wrote in an earlier post that this one could be argued (more accurately,
> debunked) based on basic physical phenomena. I leave it to the rest of
you to
> evaluate the likelihood of some kind of IR sensor being able to detect a
ship
> on fire, when the detector is located at least 50nm away from the supposed
> fire, with no direct line of sight to it (lots of several hundred foot
high
> hills in the way), and the weather is low cloud, rain and snow squalls,
i.e.
> lots of moisture in the air to absorb IR radiation and reduce the range to
> near zero.
>
> So, if any of you are tempted to read Ruben Moro's "The History of the
South
> Atlantic Conflict," you're now aware of the effort Moro put in
establishing
> the 'truth' of his more unlikely claims. Objective history, it ain't, but
it
> does serve to illustrate the mindset of nationalist partisans like Moro.
He
> reminds me of Venik, Mikhael Petukhov, et al., but at least Moro was an
actual
> participant in the war (he was a Lt. Col. at the time flying C-130s,
possibly
> including some missions into Stanley).
>
> Guy
>
>
>
>
>

Evan Brennan
April 9th 04, 01:28 AM
Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> Evan has apparently declined my offer to analyse Moro's claim below for
> accuracy (to absolutely no one's surprise), so to amuse myself I'll do so, to
> show just how easy it is to disprove it, based on the technical minutiae that
> Evan apparently finds so difficult to deal with.

[remaining drivel snipped]


By now, everyone who reads your posts must realize that it bothers you
to no end that your beloved Harrier shot down just two missile-armed
jets during the Falklands War...that their opponents had no reserve
fuel to dogfight even if they had carried missiles...that British
attempts to neutralize the airstrip at Port Stanley were, and still
are, worthy of criticism from their opponents and everyone else. Your
attempt to dismiss the substantial overclaiming of Argentine aircraft
by the British was also yawn-inducing, but not surprising.

Apparently all of this is a bitter pill for you to swallow, because
you make continous efforts to distract our attention from it with
longwinded posts of "technical minutiae", interspersed with petty
attempts to dicredit Ruben Moro, whilst propping up your hero -- the
self-righteous windbag Sharkey Ward -- who is arguably less honest
than Moro.

Basically, you are an expert at talking a lot but saying nothing.
Evidently, you have a tremendous surplus of free time not available to
the rest of us.

Guy Alcala
April 9th 04, 11:53 PM
Evan Brennan wrote:

> [remaining drivel snipped]
>
> By now, everyone who reads your posts must realize that it bothers you
> to no end that your beloved Harrier shot down just two missile-armed
> jets during the Falklands War...that their opponents had no reserve
> fuel to dogfight even if they had carried missiles...that British
> attempts to neutralize the airstrip at Port Stanley were, and still
> are, worthy of criticism from their opponents and everyone else. Your
> attempt to dismiss the substantial overclaiming of Argentine aircraft
> by the British was also yawn-inducing, but not surprising.
>
> Apparently all of this is a bitter pill for you to swallow, because
> you make continous efforts to distract our attention from it with
> longwinded posts of "technical minutiae", interspersed with petty
> attempts to dicredit Ruben Moro, whilst propping up your hero -- the
> self-righteous windbag Sharkey Ward -- who is arguably less honest
> than Moro.
>
> Basically, you are an expert at talking a lot but saying nothing.
> Evidently, you have a tremendous surplus of free time not available to
> the rest of us.

Oh, dear, Evan. I seem to have hit a nerve.

Guy

Presidente Alcazar
April 10th 04, 10:00 AM
On Fri, 09 Apr 2004 22:53:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Oh, dear, Evan. I seem to have hit a nerve.

Don't stop now - I'm waiting for Evan to conclude that the Argentines
really did sink Invincible. He provides hours of hysterical
entertainment at minimal cost. All you have to do is provide the
right Pavlovian trigger and he goes off like an Energiser bunny. I
suspect a bitter experience at the hands of a lover dumping him for a
Brit at some point in his early life.

Gavin Bailey
--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

Drewe Manton
April 10th 04, 11:19 AM
Presidente Alcazar > wrote in
:

> Don't stop now - I'm waiting for Evan to conclude that the Argentines
> really did sink Invincible. He provides hours of hysterical
> entertainment at minimal cost.

You aren't kidding! I've actually taken him out of my killfile just so I
can get both sides as Mr Alcala takes him apart bit by bit by bit with
the technical minutae Brennan appears to think so important right up to
the point where it destroys his argument (basically every time). I
actually had to check my history books at one point after reading a
Brennan post just to check that Britain did actually win that war! Still,
this thread appears to be dying now, so I suppose it'll be back into the
killfile with him shortly. . .

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Guy alcala
April 11th 04, 03:33 AM
Presidente Alcazar > wrote in message >...
> On Fri, 09 Apr 2004 22:53:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Oh, dear, Evan. I seem to have hit a nerve.
>
> Don't stop now - I'm waiting for Evan to conclude that the Argentines
> really did sink Invincible. He provides hours of hysterical
> entertainment at minimal cost. All you have to do is provide the
> right Pavlovian trigger and he goes off like an Energiser bunny. I
> suspect a bitter experience at the hands of a lover dumping him for a
> Brit at some point in his early life.

Much as I've enjoyed giving Evan the public spanking he apparently
thrives on, I think I'll give it a rest. My hand is getting tired,
and besides, there's so little challenge involved. It's rather too
much like shotgunning rabbits while they're staked out spread-eagle on
the ground - it's just too easy for anyone not an entrant in the
"Upper Class Twit of the Year" competition.

But I'm sure that, in another thread or another forum, others will be
willing to take up the gauntlet, and oblige Evan with the public
humiliation he craves. Judging by his last post here he's reached
levels of evasion, mendacity and belief that (all evidence to the
contrary notwithstanding) the truth is whatever he says it is. This
leads me to suspect that he has a new role model. If so, I must
congratulate him for his success in emulating John Tarver, a
(fortunately) rare achievement.

Guy

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